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Abstract 
 
Earnings management has captured the attention of researchers, because 
accounting earnings are considered to be amongst the most important indicators of the 
financial performance of a company, and this subject remains a fruitful area for 
academic research. As a result of the practice of earnings management, financial crises 
may occur in companies, resulting in weakening reliability and doubtful fairness of 
published financial statements. 
Previous studies have focused on earnings management and the factors that 
may affect earnings management practices. Likewise, the current study explores some 
of these factors, such as corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, and 
whether they affect earnings management practices in the financial reporting of 
industrial companies in the public sector in Jordan, during the period 2006-2015. This 
period includes 2 important events in the Jordanian context: The Corporate 
Governance Code, introduced in 2008/2009, and the global financial crisis in 2008. 
The current study has taken into consideration two periods: 2006-2008 (before the 
introduction of the Corporate Governance Code) and 2009-2015 (after the introduction 
of the Corporate Governance Code), to compare the results of this study, whilst other 
studies have considered only before or after the introduction of the Corporate 
Governance Code. Therefore, this study provides an analysis of the effectiveness of 
the code’s introduction. 
The current study has examined corporate governance mechanisms (ownership 
structure and audit committees) as control tools to ensure a firm's performance 
effectiveness, and to provide a way to monitor the behaviour of the managers. 
Additionally, the current study has examined corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
evaluated how it may be used as a mask to cover earnings management practices.  
This study has used discretionary accruals, derived from the Modified Jones 
and Modified Jones with ROA models, as a proxy for measuring earnings 
management. An ordinary least square regression was used to investigate the 
association between corporate governance mechanisms, CSR, and earnings 
management. The data was collected from 49 Jordanian industrial companies listed on 
the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), during the period 2006-2015.   
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The results have revealed that institutional ownership and earnings 
management were positively related at significant levels, whilst insider ownership has 
no effect on earnings management in the Jordanian industrial sector. CSR and earnings 
management were found to be negatively associated at significant levels. At the same 
time, audit committee and earnings management were negatively but insignificantly 
related.  
This study makes an important contribution to both the research literature and 
corporate governance practice. It facilitates discussion about the link between 
corporate governance mechanisms, CSR disclosures, and earnings management 
practices. Additionally, this research informs supervisory and regulatory authorities 
about the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, CSR disclosures and how 
they may be used to help avoid earnings management. This study assists the users or 
beneficiaries of financial reports to understand earnings management practices, and 
increase their awareness about this phenomenon. 
Keywords: Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, Ownership 
Structure, Insider Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Audit Committee, Corporate 
Social Responsibility, and Jordan. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background  
Annual financial reports of companies are considered to be an important 
information source for many parties, whether internal users such as managers, and 
employees, or external users such as investors, lenders, analysts, economists, and 
government. The Accounting Standards Board (ASB 1999) outline in the statement of 
principles: "The objective of financial statements is to provide information about the 
financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an enterprise that 
is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions". Therefore, to achieve 
that purpose, financial reports must be accurate, reliable, credible and clearly reflect 
the details of the financial performance of the company, and this, as a result, will 
contribute to high quality earnings reports. The quality of the earnings reports 
contributes to the ability of users to evaluate reported earnings in an effort to predict 
future earnings by the company, and represents the degree to which earnings reflect 
the true underlying economic effects (Melumad & Nissim 2009; Sepe, Nelson, Tan & 
Spiceland 2012).   
Standards setters, such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), list a number of qualitative 
characteristics that are required to achieve a high quality of financial reporting - these 
include relevance, faithful representation, comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and 
understandability. Although it is important to follow the standards when preparing the 
financial statements, the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) allow a 
degree of freedom to select reporting methods, estimates, and disclosures, that may be 
used to match the firm’s underlying economics. This flexibility provides opportunities 
for financial reports to be exploited by the management and reported profits to be 
manipulated (Levitt 1998). The prospect of exploitation activities increases when there 
are incentives for the management to manipulate the earnings to achieve specific goals 
(Dechow 1996; Holland & Ramsay 2003). The ability to exploit flexibility of GAAP 
may encourage managers in managing earnings. Thus, earnings management occurs 
when managers use judgment in the financial reporting to alter the financial reports 
(Healy & Wahlen 1999) to present a view of the company’s financial position which 
suits management’s needs. Earnings management and earnings quality have captured 
researchers’ attention (Ahmadpour & Shahsavari 2016), because accounting earnings 
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is considered to be one of the most important indicators of financial performance of 
the company, and this subject remains a fruitful area for academic research. 
In general, earnings management is defined as the influence of the company's 
manager on the information provided within the financial statements, for the purpose 
of misleading users wanting to assess the condition of the company (Nurdiniah & 
Herlina 2015). As a result of the practice of earnings management, significant financial 
crises have occurred in international companies (Enron, WorldCom, HIH, One-Tel, 
and Harris Scarfe), resulting in public perceptions of weakened reliability and fairness 
of the published financial statements. 
Previous studies have focused on earnings management and the factors that 
may lead to the practice of earnings management. Similarly, the current study explores 
factors such as corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, to examine 
whether they affect earnings management practices in the financial reporting of the 
industrial companies’ in the public sector in Jordan. Unlike other studies which have 
focused on earnings management in developed countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, UK, 
and USA), this study takes a case study approach focusing on a developing Jordanian 
market.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews some of the earnings 
management literature. Section 3 examines some of the earnings quality literature. 
Section 4 appraises some of the corporate governance literature. Section 5 reviews 
some of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature. Section 6 discusses the 
research motivation and justification for this research. Section 7 highlights the research 
objectives. Section 8 discusses the research problems and questions. Section 9 presents 
an overview of the research importance and the expected contribution of this research 
to literature and practice. Section 10 describes the gap existing in the literature. Section 
11 shows how the thesis’s objectives have been addressed through the study’s papers. 
Section 12 explains the structure of this thesis. Section 13 provides a chapter summary 
and conclusion. 
 
2. Definitions of Earnings Management 
Previous studies have provided several definitions for earnings management. 
For instance, Schipper (1989) defined earnings management as an intervention in the 
financial reporting process, to bring about personal interests, by selecting accounting 
methods within GAAP or by applying given methods in particular ways. Healy and 
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Wahlen (1999, p. 368) stated that: ''Earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports 
to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers''.  
Rahman, Moniruzzaman, and Sharif (2013) defined earnings management as 
control of accruals by the management, to manipulate earnings. Also, earnings 
management can be defined as the choice of accounting policies to achieve the desired 
result of financial reporting (Li, Rider & Moore 2009). One recent study defining 
earnings management, was by Nurdiniah and Herlina (2015), who have pointed out 
earnings management as intervening in or influencing the information in the financial 
statements by a company’s manager, for the purpose of deceiving the stakeholders 
who want to know the performance and condition of the company. 
Through an examination of previous studies defining earnings management, 
this study has defined earnings management as the exploitation of flexibility in 
accounting (accounting standards, GAAP and international auditing standards), which 
allows managers to choose accounting methods that serve their desires or to achieve a 
specific goal. The following section highlights that there are several incentives and 
motivations for managers to engage in the practice of earnings management.  
 
2.1 Incentives and Motivations for Earnings Management 
Previous studies have indicated several motives and reasons for why managers 
and directors manage earnings. Hashim et al. (2013) have reported that the primary 
motive for directors to manage earnings was to meet market expectations and to satisfy 
other parties’ expectations, rather than for their own benefit. Moreover, López-
Iturriaga et al. (2005) and Reitenga and Tearny (2003), have pointed out in their studies 
that earnings management may arise as result of the agency problem, in that managers 
manage earnings to improve their personal situation and interests. In addition, they 
may manage earnings to increase the company's share price in the market, reduce 
political and social costs, and enhance the company's credibility (Omar et al. 2014).  
Furthermore, Nurdiniah and Herlina (2015) summarised that there were several 
incentives to manage earnings, including the bonus motivation where the company 
owners promise managers they will receive a bonus if the companies’ performances 
reach a certain level. This provides an incentive to motivate managers to manage in an 
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effective way, and increase earnings in order to receive the bonus. Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) identified three main types of incentives for earnings management, namely, 
capital market expectations and valuation, contracts written in terms of accounting 
numbers, and political and regulatory requirements. 
As a result of these incentives and motivations outlined in this section, 
managers are able to engage in a variety of methods and procedures for managing 
earnings. Some of the most important method have been highlighted in the next 
section. 
 
2.2 Earnings Management Methods 
After discussing the incentives and reasons explaining why managers and 
directors may manage earnings, it is necessary to outline methods that managers may 
use to achieve their goals of manipulation of data and accounting figures. There are 
several methods managers resort to in order to manage earnings. The current study 
discusses some of the most important of these methods.  
Radzi et al. (2011) clarified that one method used by managers to manage 
earnings, is using the way accounting standards can be interpreted. This opportunity 
arises from exploiting the underlying flexibility in GAAP, and it is therefore difficult 
for outside parties to confirm whether changes in the application of accounting 
standards made by the company, represent manipulation, or the genuine application to 
present relevant and reliable financial reports. Rahman, Moniruzzaman, and Sharif 
(2013) hold the view that managers can use the flexibility allowed in GAAP to change 
reported earnings, without changing the underlying cash flows, which Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) call the use of administrative judgment in financial reporting 
“accounting profit management”. Consequently, managers can use the flexibility of 
GAAP and subjectivity in application of the accounting standards as a method of 
manipulating accounting numbers and managing earnings to achieve the desired 
objectives. Whether or not those objectives are to present more relevant and reliable 
information, or to manipulate the reports to present desired results, they are both an 
application of earnings management. 
Another significant method that managers may use to manage earnings are 
through the use of accruals management. Management of accruals may misrepresent 
financial information to users of financial reports, if they rely on the reports and are 
unaware of how the accruals are calculated. The accruals basis provides an opportunity 
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for managers to alter information within the financial statements, to generate earnings 
and results from the flexibility within the GAAP to choose accounting methods 
(Nurdiniah & Herlina 2015). Accruals are defined as the difference between earnings, 
and cash flows from operating activities (Dechow, Kothari & Watts 1998). Managers 
may use earnings management methods, based on an accrual basis, to utilise the 
flexibility contained within the accounting rules, and report earnings figures that meet 
or exceed the expectations of analysts (Li, Rider & Moore 2009). Previous studies 
have primarily used the accruals as a proxy to measure earnings management (Healy 
1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995). Total accruals can be split 
into discretionary and non-discretionary categories (Goel 2016). So, managers may 
increase or decrease the levels of accounting accruals (such as inventory, deferred 
revenue, payable, accrued liabilities, prepaid expenses, and receivables) in order to 
achieve desired profit and goals (Dharan 2003). Therefore, accruals can be used as a 
tool by managers to manage earnings or manipulate and change reported accounting 
figures. Based on discretionary accruals, managers are able to make changes to 
accounting estimates for certain accounts such as depreciation, production life, long-
term construction contracts, inventory, deferred revenue, payable, accrued liabilities, 
prepaid expenses, receivables, etc. This method provides managers with an 
opportunity to give manipulated estimates, but satisfy their desired outcomes and 
achieve their goals.  
Furthermore, managers are able to adopt different accounting methods to 
manage earnings, such as inventory valuation methods (e.g. FIFO, LIFO) (Cook et al. 
2012) as these methods has an impact on total assets, or delaying expenditures method 
by rotating expenses as capital expenditure and distributing to subsequent years or 
accelerating revenue recognition by recognising revenue in the current year, even 
though it belongs to more than one financial year are another. Some managers may 
also add fraudulent expenses or revenue or reduce retirement allowances (Betty et al. 
2002). Similarly, Rahman et al. (2013) explained that earnings management is an 
attempt by the management to influence or manipulate reported earnings using specific 
accounting methods, or to change accounting methods by recognising one-time non-
recurring items, accelerating expenses or revenue processes, or using other methods 
designed to influence short-term earnings.  
 Based on the above, managers may resort to a variety of methods to manipulate 
accounting figures and practicing earnings management. This may be done in order to 
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achieve several goals, as mentioned in the section on incentives, to practice earnings 
management, such as meeting market expectations and analysts' expectations, 
increasing their chances of obtaining bonuses or compensation or stock options, and 
responding to political and regulatory requirements. These methods may be difficult 
to detect especially for investors or users of accounting reports and financial 
statements, but as mentioned, previous studies have tried to find a clear measurement 
method to detect the practice of earnings management. This is further explained in the 
next section. 
 
2.3 The Development of Earnings Management Models 
A model is a representation of facts that belong to real or physical life, by using 
a number of meaningful symbols and simplifying what is complex (Kighir, Omar & 
Mohamed 2014). Previous studies have developed several models to measure earnings 
management, each model measuring earnings management by using a different 
method and a particular type of data. Examples of models used in previous studies, 
include the Healy Model 1985, DeAngelo Model 1986, Jones Model 1991, and the 
Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. 1995.  
In the current study, accounting accruals will be used as a method to measure 
earnings management activities. As mentioned previously, accruals are defined as the 
difference between earnings and cash flows from operating activities (Dechow, 
Kothari & Watts 1998). Accruals can be classified into non-discretionary accruals and 
discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary accruals are the modifications to the cash 
flows of the company by application of the accounting standards, while discretionary 
accruals are modifications to cash flows by applying flexibility allowed within the 
accounting standards, and are selected by the managers (McNichols & Wilson 1988; 
Schipper 1989; Rao & Dandale 2008; Isenmila & Elijah 2012). Accruals can provide 
managers with different techniques to manage earnings. Some studies such as Healy 
(1985), used total accruals to measure earnings management. Subsequent studies 
separated them into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals and used just 
discretionary accruals to measure earnings management, because non-discretionary 
accruals were considered to reflect non-manipulated accounting accruals items, which 
were out of managers’ control (Al-Fayoumi, Abuzayed & Alexander 2010). 
This section provides and discusses earnings management models (accruals-
based models). These models are the most common and widely used models, and they 
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are the strongest models to measure earnings management (Guay et al.1996; Peasnell, 
Pope & Young 2000; Bedard et al. 2004; Hamdan et al. 2013; Nour & Mattar 2015). 
 
2.3.1 The Healy’s Model (1985) 
Healy (1985) summarised the previous studies which tested the association 
between managers' accrual and accounting procedure decisions, and their income 
reporting incentives. He developed an accruals model to measure earnings 
management, relying on total accruals as a proxy.  However, there are some limitations 
in Healy’s approach. These limitations are mostly arising due to observing earnings 
after earnings management has occurred (Al-Masarwah 2015). 
 
2.3.2 The DeAngelo’s Model (1986) 
DeAngelo (1986) used a different method from Healy (1985) to calculate total 
accruals, relying on the average changes of discretionary and non-discretionary 
accruals.  
Healy (1985) developed an approach that used the firm's operating cash flows 
as a proxy for what earnings would have been, absent from managerial income 
manipulation. This approach has been identified as having several limitations, the most 
important of which is that total accrual contains both a discretionary and a non-
discretionary component, which may create a noise problem. The DeAngelo (1986) 
model sought to reduce this problem, by considering total accruals change in all current 
operating accounts, instead of only using operating accounts (e.g. depreciation, 
accounts receivable, income tax payable, deferred income tax, account payable and 
inventory) (Al-Masarwah 2015). 
Therefore, Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) have used total accruals as a 
proxy to measure earnings management, however total accruals consist of 
discretionary accruals (controlled by managers), and non-discretionary accruals 
(reflecting business conditions), and it is more likely for managers to use only 
discretionary accruals to practice earnings management. The reason for that, is it gives 
them an opportunity to choose the accounting methods and accounting estimates 
appropriate for their objectives, and furthermore, non-discretionary accruals are out of 
managers’ control. Previous studies have required separation of total accruals into 
discretionary and non-discretionary, and used discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management. Therefore, separation of types of accruals is a very important 
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issue for accurate results. This is further explained and clarified in the explanation of 
the following models. A review of the literature makes it obvious that the Jones (1991) 
and the modified Jones (1995) models, are the most frequently used by academic 
researchers for separating discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. 
 
2.3.3 The Jones’s Model (1991) 
Jones (1991) in his model proposed that the discretionary portion of total 
accruals should be used to capture earnings management. This was a departure from 
previous models which used total accruals to capture earnings management. Total 
accruals were calculated in the Jones’ version as the change in noncash working capital 
before income taxes payable, less total depreciation expense. The change in noncash 
working capital before taxes, was measured as the change in current assets other than 
cash and short-term investments, less current liabilities other than current maturities 
of long-term liabilities, and income taxes payable.  
Furthermore, Jones relied on the expectations model used by the DeAngelo 
(1986) model. One of the limitations of this model, is that it assumes that managers do 
not practise discretion over revenues, and this may lead to an error in determining the 
discretionary accruals when managers practise discretion in revenues. Another 
limitation of this model, was that it may provide a biased representation of accruals 
due to the neglecting of expenses (Habbash 2010). 
 
2.3.4 The Modified Jones Model (Developed by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 
1995) 
Dechow et al. (1995) studied the possible misspecifications in tests for earnings 
management, and their impact on inferences concerning earnings management. They 
used discretionary accruals to measure earnings management, and explained that the 
usual starting point for measuring discretionary accruals was the total accruals as stated 
in previous models. According to the modified Jones’s model by Dechow et al. (1995), 
total accruals (TA) are computed as the difference between earnings and cash flows 
from operating activities.  
They studied, summarised, and evaluated the prior models (Healy’s model, 
DeAngelo’s model, Jones’s model), then extended those models to develop the 
modified Jones model. They found that the Jones’s model and modified Jones’s model 
were the best in detecting earnings management, and the modified Jones model was 
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the most powerful model in detecting earnings management. This was because 
Dechow et al. (1995) used time series data to perform the research, and as this model 
was a modification of the Jones model, it has lower standard errors than the other 
models. This information means that the modified Jones model has better capabilities 
to detect earnings management.  
Thus, the Dechow et al. (1995) model when compared to other models, became 
accepted as the most powerful model for measuring earnings management. However, 
Choi et al. (2007) documented in their study a different perspective, proposing that the 
modified Jones’s model was not effective in measuring discretionary accruals for 
Korean firms. This was unlike many other studies, which agreed that the modified 
Jones’s model, proposed by Dechow et al. (1995), was a more powerful method to 
detect earnings management in both developed and developing countries, such as: 
USA, UK, Malaysia, Taiwan, and India, etc. (Islam et al. 2011). 
 
3. Earnings Quality 
Earnings quality is one of the most important characteristics of financial 
statements. It reflects current performance and is useful for predicting future 
performance (Black 1980). Moreover, Melumad and Nissim (2009) summarised that 
the most important elements illustrating the concept of earnings quality, include: 
stability, where high quality earnings exhibit low volatility over time, and enhancing 
predictability. Higher earnings quality means more accruals realised as cash (Dechow 
& Dichev 2002). In addition, higher quality earnings are earnings that represent 
faithfully the firm’s fundamental earnings process, which were relevant to a specific 
decision made by a specific decision maker (Dechow, Ge & Schrand 2010).   
Earnings quality is one of the most important concerns in the preparation of 
financial reports, and is reflective of the overall financial reporting quality (Bissessur 
2008). Therefore, the quality of earnings demonstrates the company’s financial reports 
in a manner which gives users of financial statements, the confidence to rely on the 
reports, the ability to evaluate the current company's performances, and to predict the 
future performance of the company.  
Different views come from previous studies in relation to earnings quality 
properties. Some suggest that the sustainability of earnings is a measure of earnings 
quality, and is an indicator of the relationship between current earnings and future 
earnings (Sloan 1996; Altamuro & Beatty 2007). Other studies suggest that the 
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indicator of the quality of earnings is that it is free from earnings management practices 
(Dechow & Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2002). Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) 
pointed out that previous studies have used different measures as indicators of earnings 
quality, including persistence, accruals, smoothness, timeliness, loss avoidance and 
investor responsiveness. Dechow et al. (2010) asserted that there is no one definition 
of earnings quality because ‘‘quality’’ is dependent on the context of the decision, and 
also it is a function of the company's core performance. 
Previous studies have found that the quality of earnings and earnings 
management have an inverse relationship, where earnings management leads to a 
reduction in the quality of earnings and vice versa (Healy & Wahlen 1999; Radzi et al. 
2011). This assertion will be further discussed in the following section. 
 
3.1 Relationship between Earnings Management and Earnings Quality 
Earnings management and earnings quality are two sides of the same coin 
(Azzoz & Khamees 2016), proposing that when earnings quality is high, earnings 
management is low, and vice versa. Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) assert 
that earnings quality can be measured by levels of earnings management. Williams et 
al. (2005), Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011), and Radzi et al. (2011) hold the 
view that earnings management is the most important determinant of earnings quality, 
where earnings management is considered a strong indicator of earnings quality. 
Therefore, prior research has demonstrated that earnings management has an effect on 
the quality of financial statements and usefulness of financial statements to users. 
  Earnings management and earnings quality are often used as interchangeable 
concepts. High earnings management can produce low-quality earnings, and 
information manipulation may lead to incorrect decisions (Healy & Wahlen 1999; 
Ahadiat et al. 2012; Azzoz et al. 2016). However, the lack of earnings management is 
not the only factor which can lead to a high quality of earnings, because other factors 
may increase earnings quality, such as capital market and management compensation 
(Lo 2008).  
Consequently, standard setters have sought to develop accounting standards 
that improve earnings quality and reduce earnings management, and many recent 
changes in audit, corporate governance, and law enforcement, have a similar goal 
(Ewert & Wagenhofer 2011).  
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The previous studies have given a great deal of attention to the factors that 
affect earnings management and earnings quality. The current study focuses on the 
most important influencing factors that may affect earnings management, which are: 
corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, audit committee) and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). These factors will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
4. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance plays an important role in controlling and monitoring 
management activities. There are a number of ways of defining corporate governance. 
The definition of corporate governance most widely used is "the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled" (Cadbury Committee 2012). Corporate 
governance has also been defined as the connection between the corporation and all of 
its stakeholders (Arsoy & Crowther 2008).  
Similarly, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD 2004) defined corporate governance as “The system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and 
spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing 
this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and 
the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance”. OECD (2015) 
pointed out that good corporate governance is not an end in itself, but it is a way to 
create trust in the market and business integrity, which in turn is a primary concern for 
companies wanting to attract long term investment and to maintain the confidence of 
investors. 
Therefore, corporate governance may be considered a system that includes 
rules, practices, policies, and processes for management, for the control and 
monitoring of companies. It is also a tool of control over companies, which monitors 
and supervises the rights and duties of stakeholders, such as shareholders, 
management, customers, suppliers, financiers, government and the community. Its aim 
is to achieve the company's and the stakeholders’ interests, and hamper the special 
interests of managers through its laws and regulations (Man and Wong 2013). Thus, 
improving corporate governance will balance the interests of managers and other 
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stakeholders, and may improve disclosure and the quality of information in financial 
reports. Dima and Brancoveanu (2013) have pointed out that there are several 
characteristics of corporate governance which are shown in figure 1.1.  
Figure (1.1): Characteristics of Corporate Governance 
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Source: Dima and Brancoveanu (2013), adaptation after Dana R. Hermanson, Larry E. Rittenberg (2003). 
 
Additionally, the OECD (2015) explained the principles of corporate 
governance as follows (translated adapted from OECD 2015): 
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efficiency of markets, and efficient resource allocation. They should 
support effective oversight and enforcement, and harmonised with the 
rule of law. 
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 The corporate governance framework should recognise the 
stakeholder's rights, and encourage active cooperation between 
companies and stakeholders, in creating added value, jobs, and 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises. 
 The corporate governance framework should provide accurate and 
timely disclosure of all material matters relating to the corporation. 
 The corporate governance framework should ensure the effective 
strategic coordination, effective supervision by the board of directors, 
and board accountability to the company and shareholders. 
The conclusion from the above, is that effective corporate governance seeks to 
achieve a balance between the company and the stakeholder's interests. In order to 
achieve this balance, it is necessary to ensure that the company has effective controls, 
which, in turn will lead to the accurate disclosure of all material matters relating to the 
company. When discussing corporate governance, it is important to consider the 
mechanisms for guaranteeing shareholders’ rights and resolving conflicts. Corporate 
governance encompasses mechanisms through which outside investors can protect 
their interests against insiders (La Porta et al. 2000). These mechanisms are tools for 
controlling and monitoring within the company, that explain the relationship between 
management and stakeholders and will be discussed in the next sections.  
 
4.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 Corporate governance mechanisms have attracted the attention of researchers, 
especially after the separation of ownership from management in modern companies, 
as this practice may lead to potential conflicts of interest between owners and agents 
(Habbash 2010). One important aspect of corporate governance is that it is a system 
aimed at controlling and supervising companies, whilst protecting stakeholders 
through several corporate governance mechanisms. In other words, corporate 
governance mechanisms seek to ensure that managers and other insiders always take 
appropriate measures to protect the interests of stakeholders (Al-Haddad et al. 2011).  
Ahmed et al. (2008) explained that there are two types of mechanisms which 
are able to resolve conflicts of interests between various parties in the firm, such as 
owners and managers, and majority and minority of shareholders. The first type 
includes different internal mechanisms, such as: the ownership structure, the board of 
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directors, executive compensation, and financial disclosure. The second includes 
external mechanisms, such as: an effective acquisition market, legal infrastructure, and 
competition in a productive market. As shown in figure 1.2. 
 
Figure (1.2): Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ahmed, Alam, Jafar, and Zaman (2008). 
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management, as well as the structure and characteristics of the board of directors, 
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committees, remuneration committees and ownership structures.  
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earnings management. These mechanisms include ownership structure (insider 
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to monitor the behaviour of the managers (Adams 2000; Mohamad et al. 2010; 
Hamdan et al. 2013; Abu Siam et al. 2014). Furthermore, these mechanisms provide 
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there is no general agreement regarding the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on earnings management (Attia & Hegazy 2015; Omoye & Eriki 2014; 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanism 
Internal 
Mechanism 
External 
Mechanism 
Ownership 
Structure 
Board of 
Directors 
Executive 
Compensation 
Financial 
Disclosure 
Effective Takeover 
Market 
Legal 
Infrastructure 
Product Market 
Competition 
15 
 
Isenmila & Elijah 2012; Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010). The following is a general 
explanation of each of these mechanisms, and their effectiveness in controlling 
earnings management. 
 
4.1.1 Ownership Structure 
An important issue related to corporate governance practices is the ownership 
structure and its relationship to a firm’s performance, top management, and earnings 
management. The structure of ownership is defined not only by the distribution of 
property rights in respect of votes and capital, but also by the identity of equity holders 
(Wahl 2006). This structure of the distribution of ownership in a company, determines 
the strength and control of both managers and shareholders. The following sections 
illustrate two types of ownership: insider ownership, and institutional ownership and 
their impact on earnings management.  
 
4.1.1.1 Insider Ownership 
  Insiders are defined as persons who work within the company or are employed 
within the company they own (Wahl 2006). Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) have identified 
insider ownership, by the percentage of shares held by officers or directors within the 
firm and their families. The views and results of previous studies, differed regarding 
insider ownership and its relationship with earnings management. This issue has been 
covered and discussed in paper I.  
The discussions presented in paper I show that the previous studies are divided 
into two parts with respect to insider ownership and their relationship to earnings 
management. Firstly, insider owners are those who work within the company and who 
hold a large share of the company's shares. They are considered to have an effective 
control role over the decisions and performance of the company. They are less likely 
to exhibit opportunistic behaviours such as earnings management, so as not to harm 
their interests and property, and have a desire to increase the value of the company 
(Warfield et al. 1995; Alzoubi & Selamat 2012; Huang, Wang & Zhou 2013). 
Secondly, it is proposed that insider owners who hold a large share of the company's 
shares, have greater authority and are more integrated into the company's decisions 
and performance. Which gives them the opportunity to engage in earnings 
management to achieve their goals (Yeo et al. 2002; Huang, Wang & Zhou 2013). 
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Therefore, it appears that there is no general agreement regarding the effect of insider 
ownership on earnings management. 
However, in line with agency theory and published empirical results, paper I 
hypothesises that a high level of insider ownership is associated with less earnings 
management. In this scenario, managers avoid any opportunistic behaviour that may 
affect the value of their shares or interests in the company. Therefore, agency theory 
suggests that managerial shareholdings encourage managers to improve the value of 
the company, because managers bear the proportion of wealth effects as shareholders 
(Alves 2012). Consequently, insider ownership may be considered as a mechanism to 
control managerial opportunistic behaviour (Klein 2002; Teshima & Shuto 2008). 
Furthermore, from an agency theory perspective, high insider ownership may improve 
the structure of corporate governance, which is reflected by a high quality in financial 
reporting (Ballesta & Meca 2005). Based on the previous discussion, paper I expects 
that increased insider ownership may reduce the level of earnings management 
practises.  
 
4.1.1.2 Institutional Ownership 
Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) defined institutional ownership as the percentage of 
shares owned by institutions, which includes shares held through social security and 
other funds. They also referred to Koh (2003) who listed the following organisations 
as institutional investors: insurance companies (life and non-life), pension funds, 
investment companies, and financial institutions, including banks. Likewise, Velury 
and Jenkins (2006) defined institutional ownership as large investors such as bank 
trusts, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds that invest on behalf of 
others. The views and results of previous studies differed regarding institutional 
ownership and its relationship with earnings management. This issue has also been 
covered and discussed in paper I.  
The discussions presented in paper I show that the previous studies have two 
views in terms of the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
management. Firstly, institutional ownership can be seen as a tool to monitor the 
performance and activities of the company's management. Their presence can limit 
managers' recourse to opportunistic behaviour and earnings management (Chung et al. 
2002; Alves 2012; Njah & Jarboui 2013; Ajay & Madhumathi 2015). Alternatively, 
institutional ownership does not have an effective role as a monitoring tool for 
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management activities. The reason for this is that managers may feel more forced to 
meet expectations of earnings targets of these investors, and thereby engage in 
manipulation of earnings, and may increase management incentives to participate in 
opportunist behaviour (Pound 1988; Duggal & Millar 1999; Cornett, Marcus, & 
Tehranian 2008).  
However, paper I in this regard depicts institutional ownership as a monitoring 
tool, which can assist in improving the performance and activities of the company's 
management, as well as it may prevent managers practising earnings management, as 
confirmed by many studies (Bushee 1998; Chung et al. 2002; Koh 2003). Based on 
that, paper I expects that higher institutional ownership is associated with less earnings 
management. 
 
4.1.2 Audit Committee 
The audit committee is an important corporate governance mechanism, which 
aims at controlling the performance of its members, and verifying the accuracy and 
transparency of financial statements, and provides an oversight of the company’s 
financial reporting process. The audit committee has a particular role in ensuring that 
shareholders' interests are properly protected in the process of preparing financial 
reports, and provision of internal controls and audit activities (Issarawornrawanich 
2015). The board of directors is responsible for establishing an internal audit 
committee that has the ability to assess the structure of the company and its 
governance. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB 2012, p. 34) 
defines the audit committee as: a committee (or equivalent body) established by and 
among the board of directors of a company, for the purpose of overseeing the 
accounting and financial reporting processes of the company and audits of the 
financial statements of the company. 
The audit committee can improve the quality and accuracy of financial 
information by reviewing financial statements, accounts, processes, and disclosures in 
financial statements and reports. Therefore, as a part of the corporate governance 
mechanism, the audit committee has an important and effective role as a control and 
oversight tool in reducing opportunistic behaviours such as manipulation and earnings 
management. As a result, the audit committee can improve and increase the quality of 
earnings and the quality of financial reports. This has been demonstrated by many 
studies (see, Vafeas 2005; Baxter & Cotter 2009; Albersmann & Hohenfels 2017). 
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However, some studies have contradicted that belief and found the existence of an 
audit committee does not play a vital role in constraining earnings management (Osma 
& Noguer 2007; Haniffa et al. 2006; Habbash 2011; Waweru & Riro 2013). This issue 
has been covered and discussed in paper II.  
Paper II presents the view that the presence of an audit committee is related to 
less earnings management. The reason is, that from the agency theory perspective, the 
audit committee performs oversight and audit functions as a governance mechanism 
to reduce information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers, thereby 
alleviating agency problems (Lin, Hutchinson & Percy 2009). Therefore, the presence 
of an audit committee in the company increases earnings quality, and reduces the 
practice of earnings management. Also, the existence of full audit committees with the 
following characteristics (made up of qualified members, audit committee 
independence, a high level of audit committee expertise, frequent meetings, and a large 
audit committee) and good audit committee structure, serves to strengthen corporate 
governance and thus limits the level of earnings management (Davidson et al. 2005; 
Vafeas 2005). Based on that, paper II expects that the existence of an internal audit 
committee is associated with less earnings management. 
 
5. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
CSR is an activity which indicates the extent to which companies are interested 
in society as a whole. The most important objective for CSR, is about building 
sustainability for business in a responsible manner (Moir 2001). CSR is related to 
ethical and moral aspects about corporate decision-making and behaviour (Branco & 
Rodrigues 2006). The World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD 2000, p. 6) defines CSR in the following terms: "Corporate Social 
Responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to contribute to economic 
development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as 
well as of the community and society at large." where CSR includes many aspects, 
such as human rights, employee relations, corporate ethics, community relations, fair 
market operations and the environment (Hamidu, Haron & Amran 2015). Likewise, 
Smith (2011) pointed out that the International Standards Organization (ISO) has 
identified seven key issues of social responsibility: organisational governance, 
community involvement and development, human rights, labour practices, the 
environment, fair operating practices, and consumer issues. 
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Dahlsrud (2008) concluded that there are five dimensions of CSR which are 
based on analysing 37 definitions used by previous studies. These dimensions are: 
environmental, social, economic, stakeholder, and voluntariness dimension. Table 
(1.1) summarises these dimensions. 
Table (1.1): The Five Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Dimensions 
The definition is coded 
to the 
dimension if it refers to 
 
Example phrases  
The 
environmental 
dimension 
The natural environment ‘a cleaner environment’ 
‘environmental stewardship’ 
‘environmental concerns in 
business operations’ 
The social 
dimension 
The relationship between 
business and society 
‘contribute to a better society’ 
‘integrate social concerns into 
their business operations’ 
The economic 
dimension 
Socio-economic or 
financial aspects, 
including describing CSR 
in terms of a business 
operation 
‘contribute to economic 
development’ ‘preserving the 
profitability’ ‘business operations’ 
The stakeholder 
dimension 
Stakeholders or 
stakeholder groups 
interactions with their 
stakeholders’ ‘how organizations 
interact with their employees, 
suppliers, customers and 
communities’ 
The 
voluntariness 
dimension 
Actions not prescribed by 
law 
‘based on ethical values’ ‘beyond 
legal obligations’ ‘voluntary’ 
Source: The five dimensions, how the coding scheme was applied and example phrases (Dahlsrud 2008) 
 
CSR is a significant issue for companies, and previous studies have focused on 
CSR and its relationship with earnings management. The views and results of previous 
studies differed, regarding CSR and its relationship with earnings management. Many 
previous studies have suggested that companies who provide CSR reports are less 
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likely to be involved in financial manipulations and earnings management (see, Yip et 
al. 2011; Hong & Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012). Other studies are concerned that 
CSR may be used as a mask to cover earnings management, and that it is used by 
managers to achieve their own special goals. In other words, firms may use CSR 
reporting as a tool to hide their earnings management activities (Prior et al. 2008; 
Salewski & Zulch 2014; Muttakin, Khan & Azim 2015). This issue has been covered 
and discussed in paper III.  
Paper III expects CSR to be positively related to earnings management, and 
CSR disclosures to be related to more earnings management practices. In this case, the 
managers may resort to opportunistic behaviors to cover weaknesses in the company, 
or to hide earnings management through CSR disclosures. 
 
6. Study Motivation and Justification 
This study is motivated by the global attention to corporate governance 
mechanisms and its relationship with earnings management (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010; 
Abed et al. 2012; Abbadi et al. 2016). Previous research has suggested, poor corporate 
governance, earnings management and companies’ failure, are interrelated issues 
(Charitou et al. 2007; Lara et al. 2009). Poor corporate governance practices have been 
cited as one of the causes of corporate collapses (Adeyemi & Fagbemi 2010). In 
addition, the current study is interested with CSR disclosures and its relationship with 
earnings management, as firms may use CSR reporting as a tool to hide their earnings 
management activities (Salewski & Zulch 2014) and the managers may resort to 
opportunistic behaviors to cover the company's weakness or hide earnings 
management through these CSR disclosures. 
The current study explores the factors (corporate governance mechanisms and 
CSR disclosures) that influence earnings management, with a specific focus on the 
developing Jordanian market as a case study, unlike other studies which give more 
attention to developed countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, UK, and USA).  
The decision to focus on Jordan is motived by several factors. The dearth of 
the corporate governance mechanisms, CSR, and earnings management research in the 
Jordanian context as a developing country (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010; Abed et al. 2012; 
Alzoubi 2015); a high rate of failure and bankruptcy cases amongst Jordanian firms 
(Zureigat et al. 2014); the significant financial collapses that have happened in the 
world which had an impact on the Jordanian economy provide further justification for 
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this study. Finally, there has been significant attention paid to consolidating the support 
for corporate governance in Jordan (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010) when the corporate 
governance code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman stock exchange 
(ASE), came into effect on 1 January 2009 (Securities Depository Centre, SDC 2017). 
For these reasons, Jordan has been selected as a case study for this research.    
 
7. Research Objectives 
This study explores the factors that affect earnings management practises. 
These factors include corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure and 
internal audit committee) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures. Thus, 
this study seeks to achieve the following objectives: 
 Examine the relationship between insider ownership and earnings 
management practises. 
 Examine the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
management practises. 
  Examine the relationship between internal audit committee and 
earnings management practises. 
 Examine the relationship between company attitudes to CSR and 
earnings management practises. 
 
8. Research Problem and Questions 
This research problem can be summarised by the lack of knowledge and 
awareness of earnings management practices and its implications particularly within 
the Jordanian context as mentioned earlier. Moreover, this research provides insights 
into the controversy surrounding the relationship between earnings management 
practices and influencing factors such as corporate governance mechanisms and CSR. 
The main research questions that were addressed through this study are: 
 What is the impact of insider ownership on earnings management 
practises in the Jordanian industrial public sector? 
 What is the impact of institutional ownership on earnings management 
practises in the Jordanian industrial public sector? 
 What is the impact of internal audit committee on earnings management 
practises in the Jordanian industrial public sector? 
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 What is the impact of CSR disclosures on earnings management 
practises in the Jordanian industrial public sector? 
 
9. Research Importance                          
This study makes an important contribution to both the research literature and 
corporate governance practice. Firstly: contribution to literature; this study facilitates 
discussion about the link between corporate governance mechanisms, CSR 
disclosures, and earnings management practices. It clarifies the factors that have the 
capacity to affect earnings management, and therefore affect the quality of earnings 
reporting. This study also adds to the literature by investigating the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms and CSR disclosures on earnings management in the 
Jordanian industrial public-sector context during (2006-2015). This period includes 
important events within the Jordanian context: the corporate governance code was 
introduced in 2008/2009; and the global financial crisis occurred in 2008. 
Consequently, the current study provides an opportunity to compare the results of this 
study before and after the introduction of corporate governance code. Therefore, it 
provides an analysis of the effectiveness of the code’s introduction. 
Secondly: contribution to practice; this study informs supervisory and 
regulatory authorities about the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, CSR 
disclosures and how they may be used to help avoiding earnings management. This 
study assists the users or beneficiaries of financial reports to understand earnings 
management practices and increase their awareness about this phenomenon. Thus, it 
may help in improving the corporate governance practices and may help increase the 
reliability of the financial statements in the Jordanian industrial public sector.  
 
10. The Gap in the Literature  
In the light of the above mentioned, the research gaps can be identified as: 
Firstly, corporate governance mechanisms, CSR disclosures, and earnings 
management are described important issues in the literature. However, there is a 
current lack of research exploring the relationship between these issues in the 
Jordanian context (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010; Abed et al. 2012; Abu Siam et al. 2014; 
Alzoubi 2015; Abbadi et al. 2016). Secondly, there is an omission within the previous 
studies of some important events which occurred in 2008/2009, these years include 
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important events in the Jordanian context: corporate governance code introduced in 
2008/2009; and the global financial crisis in 2008. The current study has taken into 
consideration two periods 2006-2008 (before introducing the corporate governance 
code), and 2009-2015 (after introducing the corporate governance code), to compare 
the results of this study, whilst other studies take into consideration only before or after 
introduction of the corporate governance code. Consequently, the current study will 
provide an opportunity to compare the results before and after the introduction of 
corporate governance code, providing an analysis of the effectiveness of the code’s 
introduction. The current study thus adds value in terms of knowledge to existing 
studies. 
 
11. Addressing Thesis Objectives Through the Study’s Papers  
The first and second objective were accomplished, and the outcomes were 
presented in paper I. The relationship between ownership structure (insider and 
institutional), and earnings management practices, was examined. The third objective 
was addressed in paper II. The relationship between audit committee and earnings 
management practices was examined. The fourth objective was addressed in paper III. 
The relationship between company attitudes to CSR and earnings management 
practices was examined. These papers highlighted the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and earnings management practices from one hand, and 
corporate social responsibility and earnings management practices from the other 
hand, in the Jordanian industrial sector which is the main focus of this study. 
 
12. Structure of this Thesis 
Table (1.2): Structure of this Thesis 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of this PHD thesis, and it 
provides a background to this thesis. This chapter explains the 
motivation and justification of this study, the research 
objectives, the research problem and questions, the research 
importance and the contribution of this study to literature and 
practice, and the gap in the literature. This chapter also outlines 
the structure of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: 
Institutional 
Background of 
Jordan Context 
Chapter two describes an insight of institutional background of 
Jordan context. It beings with providing a brief view of the 
background of Jordanian context. Also, a number of corporate 
governance issues in Jordanian context are covered in this 
chapter such as: the emergence and development of Jordanian 
corporate governance code; and discussed the most important 
mechanisms within the Jordanian corporate governance. In 
addition, this chapter has discussed the institutional framework 
and the dimensions of Jordanian corporate governance.  
Paper I Objective 1 & 2: 
 Examine the relationship between insider ownership and 
earnings management practises. 
 Examine the relationship between institutional 
ownership and earnings management practises. 
Summary outcomes: 
The paper found that institutional ownership and earnings 
management were positively related, whilst the insider 
ownership has no effect on earnings management in the 
Jordanian industrial sector. 
Paper II 
 
Objective 3: 
 Examine the relationship between audit committee and 
earnings management practises. 
Summary outcomes: 
The paper found that audit committee and earnings management 
were negatively but insignificantly related in the Jordanian 
industrial sector. 
Paper III 
 
Objective 4: 
 Examine the relationship between company attitudes 
to CSR and earnings management practises. 
Summary outcomes: 
The paper found that CSR and earnings management are 
negatively associated. 
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Conclusions 
 
 Summary of key outcomes from all papers. 
 Limitations and Recommendations for future research. 
 
13. Chapter Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter is the introduction chapter of this thesis. It begins with the general 
introduction background related to earnings management: definition, motivations, 
methods, and models used to detect earnings management. Subsequently, the quality 
of earnings and its relationship to earnings management were discussed. Then, it 
offered and reviewed corporate governance mechanisms. Two mechanisms of 
corporate governance were discussed in this chapter: ownership structure and audit 
committee. In addition, this chapter presented a brief discussion about corporate social 
responsibility. This chapter has provided a general summary of corporate governance 
mechanisms, corporate social responsibility and earnings management literature, and 
outlines a general understanding of this topic. This has helped to identify the concerns 
and shortcomings of previous studies, which has been used to develop hypotheses 
related to research. 
In addition, this chapter has explained the motivation and justification of this 
study, the research objectives, the research problem and questions, the research 
importance and the contribution of this study to literature and practice, and the gap in 
the literature. This chapter has shown how the thesis’s objectives have been addressed 
through the study’s papers. This chapter also has outlined the structure of the thesis. 
The next chapter of this thesis introduces a brief view of the background in the 
Jordanian context, as well as discussing a number of corporate governance issues in 
the Jordanian context.   
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF JORDAN CONTEXT 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter has provided an overview of the institutional background of 
Jordan, as well as highlights of the historical background of Jordan, Jordanian laws, 
its location, the culture of legal systems, the Jordanian economy, and one of the most 
important sectors in Jordan, the industrial sector. Also, this chapter has discussed a 
number of corporate governance issues in the Jordanian context and its mechanisms. 
The institutional framework for corporate governance in Jordan was also reviewed. 
Understanding the underlying issues has helped to frame and explain the research 
results, which has provided a wider and more general framework regarding this topic. 
Accordingly, this chapter has been structured as follows: Section 2 has 
presented a brief background of Jordan. Section 3 has shed light on the development 
of corporate governance in Jordan. Section 4 has covered the institutional framework 
of corporate governance in Jordan. Section 5 has presented corporate governance 
mechanisms in Jordan. Section 6 has provided a brief overview about corporate social 
responsibility activities in Jordan.  Section 7 has discussed earnings management in 
Jordan. Section 8 has presented an overall chapter summary. 
 
2. A Brief Background of Jordan  
 Jordan, one of the most modern countries in the Middle East, gained 
independence and was declared a kingdom in 1946. Jordan is governed by a royal 
parliamentary system. The legal system of Jordan has been affected by a variety of 
sources: the civil law family, Islamic law, and customary law. The legal system of 
Jordan has developed from codes of law founded by the Ottoman Empire (Al-Tal 
2014). These codes were complemented by British laws, during the period of the 
British mandate in Jordan (1922-1946).  
Jordan has a strategic geographic location at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and 
Europe. The capital, Amman, is the country's economic, political and cultural center 
and is Jordan's most populous city (Al-Asad 2004). The country is located 
in Southwest Asia, bordering Syria to the north, Iraq to the north-east, Palestine to the 
west, and Saudi Arabia to the east and south.  
Jordan has an area of 89,341 square kilometres and is 400 kilometres long 
between its northernmost and southernmost points (The World Fact Book 2016). The 
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culture of Jordan is based on Arabic and Islamic concepts, but also with a clear impact 
of the influence of western culture. Whilst Arabic is the formal language of Jordan, 
English is widely understood amongst the educated and the middle and upper classes 
(The World Fact Book 2016). The Jordanian Kingdom has a wide cultural diversity 
because of its location, which incorporates three continents (Asia, Africa, and Europe). 
In addition, Jordan is host to a large number of nationalities, who came to Jordan for a 
variety of reasons (e.g. refuge, tourism, and study) and have had an important impact 
on its economy.  
The Jordanian economy is one of the smallest economies in the region, and 
depends on attracting foreign investors to grow the economy, however it is classified 
by the World Bank (2016) as an "upper middle-income country". There are several 
issues that have had an influence on the Jordanian economy, such as the refuge issue 
where Jordan hosts a larger number of refugees than any other country. In fact, 
refugees constitute one third of Jordan’s population (World Bank 2016). Furthermore, 
the lack of natural resources (e.g. oil, gas) has had a large constraining influence on 
the growth of the economy. 
The industrial sector in Jordan is a strategic sector which contributes 
significantly to the Jordanian economy. The industrial sector in Jordan plays a vital 
role in balancing the Jordanian economy; the industrial sector amounted to 25% of the 
Kingdom’s GDP in 2017, and employment in the Jordanian industrial sector 
constitutes about 25% of the total employed Jordanians in 2018 (Plecher 2019).  
The industrial sector in Jordan is also one of the most interconnected sectors 
when compared to other sectors, which expresses its great importance to the Jordanian 
economy (Jordan Chamber of Industry 2014). Jordan's industrial sector is composed 
primarily of the mining, quarrying and manufacturing subsectors. Large-scale 
industries consist mainly of phosphate and potash mining, and the industrial 
production of cement, fertilizers, and refined petroleum.  
The Jordanian government has provided a number of incentives to investors, 
in order to enhance and support the investment in this sector, and this has contributed 
to making Jordan one of the most suitable investment destinations in the Middle East 
(Jaafar & El-Shawa 2009). However, the Jordanian industrial sector has also faced 
issues of failure, liquidation, and bankruptcy. There were 44 bankruptcy cases among 
Jordanian companies during the period 2000 to 2011, where 26 companies (59%) were 
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from the industrial sector, 15 companies (34%) from the service sector and 3 
companies (7%) from the financial sector (Zureigat et al. 2014). 
 
3. Corporate Governance in Jordan 
The corporate governance guide for Public Shareholding Companies Listed on 
the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in Jordan, was launched in 2008. Since 1/1/2009, 
all companies have been requested to adhere to the rules of corporate governance (Al-
Bawab 2015) through disclosure in their annual reports. The extent of their compliance 
with the code needs to be explained according to the 'comply or explain' rule (Jordan 
Securities Commission, JSC 2007). The Jordanian corporate governance guide 
determined that the application of these rules would initially be through the 
"compliance or explain" approach. This approach meant that companies were required 
to abide by the rules within the guide, and when any of the rules contained therein 
were not complied with, to provide an explanation for non-compliance. It excluded 
companies who had an exemption based on a binding legal provision. The reasons for 
non-compliance with this rule are required to be clearly stated in the company's annual 
report. 
The aim of this approach was to give companies flexibility in implementation 
and sufficient time to adapt to the requirements of the rules of governance, in order to 
enhance awareness of these rules, and thus achieve their full compliance in a gradual 
manner (Securities Depository Center, SDC 2017). Prior to issuing the corporate 
governance guide for public shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE), the Central Bank issued guidelines in 2004 for bank board members. 
This corporate governance guide for banks in Jordan provided a benchmark for 
international best practices in this area, which was based on guidelines from the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Table (2.1) shows 
the development of corporate governance in Jordan (translated adapted from Al-
Manasir (2013)):   
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Table (2.1): Development of Corporate Governance in Jordan 
Organization Year Version 
Jordanian Central Bank 2004 Issued guidelines for bank board members in 
corporate governance (Corporate 
Governance guide for Jordanian Banks 
2007) 
Insurance Authority 2006 Issued the instructions for the institutional 
governance of the insurance companies and 
the basis of their organisation and 
management. 
Jordanian Central Bank 2007 Issued the Corporate Governance Guide 
which contained terms and procedures 
whereby each bank was required to disclose 
in the annual report, full compliance, or 
provide an interpretation of reasons for non-
compliance (Corporate Governance guide 
for Jordanian Banks 2007). 
Securities Commission 2008 Issued the rules of corporate governance to 
be adhered to by public shareholding 
companies listed in the financial market. 
Required to disclose the application of these 
rules and had to be applied from 1 January 
2009 (Securities Commission 2008) 
Securities Commission 2010 Issued a detailed catalog of corporate 
governance rules and determining mandatory 
rules and guidelines (Securities Commission 
2010). 
Companies Control 
Department 
2012 Issued the Jordanian corporate governance 
guide (private shareholding companies, 
limited liability companies and public 
shareholding companies) based on a 
memorandum signed with International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2011. The 
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guide targeted small and medium-sized 
companies that were not covered by the 
corporate governance rules issued by the 
bank central or insurance commission or 
securities commission (Companies Control 
Department 2012). 
Source: Translated adapted from Al-Manasir (2013). 
 
The corporate governance structure distributed the rights and responsibilities 
in the company amongst the different parties such as: the board of directors, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and sets of rules and procedures for decision-
making (European Central Bank 2004). According to Al-Jazi (2007), the concept and 
principles of corporate governance in Jordan are present in many of the laws governing 
companies. For instance, these include companies’ law No. 22, 1997; securities law 
No. 76, 2002; banking law No. 28, 2000; and regulation law of the accounting 
profession No. 73, 2003. 
The preparation of the guide of corporate governance in Jordan was undertaken 
in line with the efforts of the Jordan securities commission (JSC) for the development 
of the capital market and its regulation. The guide contained rules of corporate 
governance for public companies listed on the ASE. These rules established a clear 
framework which regulated the relations and management and determined the rights, 
duties, and responsibilities of the company, in order to protect the rights of all 
stakeholders (Al-Sa'eed 2013). 
These rules were based primarily on a number of the most important 
legislations from the securities and legislation section, which were issued pursuant to 
the corporate law, as well as international principles set by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Compliance with corporate 
governance rules enhanced and improved the performance of management and the 
company (Securities Depository Centre, SDC 2017).  
 
4. Institutional Framework of Corporate Governance in Jordan 
In order to understand corporate governance practices by companies, it was 
first necessary to determine the institutional framework affecting corporate 
governance in Jordan. According to Shanikat and Abbadi (2011), corporate 
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governance in Jordan has been divided into six dimensions: a legislative framework, 
disclosure and accounting standards, a capital market, effective supervision of the 
board of directors, preservation of property rights and protection of minority rights, 
and transparency in privatisation. The companies’ law of 1997 and the mandates of 
2006, extensively mentioned these six dimensions, and the securities law 2002 and 
mandates of 2010, also referred to some of these dimensions. The following sections 
have further elaborated on these dimensions. 
 
4.1 Legislative Framework  
The legislative environment in Jordan has been framed by a variety of laws 
controlling companies and their actions. These include the securities law, company 
law, insurance law, banking law, law of competition and monopoly, law of investment 
promotion, commercial law, and law of privatisation (Al-Jazi 2007). The legislative 
environment has played a significant role in improving the role of the Jordanian 
Association of Certified Public Accounting (JACPA) and has led to the establishment 
of the high council of accounting and auditing.  
The Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) has 
responsibility for monitoring the quality of the accounting information. All registered 
Jordanian companies are compelled to fulfil their obligations by publishing their 
accounts after getting certification. Reports need to be made available to users 
including, decision makers, analysts, investors, and other shareholders and 
stakeholders. Certification and control of accounts in Jordan are under the jurisdiction 
of the JACPA, which has adopted International Accounting Standards (IAS). The 
auditors are authorised to certify the annual reports after receiving that certification. 
The government's accounting and auditing regulations are compatible with 
international standards (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010). Furthermore, the legal environment 
in Jordan supports good corporate governance, and increases awareness and respect 
for the culture of corporate governance (Al-Jazy 2005).  
 
4.2 Disclosure and Accounting Standards 
 The Jordanian corporate governance guide has explains points regarding 
disclosure and transparency requirements (translated adapted from SDC 2017): 
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 The company shall provide disclosure information to shareholders and 
investors in an accurate, clear, and non-misleading manner at specified 
times. 
 The company shall establish written procedures in accordance with the 
disclosure policy adopted by the board of directors, to regulate the 
disclosure of information and follow up its application in accordance 
with the requirements of the regulatory bodies and the applicable 
legislation. 
 The company shall organise its accounts and prepare its financial 
statements in accordance with the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). 
 No person familiar with the company may disclose the internal 
information related to the company, other than the competent authority 
or the judiciary. 
 The company should use its website to promote disclosure, 
transparency and information. 
 The company shall disclose its policies and programs regarding the 
local community and the environment. 
The JSC has adopted disclosure instructions for issued companies, accounting 
standards and auditing standards in item No (14), the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and 
all entities subject to the securities commission are required to prepare their financial 
statements in accordance with these standards. The International Auditing Standards 
issued by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) have been adopted for 
the purpose of auditing the accounts of entities subject to the securities commission 
monitoring. 
 
4.3 Institutional Framework - Capital Market 
According to the JSC, the Jordanian public sector has been dealing in shares 
since 1930’s. Corporate bonds have been issued since the beginning of the sixties and 
the transactions were handled by individual brokerage firms. Thus, the need of 
organising the market, and the establishment of the Amman Financial Market (AFM) 
became crucial. The securities market was established on 1st January 1978. Since then, 
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the Amman Financial Market (AFM) has been in charge of the stock exchange and the 
regulatory bodies. 
According to international standards, Securities Law No. (23), 1997, has been 
a turning point for the Jordanian capital market. Three institutions emerged out of the 
securities law. They are: 
 The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
 The Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 
 The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
The JSC is the legal inheritor of the Amman Financial Market. It was 
designated to control the capital market by performing regulatory and supervisory 
roles (JSC). The SDC is the securities depository centre of Jordan, it is a public 
institution established based on the Securities Law No. (23), 1997.  It is subjected to 
the JSC's control and supervision. Moreover, it has a legal personality and is 
independent administratively and financially. Furthermore, it is the only entity in 
Jordan that is legally empowered by the Securities Law No. (76), 2002, to supervise 
the following responsibilities: 
 Registration of securities 
 Deposit of securities 
 Safekeeping of securities and transfer of ownership 
 Settlement and clearance of securities transactions 
The third institution that emerged out of the securities law was ASE. It was 
established in March 1999 as a non-profit institution with administrative and financial 
independence. It was authorised to operate as a securities trading market. The 
membership of the ASE comprises 58 members of Jordan's brokerage firms. The 
exchange is controlled by a seven-member board of directors. A chief executive officer 
supervises responsibilities and reports to the board (Amman Stock Exchange, ASE 
2017). 
The securities law in Jordan has many purposes. The main purposes are: to 
protect investors from fraud and manipulation, to provide a suitable environment for 
safe trading in securities, and to develop and control the stock market. The ASE and 
JSC work together on controlling matters and to build strong relationships with other 
exchanges, institutions, and international organisations (ASE 2017).  
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4.4 Preservation of Property Rights and Protection of Minority Rights 
 According to the SDC (2017), the corporate governance guide for shareholding 
companies listed on the ASE includes several chapters that explain everything related 
to the board of directors, the general assembly, shareholders' rights, and disclosure and 
transparency. The most important objectives of the Jordanian corporate governance 
guide relate to, practising control role, preserving the rights of shareholders, 
stakeholders and the economic reputation of Jordan. 
 Furthermore, the Jordanian corporate governance guide indicated that the 
issue of corporate governance has become important in building good management, 
which is based on prudent decisions founded on the rules of transparency, activating 
self-supervision of the board of directors and protecting shareholders. Likewise, the 
corporate governance guide illustrated some items that are related to preservation of 
property rights and protection of minority rights, such as (translated adapted from SDC 
2017): 
 Equitable treatment of shareholders: each shareholder must be provided 
with adequate and correct information about the company unless there 
is a given reason for not giving this information. This information is 
provided to each shareholder regardless of the class of shares he owns. 
 Equal rights: shareholders have the right to vote according to the type 
and number of shares they hold. Also, the company allocate part of its 
website or other means of communication, to clarify shareholder rights 
and how to participate and vote in the meetings of the general assembly 
of shareholders. 
 The chairman of the board shall ensure that major shareholders and 
minority shareholders have equal opportunities to participate during the 
general assembly meeting of shareholders. 
 In companies with one or more major shareholders, the board of 
directors must seek to make senior shareholders benefit from their 
position by working to respect the rights and interests of minority 
shareholders. 
Moreover, the Jordanian Companies Law No. (22) (1997), and amendments 
(2006) explained in several sections all shareholder rights. The companies’ law (2006) 
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has established the principles of governance, protection of the rights of shareholders, 
safeguards for the rights of the minority, and separation of executive management and 
the board of directors. This was established in order to balance the interests of all 
parties interested in dealing with the company, in a clear framework that defined the 
rights, duties and responsibilities entrusted to the management and shareholders. 
Additionally, it reinforced the rules for control of companies, through an establishment 
of a set of principles, committed to by the management, including the protection of 
minority rights within the companies.  
 
4.5 Privatisation 
During the 1990s, the government of Jordan adopted the privatisation of some 
government companies and institutions. The aim of the process was to instigate 
economic reforms, aimed at increasing the participation of the private sector in the 
economy (Shanikat & Abbadi 2011). 
As demonstration of the importance of the issue of privatisation in Jordan, and 
in order to provide the appropriate legislative framework, the Privatisation Law No. 
(25) was issued in 2000. The law contained clear provisions regulating the 
privatisation process and allowing implementation. The law also provided the 
necessary rules for transparency and clarity in the implementation of privatisation 
operations, within mechanisms which were subject to government control (ASE 2017).  
Sharar (2006) summarised that the main objectives of the privatisation program 
were to strengthen the economy and reduce government expenditure. Achieving these 
goals was desired as a mechanism to reduce the budget deficit of the Jordanian 
government and improve overall productivity and efficiency. The aim of these 
economic developments was to serve as a platform for Jordan to compete more 
effectively in the global market. 
 
5. Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Jordan 
5.1 Board of Directors 
The Jordanian corporate governance code contains a number of items related 
to board members themselves. The number of board members must be between five 
and thirteen, and they are elected by a secret vote and meet at least six times per year. 
The board of directors are appointed to manage the company for a term of four years 
starting on the date of election. In addition, the board of directors’ chairman is not 
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allowed to work in any executive position within the firm at the same time. The 
company is not allowed to provide a loan of any kind to the chairman of the board or 
any of its members, or to any of their relatives. The company is required to provide 
board members with all the information and data related to the company, to enable 
them to carry out their duties and be aware of all aspects related to the companies’ 
work (SDC 2017). 
Based on the SDC corporate governance code for shareholding companies 
listed on ASE, the Jordanian corporate governance code has determined standards for 
the board of directors’ functions and responsibilities, and include (translated adapted 
from SDC 2017):  
 The board of directors’ sets out strategies, policies, plans and 
procedures that will benefit the company and its objectives, maximise 
its shareholders' equity and serve the local community.  
 The board develops a risk management policy for risks that the 
company may face.  
 The board organises financial, accounting and administrative matters 
of the company, under special internal regulations.  
 The board prepares annual, semi-annual and quarterly reports and 
results of initial annual work on the companies’ business.  
 The board develops the companies’ disclosure and transparency policy 
and follows up on its implementation.  
 The board appoints the general manager of the company and terminates 
his services. 
 The board defines the functions and powers of the executive 
management in the company.  
 The board establishes a mechanism to receive complaints and 
suggestions from shareholders.  
 The board approves the incentives, rewards, and benefits of directors 
and executive management.  
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 The board develops written procedures to implement and review the 
principles of good corporate governance and evaluate the extent of their 
application on an annual basis. 
 The board of directors is also responsible for forming two permanent 
committees: the audit committee; and the nominations and remunerations committee 
(SDC 2017). The audit committee is required to oversee and monitor accounting, 
internal control and auditing activities of the company. The nominations and 
remunerations committee have functions such as: ensuring the independence of 
independent members, and setting up and continually reviewing the policy for the 
annual granting of bonuses, benefits, incentives and salaries in the company.  
 
5.1.1 Effective Supervision of the Board of Directors 
 The Jordanian companies’ law (1997), and mandates (2006), has defined all 
matters related to the supervision of the board of directors such as:  
 Determine the shares that a person must own to nominate to the board 
of directors. 
 Determine the persons who are prohibited from nomination for the 
board of directors. 
 Explain the role of the government and official institutions 
representatives on the board of directors. 
 Explain how to elect of the chairman and vice-chairman of the board of 
directors. 
 Explain that the board must submit a written report for what the 
chairman and members of the board of directors own and a copy of the 
report shall be provided to the company controller. 
 The Jordanian companies’ law has also defined the duties and responsibilities 
of the board of directors. A board of directors must prepare, within a period not 
exceeding three months from the end of the financial year, the company's accounts and 
statements to be submitted to the general assembly. Therefore, the board of directors 
has the responsible for preparing the company's annual general budget, statement of 
profit and loss, statement of cash flows and clarifications in relation to the previous 
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financial year, and these are required to be approved by the company's auditors. 
Furthermore, the board of directors must prepare the board's annual report on the 
company's business during the past year and its projections for the coming year. They 
must provide the controller with copies of the accounts and statements prior to the date 
set for the meeting of the general assembly within a period of not less than twenty-one 
days. Moreover, the board of directors are required to provide a detailed disclosure of 
the expenses, wages, and privileges of the chairman and members of the board of 
directors at the meeting of the general assembly, in order to inform the shareholders 
and to provide the controller with a copy thereof. 
 Item No. (151) of the Jordanian companies law (1997), and its mandates 
(2006), clarified that the financial, accounting and administrative matters of the 
company shall be prepared by a board of directors, and specify in a detailed manner 
the duties of the board and its powers and responsibilities in such matters, as long as 
that it does not provide for anything contrary to the provisions of the law and the 
regulations issued pursuant thereto or any other legislation in force. Copies of those 
regulations have to be sent to the controller, and then to the minister upon the 
recommendation of the controller. This requirement has been created in order to 
achieve the interests of the company and its shareholders.  
According to the Jordanian companies law in item No. (159), the chairman and 
members of the board of directors of the company are jointly and severally liable to 
the shareholders for their negligence in the management of the company. These 
requirements are in place in order to provide effective supervision of the board of 
directors. This is a crucial issue in the management of companies since the board of 
directors is charged with advising, reviewing and evaluating management (Gillan 
2006). 
 
5.2 Audit Committee 
The audit committee forms the basis of the governance system. It assists the 
board of directors in its responsibilities towards the shareholders, and it is important 
to evaluate internal control systems (Oqab 2012). Based on the SDC (2017), corporate 
governance code for shareholding companies listed on the ASE, the audit committee 
is required to undertake the tasks of overseeing and monitoring, accounting, internal 
control, and auditing activities in the company. The expectation is that the audit 
committee include no less than 3 members and some of them should be non-executive 
49 
 
members. The committee must meet regularly, not less than four times a year, and 
minutes of its meetings must be taken appropriately. At least once a year, the audit 
committee must meet with the company’s external auditor, without the presence of the 
executive management or any person representing it. In addition, it has undertaken 
other tasks as stated in the Jordanian corporate governance code such as:  
 Discussing of matters related to the nomination of the external auditor. 
 Following up the company's compliance with the provisions of the 
legislation in force and the requirements of the regulatory bodies. 
 Studying the periodic reports before submitting them to the board of 
directors. 
 Any other matters decided by the board of directors. 
The corporate governance code for shareholding companies listed on ASE 
(2017), also determine that the audit committee has powers such as:  
 Requesting the presence of the external auditor if the committee 
considers it necessary to discuss with him regarding any matters 
relating to his work in the company. 
 Recommending that the board of directors nominate the external 
auditor. 
 Nominating an internal auditor to be appointed to the company.  
Moreover, the Jordanian corporate governance code explains that all audit 
committee members must have knowledge in financial and accounting matters, and at 
least one of them must have had previous work experience in the field of accounting 
or financial matters, or a scientific qualification or a professional certificate in 
accounting, finance or other related fields. 
 The Jordanian corporate governance code explains that the general assembly 
shall elect one or more auditors who are licensed to practice the profession, to carry 
out external auditing functions in accordance with the approved international auditing 
standards, and the requirements of the profession and the applicable legislation. Also, 
the external auditor is appointed to perform their duties for a period of one-year 
renewable, provided that the responsible partner of the external auditor shall not audit 
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the company's accounts for more than four consecutive years. Auditors may be re-
assigned to audit the accounts of the company after at least two years absence.  
The Jordanian corporate governance code has also explained that the company 
shall take appropriate procedures to ensure that the external auditor is independent in 
accordance with international standards on auditing (ISAs), that the auditor is required 
to act impartially and not interfere with the work of the board of directors or the 
executive management. Also, the Jordanian corporate governance code has specified 
the conditions that must be available to the external auditor. The auditor is required to 
have a valid practicing license to be a member of the Jordanian association of certified 
public accountants; also, must have practiced the profession on a full-time basis for at 
least three consecutive years after receiving a licence to practice auditing, and have at 
least one partner or employee who meets the above conditions. 
 In regard to the duties performed by the external auditor, the Jordanian 
corporate governance code has identified the following functions (translated adapted 
from SDC 2017): 
 Monitoring the company's business. 
 Attending meetings of the general assembly of the company. 
 Answering the questions and queries of the shareholders of the 
company, regarding the financial statements and final accounts during 
the meetings of the general assembly. 
 Providing an opinion on the fairness of the financial statements of the 
company, and request its amendment if there is any impact on its 
fairness. 
 Reporting any violation of the legislation in force or any financial or 
administrative matters that have a negative impact on the company's 
conditions, to the competent authorities. 
 Examining the administrative and financial systems of the company 
and the internal control systems, and give an opinion on their 
effectiveness. 
 Auditing the company's accounts in accordance with international 
standards and professional rules. 
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 Exercising the functions assigned to him in an independent and 
impartial manner. 
5.3 Shareholders 
  Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) identified three main types of ownership structure in 
Jordanian firms. These were: insider ownership; institutional ownership; and 
individual block-holder’s ownership which could affect firms’ decisions and 
performance. According to Jordan Companies Control Department (2008) 
shareholders are the owners of the company, and they enjoy certain rights. However, 
in most cases, they are not expected to take responsibility for managing the company. 
This responsibility lies on the board of directors and management, who in this case, 
are accountable to shareholders. Therefore, it is the company’s responsibility to ensure 
that shareholders are aware of their rights to justice and equality without discrimination 
(SDC 2017). The Jordanian corporate governance code has determined two types of 
shareholders’ rights: general shareholders' rights, and rights within the powers of the 
general assembly. 
 
5.3.1 General Shareholders' Rights  
Shareholders enjoy general rights, the most important of which are the 
following (translated adapted from SDC 2017):  
 The company shall keep records of the ownership of shareholders, 
including information on their contribution, their names, number of 
shares owned by them, any restrictions on ownership, and any changes 
that may occur. 
 Viewing the information and documents of the company in accordance 
with the legislation. 
 Participating and voting at the general assembly meeting. 
 Obtaining the annual profits of the company within thirty days from the 
date of issuance of the general assembly's decision to distribute them. 
 Prioritisation of any new issues of the company's shares prior to 
offering them to other investors. 
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 Requesting the holding of an extraordinary general assembly meeting, 
for shareholders holding 25% of the shares of the subscribed company. 
 Requesting the convening of an extraordinary general assembly 
meeting to demand the resignation of the board of directors of the 
company or any member thereof, for shareholders holding 20% of the 
company's shares. 
 Requesting an audit of the company's business, for shareholders 
holding 10% of the company's shares. 
 Access to the minutes of the general assembly meetings of the 
company. 
 
5.3.2 Shareholders' Rights within the Powers of the General Assembly 
The general assembly has been given wide powers, especially the power to 
make decisions that affect the future of the company directly, including the following 
(translated adapted from SDC 2017): 
 Discussing with the board of directors, the company's performance and 
plans for the coming period. 
 Election of the board of directors and the external auditor. 
 Matters related to the consolidation or liquidation of the company. 
 Selling the company or owning another company. 
 Increasing or decreasing the company's capital. 
 Purchasing of the company's shares and selling of those shares, or 
selling off the entire assets of the company or an important part, which 
may affect the achievement of the goals of the company.  
With these rights, according to the Jordan companies control department, the 
shareholders of the company have several responsibilities. These include: shareholders 
shall benefit from the meetings of the general assembly of shareholders in ensuring 
that the company is properly managed in order to maximise the interest of the 
shareholders on the basis of mutual understanding of the objectives and concerns; 
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effective participation and voting in meetings of the general assembly of shareholders 
(non-present shareholders are entitled to vote by proxy); and the company should also 
encourage shareholders to take an interest and participate in appointing board members 
and external auditors. Also, senior shareholders must respect the rights and interests 
of minority shareholders. 
 
6. Corporate Social Responsibility 
The Jordanian corporate governance guide requires companies to disclose 
social and environmental information in their annual reports. This has been covered in 
section five of the Jordanian governance guide under the title 'Disclosure and 
Transparency', that every company must disclose its policies and programs regarding 
the local community and the environment (SDC 2017).  
In response, the Jordanian SDC (2008) adopted an initiative called 
"Responsibility to the Local Community" which has reflected the centre's recognition 
of the importance of its work, functions and ethical service towards the local 
community. According to the Amman Chamber of Commerce (2017), a number of 
workshops were held on the various aspects and prospects that are able to be achieved 
through social responsibility, and the areas in which sustainable economic and social 
development can be pursued. The most prominent of these activities are environmental 
awareness, health care and public safety, education and training, job creation, 
development in remote areas, infrastructure development, youth support, women's 
support and strengthening their role in society. 
 
7. Earnings Management in Jordan 
According to, Al-Qutaish and Al-Sufi (2011) many firms in Jordan have been 
involved in earnings management, and many departments have resorted to earnings 
management to enhance their financial statements, in an effort to improve the financial 
situation of the company, in order to achieve their own targets. Al-Sartawi et al. (2013) 
supported this assertion, mentioning that many Jordanian companies listed on the ASE 
resorted to earnings management, which has distorted the meaning of financial 
reporting, and destabilised the confidence of users in the reliability of financial reports. 
These companies have resorted to these practices for several reasons. Either to 
satisfy their shareholders; or to reduce the decline in the prices of their shares traded 
in the financial market; or to avoid the forced liquidation process that threatened them 
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because of the significant decline in their operating profits; or to improve their 
profitability and the financial position reflected in published financial statements; or 
to achieve their own purposes (Mattar et al. 2013). This topic has been further 
expanded through the study’s papers in the following chapters. These papers have also 
presented the literature review related to practices of earnings management. 
 
8. Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter began with providing a brief view of the background of Jordanian 
context, and described Jordan in terms of its history, laws, location, the culture of legal 
systems, the economy, and the industrial sector which is considered to be one of the 
most important sectors in Jordan. Also, a number of corporate governance issues have 
been highlighted in this chapter such as: the emergence and development of Jordanian 
corporate governance code; and the important mechanisms to govern boards contained 
within the Jordanian corporate governance code, which are: board of directors; audit 
committee; and shareholders. This chapter has also highlighted the corporate social 
responsibilities of Jordan firms.   
Furthermore, this chapter has presented the institutional framework and the 
dimensions of Jordanian corporate governance. It has reviewed the legislative 
framework in Jordan and reviewed important laws, such as the Securities Law No. 
(23), (1997), and the three institutions comprising the regulatory bodies (the Jordan 
Securities Commission (JSC), the Securities Depository Centre (SDC), and the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE)). An overview of the functions and responsibilities of 
each institution has been provided.  Finally, this chapter discussed briefly earnings 
management within Jordan. 
In conclusion, this chapter has provided an opportunity for academics and 
practitioners to develop an understanding regarding the institutional background 
within Jordan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
References  
Al-Manasir, O 2013, 'The impact of the application of the rules of corporate 
governance on the performance of Jordanian public service companies', MA 
Thesis, Deanship of Scientific Research and Graduate Studies at the Hashemite 
University.  
Al-Asad, M 2004, 'The domination of Amman urban crossroads' CSBE, < 
http://www.csbe.org/publications-and-resources/urban-crossroads/the-
domination-of-amman/ >.  
Al-Bawab, AA 2015, 'The extent of the obligation for the Jordanian private 
universities in the requirements of corporate governance to raise the 
performance of the financial management: A field study', International Journal 
of Economics and Finance, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 131. 
Al-Fayoumi, N, Abuzayed, B & Alexander, D 2010, 'Ownership structure and earnings 
management in emerging markets: the case of Jordan', International Research 
Journal of Finance and Economics, Issue 38, EuroJournals Publishing, Inc. 
2010.  
Al-Jazi, O H 2007, Corporate Governance in Jordan, < 
http://www.aljazylaw.com/arabic/pdf/hawkamat_alsherkat2.pdf >.  
Al-Jazy, O 2005, Regional corporate governance forum private sector consultative 
meeting, <www.jcdr.com>.  
Al-Qutaish, H & al-Sufi, F 2011, 'Methods of using creative accounting in my income 
and financial position in the companies listed at the ASE industrial companies', 
Journal of Baghdad College of Economic Sciences University, no. 27. 
Al-Sa'eed, M 2013, 'Compliance with the principles of corporate governance: different 
perspectives from Jordan', Accounting and Management Information Systems, 
vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 553–577. 
Al-Sartawi, A, Hamdan, A, Mushtah, S & Abu Ijel, I 2013, 'The effect of audit 
committees on earnings management, empirical study on manufacturing listed 
companies before the international financial crisis', An-Najah University 
Research Journal (Humanities), vol. 27, no.4. 
Al-Tal, YAY 2014, 'The role of the Amman stock exchange in Jordanian corporate 
governance', School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Australia. 
Amman Chamber of Commerce 2017, < 
http://www.ammanchamber.org.jo/node/?id=106&lang=ar >. 
56 
 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 2017, 'Privatization in Jordan', < 
https://www.ase.com.jo/en/privatization-jordan >.  
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 2017, 'About ASE', < 
https://www.ase.com.jo/en/about-ase >. 
Central Intelligence Agency 2016, 'The World Fact book – Jordan', CIA World 
Factbook. < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/jo.html >. 
Department of Statistics Amman, Jordan 2012, < http://www.dos.gov.jo >.  
European Central Bank 2004, 'Annual Report: 2004, ECB, Frankfurt, Glossary', 
<https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6778 >. 
Gillan, S 2006, 'Recent developments in corporate governance: An Overview', Journal 
of Corporate Finance, vol. 12, pp.381-402. 
Jaafar, A & El-Shawa, M 2009, 'Ownership concentration, board characteristics and 
performance: evidence from Jordan', Accounting in Emerging Economies, 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392727.   
Jordan Companies Control Department 2008, 'Jordanian corporate governance, code 
private shareholding companies, limited liability companies, Non -listed public 
shareholding companies', < http://ccd.gov.jo/english/index.php >. 
Jordanian chamber of industry 2014, 'Developments of the Jordanian economy and the 
performance of the industrial sector during 2014', < 
http://www.jci.org.jo/Pages/viewpage.aspx?pageID=192 >.  
Jordanian Companies Law No. 22 of 1997 and its amendments 2006, < 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=338515 >. 
Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) 2017, 'About JSC', < 
http://www.jsc.gov.jo/public/english.aspx?site_id=1&Lang=3&site_id=1&pa
ge_id=2011&menu_id2=160 >. 
Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC) 2017, 'Disclosure instructions for issuing 
companies, accounting standards and auditing standards', < 
http://www.jsc.gov.jo/library/636510976927273710.pdf >. 
Nour, A & Mattar, M 2013, 'Earnings management methods and their impact on the 
reliability of the published financial statements of Jordanian public 
shareholding companies', A paper presented to the Conference of the 
Association of Legal Accountants. 
57 
 
Oqab, R, 2012, 'The role of the audit committee in raising the efficiency of the internal 
control system to combat money laundering in Jordanian banks', International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics, vol. 1, no. 88, pp. 102-117. 
Oxford Business Group 2016, 'Industry & Retail: From the Report: Jordan 2016', < 
https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/jordan-2016/industry-retail-0 >. 
Plecher, H 2019, 'Statistics and market data on other countries-Jordan', < 
https://www.statista.com/markets/422/topic/545/other/>. 
Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 2008, 'The role of the SDC in attracting investors 
to the Jordanian market', < 
https://www.sdc.com.jo/arabic/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i
d=936&Itemid=1 >.  
Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 2017, 'Corporate governance code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman stock exchange', < 
https://www.sdc.com.jo/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view
&id=372 >.  
Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 2017, 'Establishment and Responsibilities', < 
http://www.sdc.com.jo/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i
d=35&Itemid=62 >. 
Shanikat, M & Abbadi, SS 2011, 'Assessment of corporate governance in Jordan: An 
empirical study', Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, vol. 5, 
no. 3, p. 93. 
Sharar, Z 2006, 'A comparative analysis of the corporate governance legislative 
frameworks in Australia and Jordan measured against the OECD principles of 
corporate governance 2004 as an international benchmark'. Unpublished 
Theses. 
World Bank 2016, 'Jordan - Promoting poverty reduction and shared prosperity : 
systematic country diagnostic', < 
http://documents.albankaldawli.org/curated/ar/368161467992043090/Jordan-
Promoting-poverty-reduction-and-shared-prosperity-systematic-country-
diagnostic >.  
World Bank 2016, 'World banks response to the Syrian-conflict', < 
http://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/region/mena/brief/world-banks-response-to-
the-syrian-conflict-september-2016 >.  
58 
 
Zureigat, B, Fadzil, F & Ismail, S 2014,'The relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and going concern evaluation: evidence from firms 
listed on Amman stock exchange', Journal of Public Administration and 
Governance, vol. 4, no. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Appendix A: Official Government Sites in Jordan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.ase.com.jo/ 
 
http://www.jsc.gov.jo/public/mainEnglish.aspx?page_id=1454 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.sdc.com.jo/arabic/index.php 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.ccd.gov.jo/en 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
CHAPTER 3: PAPER I 
 
 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: 
EVIDENCE FROM JORDAN 
 
The following details show the share of the co-authors in the submitted paper for 
publishing in this thesis. 
 
 
Almadadha, R, Rashid, A, Jones, G & Shams, S, 'Ownership Structure and Earnings 
Management: Evidence from Jordan', Submitted to Sydney International 
Business Research Conference (SIBRC) 2019. Incorporated as paper I. 
 
 
Contributor Statement of contribution Contribution 
Significance 
Almadadha, R. 
(candidate) 
Almadadha, R. formulated the hypothesis and 
the objectives of the research work, 
development of methodology, collected data, 
and wrote the initial draft and revised the final 
submission. 
60% 
Rashid, A. Rashid, A. contributed in manuscript 
preparation and layout, hypothesis formulation 
and technical discussion. 
15% 
Jones, G. Jones, G. reviewed the manuscript. 15% 
Shams, S. Shams, S. reviewed the statistical analysis of the 
manuscript. 
10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: 
EVIDENCE FROM JORDAN 
 
Abstract  
Purpose - This paper examines the effect of corporate ownership structure on earnings 
management (EM) in the context of Jordan.  
Design/Methodology/Approach - The paper has used the discretionary accruals (DA) 
as a measure of earnings management. An ordinary least square regression was used 
to investigate the association between ownership structure and earnings management. 
The data was collected from 49 Jordanian industrial companies listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period 2006-2015. 
Findings - The paper found that institutional ownership and earnings management 
were positively associated. The study also found that insider ownership had no effect 
on earnings management in the Jordanian industrial sector.   
Originality/value - This paper addressed a gap in the research regarding the role of 
ownership structure on earnings management practices. Furthermore, this paper has 
informed supervisory, regulatory authorities and users of the financial reports about 
corporate ownership structure and its role in earnings management practices. 
Additionally, it has increased awareness and understand of earnings management 
practices. 
Keywords - Earnings Management (EM), Ownership Structure, Jordan. 
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1. Introduction  
Ownership structure is one of the most important corporate governance 
mechanisms available to address agency problems, and a high level of ownership will 
lead to more effective monitoring (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Due to the separation of 
ownership and control, agency problems have arisen due to the conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders. The separation of ownership and control in 
modern corporations has led to managers’ being incentivised to choose and apply 
estimates and accounting techniques, that increase their own wealth, to the detriment 
of shareholders (Kazemian & Sanusi 2015). Thus, ownership structure has been 
considered a significant control mechanism which can play a role in limiting earnings 
management activities by management (Alzoubi 2015).  
Previous studies have focused on earnings management incentives, however 
there are many factors that may limit earnings management practices, such as 
corporate governance mechanisms (Alves 2012). Habbash (2010) argued that an 
ownership structure (managers, insiders, and outsiders), where groups had a large 
concentration of shares, had high levels of strength and incentives to control the 
company, thereby reducing the likelihood of earnings management activities, as well 
as reducing agency conflicts between management and shareholders due to the 
convergence of interests. Agreeing with that proposition, Man and Wong (2013) 
indicated that the value of the company increases when owners are also corporate 
managers. Conversely, when managers were not owners, they may have wider freedom 
to achieve their own goals, resulting in a reduction of the companies’ value. These 
studies have presented the role of ownership structure in limiting the earnings 
managements practicing and thus the affect on earnings quality.  
This study has explored whether corporate ownership structure influences 
earnings management, with a specific focus on the developing Jordanian market as a 
case study, unlike other studies which have focused their attention on developed 
countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, UK, and USA). 
Jordan has been used as a case in this study for several reasons. Firstly, there 
is a lack of studies on ownership structure and earnings management in Jordan (Al-
Fayoumi et al. 2010; Abed et al. 2012; Alzoubi 2016). Secondly, there is a high rate 
of failure and bankruptcy of the Jordanian firms, especially in the industrial sector 
(Zureigat et al. 2014). Thirdly, the impact of the world financial collapses which have 
had an influence on the Jordanian economy. All of these reasons have provided further 
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justification for this paper. Finally, the significant attention which has occurred in 
recent times, which support improved corporate governance within Jordan (Al-
Fayoumi et al. 2010). 
This study has made an important contribution to both the research literature 
and corporate governance practice in developing countries. Firstly: the contribution to 
literature; this study has facilitated discussion about corporate ownership structure and 
earnings management. It has clarified the factors that have the capacity to affect 
earnings management, and therefore affect the quality of earnings reporting. This study 
has also added to the literature by investigating corporate ownership structure on 
earnings management in the Jordanian industrial public-sector context during the 
period from 2006 to 2015. This period has included several important events specific 
to the Jordanian context. These include the introduction of the corporate governance 
code in 2008, and the global financial crisis in 2008. Consequently, the current study 
has provided an opportunity to compare results from before and after the introduction 
of corporate governance code. The current study has added value in terms of 
knowledge to existing studies. 
Secondly: the contribution to practice; this study has informed supervisory and 
regulatory authorities about the influence of corporate ownership structure, and how it 
may influence or be used to help detect earnings management. This study assists the 
users or beneficiaries of financial reports to understand earnings management 
practices, and increase their awareness about this phenomenon. This study assists in 
improving corporate governance practices, and increase the reliability of the financial 
statements within the Jordanian industrial public sector.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 has discussed the institutional 
background and corporate ownership structure within Jordan. Section 3 presented the 
theoretical framework. Section 4 discussed the literature review and hypotheses 
development. Section 5 provided the research method. Section 6 reported the results 
from this study. Section 7 submitted the conclusions about this study.   
 
2. Institutional Background and Ownership Structure in Jordan  
Jordan as a developing country in the Middle East, has issued a set of 
regulations and laws which include a corporate governance code designed to improve 
the credibility of financial statements, and minimise manipulation of the financial 
statements (Zureigat et al. 2014). The corporate governance guide (Public 
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Shareholding Companies listed on the ASE) in Jordan was launched in 2008. As of 
1/1/2009, all companies have been requested to adhere to the rules of corporate 
governance (Al-Bawab 2015), through disclosure in their annual reports the extent of 
their compliance with the code according to the 'comply or explain' approach. The aim 
of this approach was to give companies flexibility in implementation of the rules and 
sufficient time to adapt to the requirements of governance, to enhance awareness of 
these rules, and thus achieve full compliance in a gradual manner (Jordan Securities 
Commission, JSC 2007).  
The preparation of the guide of corporate governance in Jordan was prepared 
in line with the efforts of the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), with the goal of 
development of the capital market and its regulation. The guide contains rules of 
corporate governance for public companies listed on the ASE (Al-sa'eed 2013). These 
rules established a clear framework that distributed the rights and responsibilities 
within the company amongst different parties and set rules and procedures for 
decision-making (European Central Bank 2004). These rules were based primarily on 
a number of the most important legislations of the securities and legislation section. 
They were issued pursuant to the corporate law, as well as international principles set 
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Compliance with corporate governance rules enhances and improves the management 
and companies’ performance (Securities Depository Centre, SDC 2017). 
Corporate governance and its mechanisms have caught the attention of 
Jordanian researchers (Alabdullah et al. 2014; Al-Azzam et al. 2015; Abbadi et al. 
2016). It is considered a relatively new topic in the Jordanian context. One of the most 
important influences on good corporate governance, is the ownership structure and its 
relationship to a firm’s performance, top management, and earnings management. 
There are three types of ownership structure in Jordanian firms. These are: insider 
ownership, institutional ownership, and individual block-holder’s ownership which 
affect firms’ decisions and performance (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010). It is the company’s 
responsibility to ensure that shareholders know their rights to achieve justice and 
equality without discrimination (SDC 2017). 
According to the Jordan Companies Control Department (2008), shareholders 
are the owners of the company, and they enjoy certain rights, but in most cases, they 
are not expected to take responsibility for managing the company. This responsibility 
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lies with the board of directors and management, where the board of directors and 
management, in this case, are accountable to shareholders.  
With these rights, the Jordanian Companies Control Department has identified 
several responsibilities in which the shareholders of the company should be 
committed. These include that shareholders shall benefit from the meetings of the 
general assembly of shareholders to ensuring that the company is properly managed, 
in order to maximise the interest of the shareholders on the basis of mutual 
understanding of the objectives and concerns. Engage in effective participation and 
voting in meetings of the general assembly of shareholders (non-present shareholders 
are entitled to vote by proxy), and the company should also encourage shareholders to 
take an interest and participate in appointing board members and external auditors. 
Additionally, dominant shareholders are required to respect the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders. 
However, the managers often have incentives to pursue and achieve their 
personal interests which are sometimes in conflict with those of the shareholders 
(Habbash 2010). In those cases, managers would be incentivised to manage earnings 
and maximise their own benefits. Similarly to many other countries, Jordan is under 
the effect of this phenomenon (earnings management). According to, Al-Qutaish and 
Al-Sufi (2011), many Jordanian firms have been involved in earnings management 
and many departments have resorted to earnings management to enhance their 
financial statements and improve the financial situation of the company, in order to 
achieve their own targets. Al-Sartawi et al. (2013) supported this assertion, mentioning 
that many Jordanian companies listed on the ASE have resorted to earnings 
management, which has distorted the meaning of the financial reports, and destabilised 
the confidence of users in the financial reporting process. Thus, the current study has 
examined the effect of different ownership structures on earnings management in the 
Jordanian context. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
Researchers have commonly used agency theory to describe earnings 
management behaviour and have provided a solid theoretical framework for 
understanding the practice of earnings management (Rani, Hussain & Chand 2013). 
Agency theory has been used to explain the relationship between principals (owners) 
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and agents (managers), and how that relationship may be best managed (Ross 1972; 
Mitnick 1973; Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
According to agency theory, the relationship between the principal and the 
agent may lead to conflicts called “agency problems” where both managers and 
shareholders may have specific concerns and follow their own interests (Saltaji 2013). 
These problems arise when managers do not operate a company for the best interests 
of shareholders or because investors and other stakeholders are not in a position to be 
able to make optimal decisions about the company (Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim & Nemec 
2004). Thus, according to agency theory, the managers often have incentives to pursue 
their personal interests, which may be to the detriment of the interests of shareholders 
(Habbash 2010). 
When personal goals of managers compete with the shareholders' goals, it leads 
to a conflict of interest which is described as an agency cost. Earnings management is 
considered one type of agency cost. This is because when managers issue financial 
reports that do not provide a precise economic picture of the company, and 
shareholders rely on those reports, they may make unfavourable investment decisions 
(Davidson et al. 2004) which is an associated agency cost. Additionally, agency theory 
has proposed that managers who are motivated by self-interest, may not faithfully 
present the company position (Prior, Surroca & Tribó 2007). In other words, managers 
may be involved in earnings management to present a better picture of the company. 
They may do this for a variety of reasons, such as, to meet market expectations, to 
improve their personal situation and interests, or to receive bonuses which were based 
on the profit made by the company.  
Within agency theory there are a number of assumptions, which are related to 
the manager's behaviour in conjunction with financial reporting (Fields et al. 2001; 
Iatridis 2010). Based on the earnings management concept, agency theory has 
indicated that managers’ use accounting figures to influence contractual outcomes -
this behaviour reflects the concept of opportunistic behaviour (Duru & Tsitinidis 
2013). Therefore, companies need to separate decision management from decision 
control, by controlling management authority and ensuring that the best interests of 
the shareholders are the primary goal and it will lead to a reduction in agency costs 
(Fama & Jensen 1983). 
Corporate governance is considered to act as a monitoring and controlling 
system. According to agency theory, monitoring mechanisms align the interests of 
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both management and the shareholders, and reduce opportunistic behaviour which 
arises from conflicts of interest (Kazemian & Sanusi 2015). Furthermore, agency 
theory has suggested that monitoring mechanisms such as corporate governance, may 
limit earnings management practices (Habbash 2010). Davis et al. (1997 p.23) stated 
that ''The governance mechanisms are designed to ensure agent-principal interest 
alignment, protect shareholder interests and thus minimise agency costs''. Similarly, 
McKnight and Weir (2009) pointed to agency costs being reduced by a number of 
governance mechanisms which reorganise and align the interests of agents and 
principals. Further, there are a variety of optimal governance structures that minimise 
agency costs and maximise performance outcomes (McKnight & Weir 2009). Thus, 
corporate governance plays an important role in controlling and monitoring 
management decisions and protecting the interests of shareholders, which in turn may 
reduce agency problems and conflicts between agents and principals.  
Corporate governance mechanisms such as ownership structures, give 
shareholders an opportunity to monitor the work of the management. The weakness of 
corporate controlling and monitoring, may provide an opportunity for managers to 
pursue and achieve their personal interests by following opportunistic behaviours such 
as earnings management, but effective corporate governance mechanisms can reduce 
this behaviour (Habbash 2010).  
In the light of the above, agency theory can be summarised as the problem 
which occurs as a result of the separation of management and ownership in companies. 
This separation may cause a problem (agency problem) because of the different 
interests of both managers and shareholders. Thus, to minimise this problem, there 
must be an effective control system, such as corporate governance, to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and control management performance, and to protect 
shareholder rights.  
The adoption of a particular theory relies on contextual factors: information 
asymmetry, board power, and environmental uncertainty (Hendry & Kiel 2004). As 
stated earlier, agency theory has argued that the individual is primarily self-interested 
and self-opportunistic, rather than altruistic (Rashid 2009). Therefore, this study 
considers agency theory an appropriate tool to clarify the motivations and incentives 
of earnings management practices. Thus, this study has relied on agency theory in its 
hypotheses development, to test whether there is a relationship between corporate 
ownership structure and earnings management practices. 
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4. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
4.1 Insider Ownership 
  A considerable amount of literature has investigated the relationship between 
insider ownership and earnings management (Chandra & Wimelda 2018; Salehi, 
Mahmoudabadi & Adibian 2018) . Many studies have found that insider ownership 
may affect the behaviour of managers when preparing discretionary financial reports. 
In other words, managers with higher levels of insider ownership, were less likely to 
participate in manipulating financial reports, so as not to harm their interests and 
property (Huang, Wang & Zhou 2013). Similarly, earnings reports reflected more 
reliability when managers have a high level of ownership in the firm (Warfield et al. 
1995). Furthermore, Alzoubi and Selamat (2012) pointed out that the insiders or 
managers who have a large part of the shares of the company, were useful in reducing 
agency conflicts as there was better alignment of the interests of management and 
shareholders.  
In their study, O’Callaghan, Ashton, and Hodgkinson (2018) investigated the 
relationship between earnings management and managerial ownership. The results of 
their study proved that firms with low managerial ownership engage in more earnings 
management. Likewise, Alves (2012) found that discretionary accruals was negatively 
related with managerial ownership, thus she suggested that managerial ownership 
improved the quality of annual earnings by reducing the levels of earnings 
management. Yang, Lai, and Tan (2008) suggested that shareholdings by company 
officers should be encouraged, in order to reduce agency costs and thereby enhance 
information content related to earnings. 
However, high levels of insider ownership can also provide managers with 
greater freedom to undertake opportunistic actions such as opportunistic financial 
reports, manipulation of accounting figures, and choice of accounting policies that are 
commensurate with their objectives, with less fear of being removed (Huang, Wang & 
Zhou 2013). Consequently, managers who hold a larger share of the ownership are 
more integrated into the company, and therefore may have less external control over 
their decisions and actions. This provides the appropriate environment for managers 
who have a large share of the ownership in the company to practise opportunistic 
behaviours.  
This view was supported by Yeo,Tan, Ho, and Chen (2002) who have pointed 
out that there may be a positive relationship between earnings management and 
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managerial ownership, and the high level of managerial ownership can become 
ineffective in aligning managerial goals with decisions of maximum value. In the same 
vein, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) have examined the association between earnings 
management and ownership structure in emerging markets (Jordan). They indicated 
that there was a positive and significant relationship between higher insider ownership 
and earnings management, and the quality of earnings and earnings was reported to 
decrease.   
The previous studies are divided into two parts with respect to insider 
ownership and their relationship to earnings management. Firstly, insider ownership 
who hold a large share of the company's shares are considered to have effective control 
role over the decisions and performance of the company. These owners engage in less 
opportunistic behaviours such as earnings management, because of the fear that it may 
impact on the value of their property and because of the desire to increase the value of 
the company. Secondly, insider ownership who hold a large share of the company's 
shares, have greater authority and are more integrated into the company's decisions 
and performance, which provides the opportunity and environment for them to engage 
in earnings management and manipulation to achieve their goals. Therefore, it appears 
that there is no general agreement regarding the effect of insider ownership on earnings 
management. 
In line with agency theory and published empirical results, this study has 
hypothesised that a high level of insider ownership is associated with less earnings 
management. In this scenario the managers avoid any opportunistic behaviour that may 
affect the value of their shares or interests in the company. Therefore, agency theory 
has suggested that managerial shareholdings encourage managers to improve the value 
of the company because managers, as shareholders, bear the proportion of wealth 
effects (Alves 2012). Consequently, insider ownership may be considered as a 
mechanism to control managerial opportunistic behaviour (Klein 2002; Teshima & 
Shuto 2008). Furthermore, from agency theory perspective, high insider ownership 
may improve the structure of corporate governance which has been reflected in a high 
quality in financial reporting (Ballesta & Meca 2005).  
Based on the previous discussion, this study expects that increased insider 
ownership may reduce the earnings management practising. This discussion has led to 
the following hypothesis: 
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H1: There will be a negative relationship between insider ownership and earnings 
management. 
 
4.2 Institutional Ownership 
Several studies have indicated that institutional ownership is an important 
governance mechanism, which is linked to better monitoring of management activities, 
which thereby reduces managers' ability to exploit earnings (Anwara & Buvanendraa 
2019). The studies have proposed that institutions have the opportunity, resources and 
ability to monitor managers behaviour and company activities (Alves 2012).  
Habbash (2010) clarified that the institutional investors have been categorized 
into two major groups. First, long-term institutional investors, who invest in 
companies over a long period, thus, they have strong incentives to monitor those 
companies. Second, short-term institutional investors, due to their restricted focus 
primarily on current earnings. Also, she summarised that previous studies showed that 
long-term institutional holdings have a negative impact on earnings management 
activities, while short-term institutional holdings have a positive impact. Furthermore, 
Njah and Jarboui (2013) clarified the relationship between institutional ownership and 
the behaviour of earnings management for some French companies. The results 
indicated that the monitoring role of active institutional investors has reduced 
opportunistic behaviour by managers. Therefore, institutional ownership in companies 
acts as a proxy for monitoring devices that align the interests of both managers and 
shareholders (Ebrahim 2007).  
In the same vein, Ajay and Madhumathi (2015) have studied institutional 
ownership and earnings management in India. The findings indicated that companies 
with higher institutional holdings had higher earnings quality, thus limiting managers 
from using their discretionary powers to manage earnings. Also, they found that 
institutional ownership has a negative relationship with earnings management, for 
large and mature companies. Thus, institutional investors monitor companies actions, 
which in turn reduces aggressive earnings management. 
Chung et al. (2002) held the view that large institutional shareholdings may 
inhibit managers from managing earnings, as they have greater incentives for gathering 
information, monitoring management procedures and motivating better performance. 
Kazemian and Sanusi (2015) asserted that institutional ownership was linked to better 
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monitoring of management activities, and thereby reduced the ability of managers to 
exercise opportunistic behaviours. 
However, some have argued that institutional ownership does not have an 
effective role as a monitoring tool for management activities. Duggal and Millar 
(1999) employed corporate takeover decisions to investigate the impact of institutional 
ownership on corporate performance. They did not find any evidence that institutional 
investors were active in enhancing market efficiency through monitoring companies, 
suggesting that institutional investors may collude and vote with management against 
their own fiduciary interests (Pound 1988).  Similarly, Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) found 
no evidence that institutional investors have an effective role in corporate governance. 
Wong, Loo, Mohd, and Mohamad (2009) have examined the role of outside 
directors and institutional shareholders in constraining earnings management 
activities. The results indicated that there is no correlation between the degree of 
manipulation of earnings and the ratio of outside directors and institutional 
shareholders. Also, they indicated that there was weak evidence showing that outside 
directors have some influence in curbing earnings management. 
Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) had two views: firstly, that monitoring 
by institutional ownership can compel managers to focus more on corporate 
performance and less on opportunistic behaviour. Secondly, that managers feel more 
forced to meet expectations of earnings targets for these types of investors and thereby 
engage in further manipulation of earnings, and that this may increase management 
incentives to participate in opportunist behaviour. 
In the context of Jordan, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) found an insignificant 
relationship between institutions ownership and earnings management. Alternatively, 
Alzoubi (2016) found that aspects of ownership structure have a significant influence 
on earnings management in Jordanian companies, and that insider managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, external block holders, family ownership and 
foreign ownership had a superior influence on financial reporting quality.  
Thus, the results of previous studies differed regarding the institutional 
ownership impact on earnings management, possibly, because of different legal and 
corporate governance systems in each country. However, the current study considered 
that institutional ownership could be seen as a tool to monitor the performance and 
activities of the company's management, as their presence can limit managers' recourse 
to opportunistic behaviour and earnings management. Thus, the existence of 
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institutional ownership prevented managers from practicing earnings management, 
which has been confirmed by many studies (Bushee 1998; Chung et al. 2002; Koh 
2003).  
Based on the previous discussion, which indicated that there was a relationship 
between institutional ownership and earnings management, this study expected that 
higher institutional ownership would be associated with less earnings management. 
This discussion has led to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: There will be a negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
earnings management. 
 
5. Research Method 
5.1 Sample   
This paper examined whether the corporate ownership structure influenced 
earnings management in the Jordanian industrial sector. The study examined selected 
Jordanian industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during 
the period of 2006-2015. The population of this study consisted of industrial 
companies listed in ASE, which represented 64 companies at the end of 2015. The 
study’s sample included 49 Jordanian industrial companies which were selected based 
on: (i) the availability of data; (ii) the company had not merged; (iii) and the company 
was still trading and had not stopped trading during the period of the study. 
The study gathered necessary data from annual financial statements of these 
companies based on the company's guide issued by ASE during the period 2006-2015. 
The Jordanian industrial sector consists of 16 different types of industries (e.g. metal 
mining, chemical and allied products, etc.). These 16 types of industries represented 
49 firms which had financial statements and annual reports available for 10 years, 
which formed the total sample used in this paper, as shown in table (1). 
 
Table (1): Industry Classification of the Sample 
Industry Type Number Percent% 
Agricultural Production-Livestock 2 4.10 
Metal Mining 1 2.04 
Oil and Gas Extraction 1 2.04 
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Non-Metallic Minerals, except Fuels 2 4.10 
Food and Kindred Products 8 16.32 
Tobacco Products 1 2.04 
Textile Mill Products 1 2.04 
Apparel and other Textile Products 3 6.12 
Lumber and Wood Products 1 2.04 
Paper and Allied Products 2 4.10 
Chemicals and Allied Products 10 20.40 
Petroleum and Coal Products 2 4.10 
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 5 10.20 
Primary Metal Industries 6 12.20 
Electronic and other Electric Equipment 3 6.12 
Transportation Equipment 1 2.04 
Total  49 100% 
 
5.2 Variables Definitions 
5.2.1 Measurement of Earnings Management  
 Modified Jones Model Using DACC (EM1) 
Many studies have used accounting accruals to detect the presence of earnings 
management, as managers may practise earnings management through manipulation 
of accruals as it is less likely to be exposed (Habbash 2010). Healy (1995) used total 
accruals to measure earnings management, and subsequently, many other studies have 
separated them into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, and then used just 
discretionary accruals to measure earnings management. Non-discretionary accruals 
reflect non-manipulated accounting accruals items because they are out of managers’ 
control (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010).   
Prior studies used a number of models to detect and measure earnings 
management such as: Healy Model 1985; DeAngelo Model 1986; Jones Model 1991; 
Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. 1995. In this study, earnings management has 
been measured by using the modified Jones Model (1995) developed by Dechow et al. 
(1995). The modified Jones Model (1995) is the most common and widely used model 
in accounting literature for studying and measuring earnings management, and it 
provides the most powerful method for detecting and measuring earnings management 
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and discretionary accruals (Guay et al. 1996; Peasnell, Pope & Young 2000; Bedard 
et al. 2004). Similarly, Dechow et al. (1995) pointed out that, it is more powerful in 
exposing the discretionary accruals, when comparing other models proposed in the 
earnings management literature.  
In this regard, this study calculated the total accruals and then calculated non-
discretionary accruals, thus the discretionary accruals were calculated through 
analysing the difference between the total accruals and the non-discretionary accruals. 
According to the modified Jones Model developed by Dechow et al. (1995), 
which has been used in many studies (e.g. Muttakin et al. 2015; Abbadi et al. 2016), 
total accruals (TA) were computed as the difference between earnings and cash flows 
from operating activities. 
TACCit = NIit - OCFit 
The equation below was estimated for each firm and fiscal year combination. Thus, 
the industry specific parameters of the Jones model were estimated as follows: 
TACCit/TAit-1 = α1 (1/TAit-1) +α2 [(∆REVit)/TAit-1] + α3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + εit 
Nondiscretionary accruals were estimated for each year and fiscal year combination 
by using the following equation:  
NDACit =â1 (1/TAit-1) + â2 [(∆REVit- ∆RECit)/TAit-1] +â3 (PPEit/TAit-1) 
Discretionary accruals were estimated by subtracting the predicted level of 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDAP) from total accruals, and calculated by using the 
following equation:  
DACCit= TACCit – NDACit 
Where, 
TACCit = Total accruals for company i in year t; 
NIit = Net income before extraordinary items for company i in year t; 
OCFit = Operating cash flows for company i in year t; 
TAit-1 = Previous year’s total assets; 
∆REVit = Change in operating revenues for company i in year t; 
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment for company i in year t; 
NDACit = Non-discretionary accruals for company i in year t; 
∆RECit = Change in net receivables for company i in year t; 
DACCit = Discretionary accruals for company i in year t; 
α1- α3 = Regression parameters; 
εit = Error term for company i in year t. 
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 Modified Jones Model Using ROA (EM2) 
Choi, Lee and Park (2013) supported the suggestion made by Kothari et al. 
(2005) to use the modified Jones model, after introducing an additional independent 
variable, the current ROA, to control for the impact of a firm’s performance on 
discretionary accruals. Sincerre, Sampaio, Famá and Santos (2016) summed up the 
difference between the Modified Jones and the Modified Jones with ROA models as: 
The Modified Jones with ROA model takes into account the return on assets (ROA) 
variable in the estimation of non-discretionary accruals, in addition to considering the 
net revenue and receivables variables. Based on that, total accruals and 
nondiscretionary accruals have been defined as follows:  
TACCit/TAit-1 = α1 (1/TAit-1) +α2 [(∆REVit)/TAit-1] + α3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + α4 ROA it-1 + εit 
NDACit = â1 (1/TAit-1) + â2 [(∆REVit- ∆RECit)/TAit-1] +â3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + â4 ROA it-1 
Where, ROA has been calculated as the net income in year t, divided by the total assets 
in year t-1.  
 
5.2.2 Measurement of Ownership Structure 
As mentioned previously, ownership structure is an important monitoring 
mechanism, as it may restrict the appearance of earnings management practices (Alves 
2012). This variable was measured within the following ownership structure 
categories: insider ownership (INSOWN) defined as the percentage of shares held by 
officers or directors within the firm and their families; and institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) defined as the percent of shares held by institutions, which includes 
shares owned through social security and other funds. This measurement has been used 
in many studies (Habbash 2010; Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010; Isenmila & Elijah 2012). 
 
5.3 Model Specification  
The study used the following model to test the hypotheses presented below: 
DACCit = β0 + β1 INSOWN it + β2 INSTOWN it + β3 ROAit + β4 LEVit + β5 SIZEit + 
β6 CASHit + eit 
Where, 
DACCit: Discretionary accruals for company i in year t; 
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INSOWNit: The percentage of shares held by officers or directors within the firm and 
their families for company i in year t; 
INSTOWNit: The percent of shares held by the institutions for company i in year t; 
ROAit: Return on assets for company i in year t; 
LEVit: Financial leverage for company i in year t; 
SIZEit: The firm size for company i in year t; 
CASHit: Cash holding for company i in year t.  
From the above-mentioned model, the measurement of earnings management 
(DACC) was the dependent variable. INSOWN and INSTOWN were the independent 
variables. The control variables were: return on assets (ROA); financial leverage 
(LEV); firm size (SIZE); and cash holding (CASH). 
Based on prior studies, this study included four control variables: ROA, LEV, 
SIZE, CASH, since these have been found to be associated with the level of earnings 
management (Chen 2008; Sun & Rath 2009; Ardison et al. 2012; Gallap 2014; Kang 
& Kim 2014). ROA has been defined as the ratio of net profit and interest expenses to 
total assets; LEV was defined as the ratio of debt to total assets; SIZE was the natural 
logarithm of total assets; CASH was defined as cash to total assets after extracting the 
cash. Table (A1) summarised the definitions of the key variables employed in this 
work. 
 
6. Results  
Table (2) has provided the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
study. The average level of discretionary accruals (DACC) was 8.12 (median = 6.23) 
and DACC_ROA was 7.87 (median = 6.16). The average INSOWN was 51.30 
(median = 49.60) and INSTOWN was 42.06 (median = 39.42). By looking at the firm 
characteristics, it was found that the average level of return on assets (ROA) was 2.39 
(median = 3.85). The average level of leverage (LEV) was 35.16 (median = 30.59). 
The average level of ln of firm size (SIZE) was 16.91 (median = 16.71). The average 
cash holding (CASH) was 8.28 (median = 2.11).   
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Table (2): Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Observati
ons 
DACC 0.46 0.76 11.00 -49.17 41.10 490 
Absolute_DAC
C 8.12 6.23 7.42 0.01 49.17 490 
DACC_ROA 0.40 -0.52 10.32 -47.61 37.62 490 
Absolute_DAC
C_ROA 7.87 6.16 6.68 0.02 47.61 490 
INSOWN 51.30 49.60 28.29 0.20 100 490 
INSTOWN 42.06 39.42 30.25 0.00 100 490 
ROA 2.39 3.85 9.39 -58.67 43.94 490 
LEV 35.16 30.59 26.55 0.00 227.53 490 
SIZE 16.91 16.71 1.35 13.99 21.31 490 
CASH 8.28 2.11 20.97 0.00 197.20 490 
Note: table (2) presented descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables. Different 
notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC = the level of discretionary accruals 
(measured by Modified Jones Model); DACC_ROA = the level of discretionary accruals (measured 
by Modified Jones Model with ROA); INSOWN = insider ownership; INSTOWN = institutional 
ownership; ROA = return on assets; LEV = leverage, SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH 
= cash holding. 
 
Table (3) has presented the correlation matrix. The dependent variable EM 
(measured by DACC) was negatively insignificant correlated with INSOWN, SIZE, 
and CASH, and it was negatively significant correlated with ROA (r = -0.20). Whilst 
it was positively insignificant correlated with INSTOWN and positively significant 
with LEV (r = 0.15). The independent variable INSOWN was positively significant 
correlated with INSTOWN, SIZE, and CASH (r = 0.63; 0.14; 0.27) respectively. 
Whilst it was negatively significant correlated with LEV (r = -0.16). The same with 
the second independent variable INSTOWN was positively significant correlated with 
SIZE, and CASH (r = 0.33; 0.29) respectively. That means existence of earnings 
management practices in firms was not related significantly with INSOWN and 
INSTOWN. From the other hand, an increase in ROA may discourage managers to 
practice earnings management, while an increase in LEV may encourage managers to 
practice earnings management. 
In the second model, the EM measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA, 
was positively insignificant correlated with INSOWN, INSTOWN, ROA, and 
negatively insignificant correlated with LEV, SIZE, and CASH.  
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Table (3): Correlation Matrix 
 DACC 
DAC
C-
ROA 
INSO
WN 
INSTO
WN ROA LEV SIZE CAH 
DACCC 1.00        
DACC_R
OA 0.74*** 1.00       
INSOWN -0.02 0.05 1.00      
INSTOW
N 0.04 0.05 0.63*** 1.00     
ROA -0.20*** 0.05 0.09 0.14 1.00    
LEV 0.15** -0.01 -0.16* -0.04 -0.37*** 1.00   
SIZE -0.01 -0.01 0.14* 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.14* 1.00  
CASH -0.09 -0.06 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.19** 
-
0.22**
* -0.02 1.00 
Note: table (3) presented the correlation matrix. Different notations used in the table were defined as 
follows: DACC = earnings management measured by the level of discretionary accruals; DACC-
ROA = earnings management measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA; INSOWN = the 
percentage of shares held by officers or directors within the firm and their families; INSTOWN: the 
percent of shares held by the institutions; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage; 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, **, or ***: Significant at 
a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
VIF of the correlation matrix: 1.91 
 
Table (4) presented the differences in the mean values of the explanatory 
variables analysis before and after implementing corporate governance code for firms 
with a score lower and higher than the median. A Mann-Whitney test has been used to 
test the statistical significance of the mean differences. It is noted that variables such 
as DACC, DACC_ROA, and ROA differed significantly between both groups (before 
and after implementing corporate governance code) of firms. Furthermore, the analysis 
revealed that other variables such as INSOWN, ISTOWN, LEV, SIZE, and CASH 
differed statistically insignificantly between both groups. 
 
Table (4): Differences in the Mean Values of the Explanatory Variables Analysis 
Before and After Implementing Corporate Governance Code 
 Before CG After CG Mann-
Whitney test  Mean Median Mean Median 
DACC 0.16 -0.02 0.59 1.11 0.71 
Absolute_DACC 9.36 6.56 7.60 6.17 1.75* 
DACC_ROA -0.33 0.54 -0.42 -0.62 0.57 
Absolute_DACC_R
OA 9.70 7.34 7.08 5.75 
3.40*** 
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INSOWN 50.12 41.77 51.81 52.67 0.58 
INSTOWN 41.57 39.49 42.26 39.34 0.15 
ROA 4.28 5.24 1.58 3.34 3.69*** 
LEV 31.20 28.40 36.86 31.48 1.54 
SIZE 16.88 16.73 16.92 16.69 0.12 
CASH 5.78 2.09 9.35 2.13 0.13 
Total 147 343  
Note: table (4) presented the differences in the mean values of the explanatory variables analysis. 
Different notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC = earnings management 
measured by the level of discretionary accruals; DACC-ROA = earnings management measured by 
Modified Jones Model with ROA; INSOWN = the percentage of shares held by officers or directors 
within the firm and their families; INSTOWN: the percent of shares held by the institutions; ROA = 
ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = 
ratio of cash holding; *, **, or ***: Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
The relationship between ownership and earnings management 
Table (5) presented the regression results between the level of ownership and 
EM (measured by DACC). In the first model (EM and INSOWN), the regression 
analysis between insider ownership and earnings management, was run. A positive 
insignificant coefficient between the variables was found. In other words, there was 
no significant relationship between insider ownership and earning management. This 
result was consistent with many studies, such as Abed et al. (2012) and Spinos (2013). 
By considering the control variables, it was found that both ROA and CASH 
variables were significant and negative at (β = -0.1607, p < 0.05; β = -0.0251, p < 0.10) 
respectively, while LEV and SIZE were statistically insignificant. 
In the second model (EM and INSTOWN), the regression between institutional 
ownership and earnings management was run. A positive significant coefficient (β = 
.0390, p < .05) between these variables was found. This finding indicated that a higher 
institutional ownership resulted in higher discretionary accruals (DACC). That meant, 
a higher institutional ownership in the Jordanian industrial sector increased earnings 
management practices. This result was consistent with other studies, such as Alves 
(2012) who pointed out that institutional ownership may be unable to practice their 
monitoring role and unwilling to vote against managers, because it may affect their 
business interests with the company. As a result, this may encourage managers to 
engage in earnings management. Also, Cheng et al. (2001) proposed that institutional 
investors were interested in short-term financial results which created pressure on 
management to meet short-term earnings expectations. Moreover, Emamgholipoura et 
al. (2013) suggested that increasing the ownership percentage of institutional 
shareholders, increased earnings management practices. 
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These arguments indicated that institutional ownership may increase the 
incentives of managers to engage in earnings management, thus, may not have a 
limiting effect on managers’ earnings management practices. Therefore, institutional 
investors do not always exert their role as monitors (Alves 2012; Cheng et al. 2001).  
When evaluating the control variables, it was found that both ROA and CASH 
variables were significant and negative at (β = -0.1588, p < 0.05; β = -0.0393, p < 0.01) 
respectively, while LEV and SIZE were statistically insignificant. 
In the third model, both insider and institutional ownership and earnings 
management were controlled in column 3 of table (5). The results showed a negative 
and insignificant coefficient between EM and INSOWN. On the other hand, it was 
found that INSTOWN had a positive and significant coefficient (β = .0409, p < .05) 
on earnings management. Similar to model 1 and 2, the control variables were 
statistically significant for ROA and CASH (β = -0.1587, p < .05; β = -0.0392, p < .01) 
respectively, and insignificant for LEV and SIZE. 
 
Table (5): The Impact of Ownership Structure on Firm’s Earnings 
Management (Measured by DACC) 
Model 1 2 3 
Constant 
0.0677 
(1.21) 
0.0702 
(1.29) 
0.0749 
(1.35) 
INSOWN 
0.0012 
(0.29)  
-0.0037 
(-0.84) 
INSTOWN  
0.0390 
(2.40)** 
0.0409 
(2.48)** 
ROA 
-0.1607 
(-2.30)** 
-0.1588 
(-2.29)** 
-0.1587 
(-2.29)** 
LEV 
0.0246 
(1.54) 
0.0254 
(1.63) 
0.0253 
(1.63) 
Size 
0.0005 
(0.15) 
-0.0005 
(-0.14) 
-0.0007 
(-0.20) 
CASH 
-0.0251 
(-1.81)* 
-0.0393 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.0392 
(-2.72)*** 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0785 0.0893 0.0878 
F-Statistics 2.23 2.36 2.33 
Probability 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 
N 490 490 490 
Note: table (5) presented the regression results between the level of ownership and EM (measured 
by DACC). Different notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC = earnings 
management measured by the level of discretionary accruals; INSOWN = the percentage of shares 
held by officers or directors within the firm and their families; INSTOWN: the percent of shares held 
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by the institutions; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage; SIZE = natural logarithm 
of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, **, or ***: Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
Table (6) presented the regression results between ownership structure and EM 
using a different measure of earnings management (measured by DACC_ROA). The 
results have been reported in table (6). The first model (EM and INSOWN), examined 
the influence of insider ownership and earnings management and found a positive 
insignificant coefficient between them. The only control variable which was 
statistically significant for CASH at (β = -0.0285, p < .05), while ROA, LEV and SIZE 
were statistically insignificant. 
In the second model (EM and INSTOWN), this study estimated the regression 
between institutional ownership and earnings management. Similar results were found 
and reported in table (5). There was a significant positive association between 
institutional ownership and earnings management (β = .0299, p < .05). The control 
variables’ coefficients were statistically significant and negative for CASH (β = -
0.0386, p < .01), while ROA, LEV and SIZE were statistically insignificant. 
In the third model, this study showed regression results after controlling for 
both insider and institutional ownership in model 3. A positive and insignificant 
coefficient between EM and INSOWN was found. On the other hand, we found that 
INSTOWN had a positive and significant coefficient (β = .0295, p < .05). The control 
variables’ coefficients were statistically significant and negative for CASH (β = -
0.0386, p < .01), while ROA, LEV and SIZE were statistically insignificant. 
Thus, the above findings have implied that firms with high institutional 
ownership in the Jordanian industrial sector, may have higher flexibility to use accruals 
to manage earnings, whilst the insider ownership had no significant impact on earnings 
management. The reason may be due to the enacting of Jordanian Securities Law, 
which created several rules and restrictions to control insider trading; based on ethical 
and economic rationale, on the other hand, this law also eased restrictions on investors 
and outside ownership (Malkawi & Haloush 2007). This may explain why the insider 
ownership-earnings management relation was insignificant, and the outside 
ownership-earnings management was positively significant.  
Furthermore, the relation may be different according to the corporate 
governance environment, as corporate governance environment may have determined 
whether the relation was positive, negative or insignificant, especially in the economic 
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environment, where economic environment includes different ownership (diffused or 
concentrated) and types of shareholders (stable shareholders or market investors), 
unfortunately many studies have ignored the impact of environmental context (Hu & 
Izumida 2008). 
  
Table (6): The Impact of Ownership Structure on Firm’s Earnings 
Management (Measured by DACC_ROA) 
Model 1 2 3 
Constant 
0.1362 
(2.76)*** 
0.1424 
(2.94)*** 
0.1414 
(2.86)*** 
INSOWN 
0.0043 
(0.78)  
0.0008 
(0.18) 
INSTOWN  
0.0299 
(2.22)** 
0.0295 
(2.11)** 
ROA 
0.0375 
(1.01) 
0.0391 
(1.05) 
0.0390 
(1.05) 
LEV 
0.0038 
(0.31) 
0.0043 
(0.36) 
0.0044 
(0.36) 
Size 
-0.0039 
(-1.32) 
-0.0048 
(-1.64) 
-0.0048 
(-1.59) 
CASH 
-0.0285 
(-2.28)** 
-0.0386 
(-2.98)*** 
-0.0386 
(-2.98)*** 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0539 0.0611 0.0591 
F-Statistics 2.33 2.42 2.33 
Probability 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
N 490 490 490 
Note: table (6) presented the regression results between the level of ownership and EM (measured 
by DACC-ROA). Different notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC-ROA = 
earnings management measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA; INSOWN = the percentage of 
shares held by officers or directors within the firm and their families; INSTOWN: the percent of 
shares held by the institutions; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage; SIZE = 
natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, **, or ***: Significant at a 10%, 
5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
In table (7) the regression model for three main industries was run. In the first 
model (consumer discretionary) a negative significant coefficient (β = -0.1287, p < 
0.01) between INSTOWN and earnings management was found, while INSOWN was 
statistically insignificant. In the second model (consumer staple) and the third 
(energy), a positive significant coefficient (β = 0.0714, p < 0.05) and (β = 0.3683, p < 
0.01) respectively between INSTOWN and earnings management was found, whilst 
INSOWN was statistically insignificant in both models, implying that the results were 
consistent with the regression model in table (5). 
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Table (7): Industry Analysis 
Model Consumer Discretionary Consumer Staple Energy 
Constant 
0.4449 
(1.83)* 
0.2277 
(1.21) 
0.0043 
(0.02) 
INSOWN 
0.0021 
(0.05) 
-0.0230 
(-1.04) 
-0.0524 
(-0.19) 
INSTOWN 
-0.1287 
(-3.16)*** 
0.0714 
(2.33)** 
0.3683 
(2.58)*** 
ROA 
0.5507 
(2.13)** 
-0.4461 
(-4.91)*** 
-0.6174 
(-2.39)** 
LEV 
0.1247 
(1.84)* 
-0.0349 
(-1.78)* 
0.2905 
(1.15) 
Size 
-0.0199 
(-1.56) 
-0.0116 
(-1.02) 
-0.0117 
(-0.52) 
CASH 
-0.6595 
(-1.66)* 
0.2407 
(1.78)* 
-0.0832 
(-1.98)** 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4510 0.3354 0.6699 
F-Statistics 7.51 3.36 5.389 
Probability 0.000 0.0000 0.0010 
N 40 110 30 
Note: table (7) presented the industry analysis. Different notations used in the table were defined as 
follows: INSOWN = the percentage of shares held by officers or directors within the firm and their 
families; INSTOWN: the percent of shares held by the institutions; ROA = ratio of return on assets; 
LEV = ratio of leverage; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, 
**, or ***: Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
In table (8) the sample was classified into two groups: (i) prior to approval of 
corporate governance code and (ii) after implementing the corporate governance code. 
Table (8) presented the regression results between ownership structure (INSOWN and 
INSTOWN) and EM (measured by DACC). Before the implementation of corporate 
governance code, findings showed a positive and insignificant coefficient for the 
INSOWN variable while there was a positive significant coefficient for the INSTOWN 
variable (β = 0.0700, p < 0.10). However, after the implementation of corporate 
governance code, findings were that there was a negative insignificant coefficient for 
the INSOWN and a positive insignificant coefficient for INSTOWN. In models 3 and 
6, both INSOWN and INSTOWN were controlled, and the same result of regression 
was found. 
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Table (8): The Impact of Ownership Structure on Earnings Management 
(DACC) Before and After Corporate Governance (CG) 
 Before CG After CG 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 
0.0978 
(0.71) 
0.1034 
(0.78) 
0.1158 
(0.93) 
0.0250 
(0.38) 
0.0305 
(0.48) 
0.0244 
(0.38) 
INSOWN 
0.0367 
(1.02)  
0.0153 
(0.59) 
-0.0013 
(-0.18)  
-0.0148 
(-0.62) 
INSTOWN  
0.0700 
(1.86)* 
0.0609 
(1.95)*  
0.0250 
(1.35) 
0.0292 
(1.29) 
ROA 
-0.1809 
(-2.12)** 
-0.1944 
(-2.30)** 
-0.1866 
(-1.12) 
-0.2314 
(-4.51)*** 
-0.2242 
(-4.36)*** 
-0.2471 
(-3.14)*** 
LEV 
0.1010 
(2.40)** 
0.0928 
(2.27)** 
0.0936 
(2.39)** 
-0.0065 
(-0.41) 
-0.0055 
(-0.34) 
-0.0080 
(-0.57) 
Size 
-0.0005 
(-0.06) 
-0.0022 
(-0.28) 
-0.0012 
(-0.14) 
0.0039 
(1.04) 
0.0032 
(0.84) 
0.0029 
(0.80) 
CASH 
-0.0247 
(-0.34) 
-0.0552 
(-0.75) 
-0.0604 
(-0.84) 
-0.0171 
(-0.91) 
-0.0273 
(-1.36) 
-0.0231 
(-1.29) 
Industry 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.1201 0.1366 0.1245 0.0752 0.0803 0.1183 
F-Statistics 2.00 2.15 4.47 2.39 2.49 2.22 
Probability 0.0115 0.0056 0.0000 0.0009 0.0005 0.0007 
N 147 147 147 343 343 343 
Notes:  table (8) presented the regression results between the level of ownership and EM (measured 
by DACC) before and after corporate governance code. Different notations used in the table were 
defined as follows: DACC = earnings management measured by the level of discretionary accruals; 
INSOWN = the percentage of shares held by officers or directors within the firm and their families; 
INSTOWN: the percent of shares held by the institutions; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = 
ratio of leverage; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, **, or 
***: Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
In table (9), the same model using DACC_ROA as an alternative proxy of 
earnings management was re-estimated. The results showed that before the 
implementation of corporate governance code, there was a positive and significant 
relationship between ownership (INSOWN and INSTOWN) and EM (β = 0.0744, p < 
0.01; β = 0.0579, p < 0.10).  After the implementation of corporate governance code, 
a positive and insignificant coefficient between INSOWN, INSTOWN, and EM was 
found. In models 3 and 6 both INSOWN and INSTOWN were controlled, and the 
results have not changed substantially. 
This implied that before the issuance of the corporate governance code, the 
existence of the insider and institutional ownership may have increased the 
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engagement of managers in earnings management practices, but after the issuance of 
the code, the ownership had no impact on earnings management. This may be due to 
the timeframe associated with the implementation of the corporate governance code 
for Jordanian companies.   
 
Table (9): The Impact of Ownership Structure on Earnings Management 
(DACC_ROA) Before and After Corporate Governance (CG) 
 Before CG After CG 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 
0.1269 
(1.13) 
0.1914 
(1.72)* 
0.1260 
(1.11) 
0.1048 
(1.94)* 
0.1135 
(2.25)** 
0.1141 
(2.01)** 
INSOWN 
0.0744 
(2.81)***  
0.0625 
(2.48)** 
0.0069 
(0.38)  
-0.0007 
(-0.03) 
INSTOWN  
0.0579 
(1.75)* 
0.0332 
(1.02)  
0.0160 
(1.06) 
0.0163 
(0.81) 
ROA 
-0.0556 
(-0.61) 
-0.0470 
(-0.52) 
-0.0653 
(-0.71) 
0.0155 
(0.38) 
0.0188 
(0.48) 
0.0187 
(0.47) 
LEV 
0.0715 
(2.07)** 
0.0530 
(1.57) 
0.0684 
(2.05)** 
-0.0142 
(-1.21) 
-0.0140 
(-1.21) 
-0.0140 
(-1.20) 
Size 
-0.0019 
(-0.27) 
-0.0052 
(-0.75) 
-0.0023 
(-0.32) 
-0.0024 
(-0.82) 
-0.0031 
(-1.06) 
-0.0031 
(-0.99) 
CASH 
-0.0312 
(-0.41) 
-0.0345 
(-0.45) 
-0.0478 
(-0.61) 
-0.0284 
(-2.52)** 
-0.0329 
(-2.66)*** 
-0.0329 
(-2.70)*** 
Industry 
effect Yes Yes 
Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.0359 0.0200 
0.0336 
0.0531 0.0554 
0.0524 
F-Statistics 1.70 1.25 1.67 2.05 2.06 1.98 
Probability 0.0388 0.2215 0.0412 0.0026 0.0025 0.0037 
N 147 147 147 343 343 343 
Notes:  table (9) presented the regression results between the level of ownership and EM (measured by 
DACC_ROA) before and after corporate governance code. Different notations used in the table were 
defined as follows: DACC-ROA = earnings management measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA; 
INSOWN = the percentage of shares held by officers or directors within the firm and their families; 
INSTOWN: the percent of shares held by the institutions; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio 
of leverage; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, **, or ***: 
Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
7. Conclusions  
This study examined the association between ownership structure and earnings 
management in the Jordanian industrial sector, as a case study. Based on the earnings 
management concept, agency theory indicated that managers use accounting figures 
to influence contractual outcomes which reflected the concept of opportunistic 
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behaviour (Duru & Tsitinidis 2013). According to agency theory, the monitoring 
mechanisms such as insider and institutional ownership, aligned the interests of both 
management and the shareholders, and mitigated any opportunistic behaviour arising 
from conflict of interest (Kazemian & Sanusi 2015). So, many studies (e.g. Alves 
2012; Huang et al. 2013; Njah et al. 2013; Ajay et al. 2015) have found a negative 
relationship between insider, institutional ownership and earnings management. This 
study has extended these studies, in order to investigate the relationship between 
ownership structure and earnings management in the Jordanian industrial sector. Thus, 
it was expected that insider and institutional ownership would have been negatively 
related to earnings management; consequently, ownership structure was related to less 
earnings management practices.  
This research used discretionary accruals as a proxy for measuring earnings 
management, which was derived from the Modified Jones and Modified Jones with 
ROA models. In addition, other control variables were identified. It was found that 
institutional ownership and earnings management were positively related in the 
Jordanian industrial sector. Furthermore, it was documented that firms that had more 
institutional ownership have more engagement in earnings management. Thus, the 
study hypothesis has been rejected.  
Moreover, the study found that the insider ownership had no effect on earnings 
management in the Jordanian industrial sector. As mentioned before, the reason may 
be due to the Jordanian Securities Law being enacted, creating several rules and 
restrictions to control insider trading, an ethical basis and an economic rationale. On 
the other hand, these laws eased restrictions on investors and outside ownership 
(Malkawi & Haloush 2007). This may explain why the insider ownership-earnings 
management relationship was insignificant, and the outsider ownership-earnings 
management relationship was positively significant. Furthermore, in a specific 
economic environment, different ownership (diffused or concentrated) and types of 
shareholders such as stable shareholders or market investors (Hu & Izumida 2008), 
may determine whether the ownership-earnings management relation is positive, 
negative, or insignificant. This implied that the theoretical implication of this study did 
not reject the perspective of agency theory about ownership structure, as the impact of 
ownership structure depended on the economic environment.    
This study had several limitations: Firstly, this study focused only on the 
influence of insider and institutional ownership on earnings management, so future 
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studies can address other influential variables. Secondly, this study only focused on 
Jordanian industrial companies, so future studies can evaluate different sectors, 
companies or countries. Thus, future research could consider these issues as interesting 
lines of investigation. 
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Appendix (A) 
Summary of Variables 
 
Table (A1) Definition and Measures for Study Variables  
Dependent 
Variable 
Definition/Proxy 
EM Earnings Management measured as: Accounting accruals 
(modified Jones Model by Dechowetal. 1995). 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Ownership Structure 
INSOWN Insider ownership measured as: The percentage of shares held 
by officers or directors within the firm and their families. 
INSTOWN Institutional ownership measured as: The percent of shares held 
by the institutions. 
Control 
Variables 
 
ROA Return on assets measured as: ROA= net profit +interest 
expenses / total assets  
LEV Financial leverage measured as: LEV= the ratio of debt/ total 
assets. 
SIZE Firm size measured as: SIZE= Ln (Total Assets) 
CASH Cash holding measured as: CASH = Cash / (Total Assets-Cash) 
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Summary-Objective 1 and 2 
 
Objectives 1 and 2 were fulfilled in paper I. The relationship between 
ownership structure (insider and institutional) and earnings management practices was 
examined. The paper found that institutional ownership and earnings management 
were positively related while the insider ownership had no effect on earnings 
management in the Jordanian industrial sector. Although, it was expected that insider 
and institutional ownership as monitoring mechanisms would be negatively related to 
earnings management; consequently, ownership structure to be related to less earnings 
management practices. Another monitoring mechanism, that is, audit committee, has 
been investigated in the following section of this thesis. 
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AUDIT COMMITTEES AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE 
FROM JORDAN  
 
Abstract  
Purpose - This paper has examined the effect of internal audit committee on earnings 
management (EM) in the context of Jordan. 
Design/Methodology/Approach – The paper used discretionary accruals (DA) as a 
measure of earnings management. An ordinary least square regression was used to 
investigate the association between internal audit committee and earnings 
management. The data was collected from 49 Jordanian industrial companies listed on 
the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period 2006-2015.  
Findings – The paper found that audit committee and earnings management were 
negatively but insignificantly related in the Jordanian industrial sector. 
Originality/value – This paper addressed a gap in research regarding the relationship 
between internal audit committees and earnings management practices. Moreover, this 
paper has increased the awareness of earnings management practices among 
supervisory, regulatory authorities and users of the financial reports, and informed 
them of the nature of internal audit committee-earnings management practices 
relationship. 
Keywords - Earnings Management (EM), Audit Committee (AC), Jordan. 
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1. Introduction  
Corporate governance plays an important role in controlling and monitoring 
management activities. One important aspect of corporate governance is that it is a 
system aimed at controlling and supervising companies, and protecting stakeholders 
through several corporate governance mechanisms. Good corporate governance 
includes a set of mechanisms to ensure the interests of the company and stakeholders.   
The audit committee is one of the most important corporate governance 
mechanisms, which aims at controlling the performance of its members, and verifying 
the accuracy, transparency and auditing of financial statements, and oversight of the 
company’s financial reporting process (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
PCAOB 2012). The audit committee plays an important role in ensuring that 
shareholders' interests are properly protected in the preparation of financial reports, 
internal controls and audit activities (Issarawornrawanich 2015).  
Furthermore, Alves (2013) argued that the audit committee performs oversight 
functions of the activities performed by management, with regard to audit, financial 
reporting, internal control and risk management in institutions, and is therefore 
expected to protect the interests of shareholders. Moreover, according to agency 
theory, the audit committee performs oversight and audit functions as a governance 
mechanism, to reduce information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers, 
thereby alleviating agency problems (Lin, Hutchinson & Percy 2009).  
Thus, the existence of an audit committee in the company, increases the 
accountability of the board of directors and improves the efficiency of supervision and 
oversight of the accounting figures contained in the financial statements and reports, 
which are reviewed by the audit committee. This in turn improves the quality of 
earnings, and reduces the opportunity for managers to manage earnings. That means 
the existence of an audit committee within the company, may reduce the conflicts of 
interest between managers and stakeholders (agency problem).  
This study has explored whether internal audit committee influences earnings 
management, with a specific focus on a developing Jordanian market as a case study. 
This study differs from previous studies which have given more attention to developed 
countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, UK, and USA).   
Jordan has been selected as a case study for this paper for several reasons. 
Firstly, there is a lack of studies on audit committee-earnings management relationship 
(Siam, Laili & Khairi 2015). Secondly, Jordanian firms have suffered from a high rate 
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of failure, and bankruptcy cases (Zureigat et al. 2014). Thirdly, global financial 
collapses which have occurred in recent years, have had an influence on the Jordanian 
economy and provide further justification for this paper. Finally, recently, there has 
been significant attention paid to the corporate governance environment in Jordan (Al-
Fayoumi et al. 2010). 
This study has made an important contribution to both the research literature 
and corporate governance practice. Firstly: contribution to literature; this study has 
facilitated discussion about internal audit committee and earnings management. It 
clarified the factors that have the capacity to affect earnings management, and 
therefore affect the quality of earnings reporting. This study also added to the 
literature, by investigating internal audit committee impact on earnings management 
in the Jordanian industrial public-sector context during (2006-2015). This period 
included important events in the Jordanian context: corporate governance code 
introduced in 2008/2009, and the global financial crisis in 2008. Consequently, the 
current study provides an opportunity to compare the results of this study before and 
after the introduction of the corporate governance code. The current study thus has 
added value in terms of knowledge, to existing studies.   
Secondly: contribution to practice; this study has informed supervisory and 
regulatory authorities about the influence of internal audit committee, and how it may 
influence or help detect earnings management practices. This study assists the users or 
beneficiaries of financial reports, to understand earnings management practices and 
increase their awareness about this phenomenon. This study may lead to improvements 
in corporate governance practices and increase the reliability of the financial 
statements in the Jordanian industrial public sector. 
This paper has been structured as follows: Section 2 discussed the institutional 
background and the audit committee in Jordan. Section 3 presented the theoretical 
framework. Section 4 has outlined the literature review and hypotheses development. 
Section 5 provided the research method. Section 6 has shown the results of this study. 
Section 7 communicated the conclusions from this study.   
 
2.  Institutional Background and the Audit Committee in Jordan 
Jordan as a developing country in the Middle East, has issued a set of 
regulations and laws including a corporate governance code, to improve the credibility 
of financial statements, and minimise manipulation of financial statements (Zureigat 
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et al. 2014). The corporate governance guide (Public Shareholding Companies listed 
on the ASE) in Jordan was launched in 2008. From 1/1/2009 all companies have been 
requested to adhere to the rules of corporate governance (Al-Bawab 2015) through 
disclosure in their annual reports. This disclosure is required to outline the extent of 
their compliance with the code, according to the 'comply or explain' approach. The 
aim of this approach was to give companies flexibility in implementation of the code, 
and sufficient time to adapt to the requirements of the rules of governance to enhance 
awareness of these rules, and thus achieve their full compliance in a gradual manner 
(Jordan Securities Commission, JSC 2007). 
Corporate governance and its mechanisms have caught the attention of 
Jordanian researchers (Alabdullah et al. 2014; Al-Azzam et al. 2015; Abbadi et al. 
2016), as it is considered a relatively new topic in the Jordanian context. One of the 
most important mechanisms for good corporate governance, is the existence of an 
internal audit committee, and its relationship to controlling a firm’s performance, top 
management, and earnings management. 
Based on the Jordanian Securities Depository Center (SDC 2017), in regard to 
the corporate governance code for shareholding companies listed on the ASE, the audit 
committee shall undertake the task of overseeing and monitoring accounting and 
internal control, and auditing activities in the company. The audit committee is 
required to consist of at least 3 members, and some of them should be non-executive 
members. The committee is required to meet regularly, not less than four times a year, 
and minutes of its meetings must be taken appropriately. At least once a year, the audit 
committee must meet with the company’s external auditor, without the presence of the 
executive management or any person representing it. 
In addition, it undertakes other tasks as stated in the Jordanian corporate 
governance code, such as: discussion of matters relating to the nomination of the 
external auditor; following up the company's compliance with the provisions of the 
legislation in force and the requirements of the regulatory bodies; studying the periodic 
reports before submitting them to the board of directors; and any other matters decided 
by the board of directors. 
The corporate governance code also determined that the audit committee has 
powers such as: requesting the presence of the external auditor if the committee 
considers it necessary to discuss with them any matters relating to their work in the 
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company; recommending that the board of directors nominate the external auditor; and 
nominating an internal auditor to be appointed to the company (SDC 2017).  
Moreover, the code determined that all audit committee members must have 
knowledge in financial and accounting matters, and that at least one of them has had 
previous work experience in the field of accounting or financial matters, or has a 
scientific qualification or a professional certificate in accounting, finance or other 
related fields. The goal of these provisions is to alleviate agency problems. It is the 
belief that the existence of a qualified audit committee (high experience, regular 
meetings, independence) can improve the quality of earnings, the quality of financial 
reports, and reduce earnings management and information asymmetry between 
shareholders and managers (Lin, Hutchinson & Percy 2009). 
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
Many studies have shown the link between earnings management and agency 
theory (e.g. Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim & Nemec 2004; Prior, Surroca & Tribó 2007). 
Agency theory has been used widely in literature, to determine the optimal contract 
between different individuals, and to establish an appropriate accounting control to 
monitor and control management behaviour (Biaman 1982; Namazie 1985; Namazi 
2013). Agency theory is used to explain the relationship between principals (owners) 
and agents (managers) and how that relationship may be best managed (Ross 1972; 
Mitnick 1973; Jensen & Meckling 1976).  Moreover, agency theory provides 
information about, managers’ incentives to choose and apply estimates and accounting 
techniques which increase their own wealth. These incentives have resulted from the 
separation of ownership and control (Kazemian & Sanusi 2015). Thus, from the 
perspective of agency theory, managers often have incentives to achieve their personal 
interests ahead of considering the interests of shareholders (Habbash 2010).   
Consequently, this has generated a conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders which leads to an agency cost. Earnings management is considered a type 
of agency cost. This because if managers issue financial reports that do not provide a 
precise economic picture of the company, and shareholders make unfavourable 
investment decisions based on that information (Davidson et al. 2004), then there is an 
associated agency cost. Additionally, agency theory has proposed that managers are 
motivated by self-interest and as a result may not faithfully present the company 
position (Prior, Surroca & Tribó 2007). This theory has proposed that managers may 
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be engaged in earnings management practices to present a better picture of the 
performance of the company, with the goal of achieving their personal motives (e.g. 
meeting market expectations, improving their personal situation and interests, and 
receiving bonuses based on profit).  
Based on the earnings management concept, agency theory has indicated that 
managers use accounting figures to influence contractual outcomes which reflects the 
concept of opportunistic behaviour (Duru & Tsitinidis 2013). Thus, it can be concluded 
that managers may resort to altering and manipulating financial reports to cover 
opportunistic behaviour and earnings management. Fama and Jensen (1983) have 
suggested that companies need to separate decision management from decision 
control, as controlling the management authority and ensuring interests of the 
shareholders reduces the agency costs. 
According to agency theory, controlling and monitoring mechanisms as 
corporate governance tools, can align the interests of both management and 
shareholders, and reduce opportunistic behaviour arising from conflicts of interest 
(Kazemian & Sanusi 2015). Agency theory takes into consideration earnings 
management activities, and suggested that it may indicate an agency problem, and has 
proposed that corporate governance may limit earnings management practices 
(Habbash 2010). Likewise, Davis et al. (1997 p.23) stated that ''The governance 
mechanisms are designed to ensure agent-principal interest alignment, protect 
shareholder interests and thus minimise agency costs''. Thus, corporate governance 
plays an important role in controlling and monitoring management decisions and 
protecting the interests of shareholders, which in turn may reduce agency problems 
and conflicts between agents and principals.   
Corporate governance mechanisms such as an audit committee, provide an 
opportunity to monitor the work of management. Weakness within corporate controls 
and monitoring, may provide an opportunity for managers to pursue and achieve their 
personal interests by following opportunistic behaviours such as earnings 
management, but effective corporate governance mechanisms can reduce this 
behaviour (Habbash 2010).  
Likewise, Al-Ghamdi (2012) has pointed out that agency theory considers 
auditing as the most important monitoring mechanism to regulate conflicts of interest 
and reduce agency costs. Furthermore, he asserted that high audit quality, can reduce 
the opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
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In the light of the above, agency theory can be summarised as the problem 
which occurs as a result of the separation of management and ownership in companies. 
This separation may cause a problem (agency problem) because of the different 
interests of both managers and shareholders. Thus, to minimise this problem, there 
must be an effective control system such as corporate governance to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and control management performance, and to protect 
shareholder rights.  
As stated earlier, agency theory argued that the individual is primarily self-
interested and self-opportunistic, rather than altruistic (Rashid 2009). Therefore, this 
study considers agency theory as an appropriate tool to clarify the motivations and 
incentives of earnings management practices. Thus, this study has relied on agency 
theory in its hypotheses development, to test whether there is a relationship between 
internal audit committee and earnings management practices.  
  
4. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
Recent attention within the literature has focused on the effect of the audit 
committee on earnings management practices and the quality of financial reporting 
(Habbash 2019; Alzoubi 2019; Agyei-Mensah & Yeboah 2019). Previous studies have 
argued that the presence of an audit committee is associated with a lower level of 
financial statement fraud and more reliable financial reporting (Beasley et al. 2000). 
In the same vein, Anderson et al. (2004) concluded that the presence of an audit 
committee has a significant role in controlling the financial reporting and the internal 
system. Thus, audit committee is considered an efficient mechanism for detecting and 
reducing earnings management, and hence, improve earnings quality (Piot & Janin 
2007; Baxter & Cotter 2009). 
Vafeas (2005) argued that the structure and activity of audit committee relate 
to the quality of earnings information produced by firms. He found that the 
characteristics of a strong audit committee (e.g. audit committee independence; a high 
level of audit committee expertise; frequent meetings; and a large audit committee) 
helped to enhance financial reporting quality and led to an increase in earnings quality. 
Likewise, Bedard et al. (2004) and Albersmann and Hohenfels (2017) hold the view 
that audit committees who have members with financial expertise, help prevent 
earnings management. Xie et al. (2003) argued that the more frequent the meetings, 
and the more active the audit committees, the more effective monitoring is expected. 
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As a result, audit committees which include members with financial experience, and 
where there are regular meetings, help to strengthen the board structure and the 
efficiency of its work. Similarly, Stewart and Munro (2007) asserted that not only the 
existence of the audit committee, but also the frequency of audit committee meetings 
and the auditor’s attendance at meetings, are significantly associated with a reduction 
in the audit risk. In addition, it can help resolve disputes with management, and 
improve overall audit quality.  
Lin, Hutchinson and Percy (2009) studied the role of the audit committees in 
constraining earnings management and conducted their studies on Chinese firms listed 
in Hong Kong. They found that independence, expertise and size of audit committee, 
are associated with lower levels of earnings management. Furthermore, in a study 
conducted on Malaysian public listed companies, Chandrasegaram et al. (2013) argued 
that the audit committee is responsible for monitoring the operating system and 
internal controls of the company, in order to protect the interests of the shareholders. 
Similarly, Alves (2013) found that the existence of an audit committee and external 
auditor, together reduces earnings management practices. Also, she asserted that the 
presence of an audit committee in the company, is able to improve the quality and 
accuracy of financial information. Consequently, an audit committee, as part of the 
corporate governance mechanism, can play a key role in restricting earnings 
management. The existence of audit committee within the company, enhances the 
quality of earnings reports and compliance with corporate governance principles, and 
thus ensures a sound corporate governance system able to oversee the financial 
reporting of the company (Liu, Harris & Omar 2013). 
However, some studies have found the existence of an audit committee does 
not play a vital role in constraining earnings management (Osma & Noguer 2007). 
These studies have shown that the presence of audit committee does not have a direct 
interaction with earnings management (see, Peasnell et al. 2005; Osma & Noguer 
2007; Wan Mohammad et al. 2016). Furthermore, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), 
Habbash (2011), and Waweru and Riro (2013), found that there was an insignificant 
relationship between audit committee and earnings management. The contradictory 
results between previous studies around the role of audit committee in monitoring and 
detecting earnings management, is justifiable, as the mere existence of the audit 
committee cannot guarantee the efficiency of the monitoring process, without ensuring 
its independence and efficiency (Siam, Laili & Khairi 2015). 
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In the context of Jordan, Al-khabash and Al-Thuneibat (2009) examined in 
their study earnings management practices from the perspective of external and 
internal auditors. They designed a questionnaire and distributed it to a sample of both 
external and internal auditors. The study results showed that there was a significant 
difference between their views. External auditors believed that management engaged 
significantly in earnings management, that either increased or decreased income. 
However, internal auditors believed that management engaged in earnings 
management that only increased income. 
It is concluded that the existence of an audit committee is an important measure 
to control and oversee the performance and operations of the board itself, and the 
quality of the financial statements and disclosures, so that they can benefit and serve 
the needs of a variety of users. Managers may feel more accountable for their decision 
making when there is an audit committee, thus the chances of opportunistic behaviour 
by managers may be reduced. The presence of the audit committee can also be 
considered to provide protection for shareholders’ interests. Therefore, the existence 
of a qualified audit committee (high experience, regular meetings, independent) can 
improve the quality of earnings, the quality of financial reports, and reduce the 
earnings management activities.  
Based on agency theory and published empirical results, this study 
hypothesised that the presence of audit committees is related to less earnings 
management. The reason is that from the agency theory perspective, audit committees 
perform oversight and audit functions, as a governance mechanism to reduce 
information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers, thereby alleviating 
agency problems (Lin, Hutchinson & Percy 2009). Therefore, the presence of an audit 
committee in the company leads to increased earnings quality and reduces the practice 
of managing earnings. Also, the existence of full audit committees (qualified; audit 
committee independence; a high level of audit committee expertise; frequent meetings; 
and a large audit committee) and good audit committee structure, serves to strengthen 
corporate governance and limit the level of earnings management (Davidson et al. 
2005; Vafeas 2005). This discussion has led to the following hypothesis. 
 
H1: There will be a negative relationship between the presence of audit committee and 
earnings management. 
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5. Research Method  
5.1 Sample   
This paper has examined whether the internal audit committee influence the 
earnings management activities in the Jordanian industrial sector. We examined 
selected Jordanian industrial companies which were listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) during the period of 2006-2015. The study population consisted of 
industrial companies listed in ASE, which represented 64 companies at the end of 
2015. The study’s sample consisted of all industrial companies that have the available 
data to achieve research objectives. It included 49 Jordanian industrial companies 
selected on the basis of: (i) the availability of data; (ii) the company was not merged; 
(iii) and the company was still trading and had not stopped trading during the period 
of the study. 
The study gathered necessary data from annual financial statements of these 
companies based on the company's guide issued by ASE during the period 2006-2015. 
The Jordanian industrial sector consists of 16 different types of industries (e.g. metal 
mining, chemical and allied products, etc.). These 16 types of industries represent 49 
firms which have financial statements and annual reports available for 10 years, which 
formed the total sample used in this paper, as shown in table (1). 
 
Table (1): Industry Classification of the Sample 
Industry Type Number Percent% 
Agricultural Production-Livestock 2 4.10 
Metal Mining 1 2.04 
Oil and Gas Extraction 1 2.04 
Non-Metallic Minerals, except Fuels 2 4.10 
Food and Kindred Products 8 16.32 
Tobacco Products 1 2.04 
Textile Mill Products 1 2.04 
Apparel and other Textile Products 3 6.12 
Lumber and Wood Products 1 2.04 
Paper and Allied Products 2 4.10 
Chemicals and Allied Products 10 20.40 
Petroleum and Coal Products 2 4.10 
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Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 5 10.20 
Primary Metal Industries 6 12.20 
Electronic and other Electric Equipment 3 6.12 
Transportation Equipment 1 2.04 
Total  49 100% 
  
5.2 Variables Definitions 
5.2.1 Measurement of Earnings Management 
 Modified Jones Model (EM1) 
In this paper, discretionary accruals were used to detect the presence of 
earnings management. This is because managers may practise earnings management 
through the manipulation of discretionary accruals, as it is less likely to be exposed 
(Habbash 2010). Prior studies have used a number of models to detect and measure 
the earnings management, such as: Healy Model 1985; DeAngelo Model 1986; Jones 
Model 1991; Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. 1995. This paper has used the 
modified Jones Model (1995) developed by Dechow et al. (1995), to measure earnings 
management. 
The modified Jones Model (1995) is the most common and widely used model 
in accounting literature used for studying and measuring earnings management, and it 
provides the most power in detecting and measuring earnings management and 
discretionary accruals (Guay et al.1996; Peasnell, Pope & Young 2000; Bedard et al. 
2004). Discretionary accruals are more susceptible to manipulation and thus 
considered a good measurement of earnings management (Al-Sartawi et al. 2013). In 
this regard, we calculated the total accruals and then calculated the non-discretionary 
accruals, thus the discretionary accruals were calculated through the difference 
between the total accruals and the non-discretionary accruals. 
According to the modified Jones Model developed by Dechow et al. (1995), 
which has been used in many studies (e.g. Muttakin et al. 2015; Abbadi et al. 2016), 
total accruals (TA) are computed as the difference between earnings and cash flows 
from operating activities.  
TACCit = NIit - OCFit 
The equation below was estimated for each firm and fiscal year combination. Thus, 
the industry specific parameters of the Jones model were estimated as follows: 
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TACCit/TAit-1 = α1 (1/TAit-1) +α2 [(∆REVit)/TAit-1] + α3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + εit 
Nondiscretionary accruals were estimated for each year and fiscal year combination, 
by using the equation as follows:  
NDACit =â1 (1/TAit-1) + â2 [(∆REVit- ∆RECit)/TAit-1] +â3 (PPEit/TAit-1) 
Then discretionary accruals were estimated by subtracting the predicted level of non-
discretionary accruals (NDAP) from total accruals, and is shown by the use of the 
following equation:  
DACCit= TACCit – NDACit 
Where, 
TACCit = Total accruals for company i in year t; 
NIit = Net income before extraordinary items for company i in year t; 
OCFit = Operating cash flows for company i in year t; 
TAit-1 = Previous year’s total assets; 
∆REVit = Change in operating revenues for company i in year t; 
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment for company i in year t; 
NDACit = Non-discretionary accruals for company i in year t; 
∆RECit = Change in net receivables for company i in year t; 
DACCit = Discretionary accruals for company i in year t; 
α1- α3 = Regression parameters; 
εit = Error term for company i in year t. 
 
 Modified Jones Model using ROA (EM2) 
Choi, Lee and Park (2013) supported the suggestion made by Kothari et al. 
(2005) to use the modified Jones model after introducing an additional independent 
variable, the current ROA, to control for the impact of a firm’s performance on 
discretionary accruals. Sincerre, Sampaio, Famá and Santos (2016) summed up the 
difference between the Modified Jones and the Modified Jones with ROA models as: 
The Modified Jones with ROA model takes into account the return on assets (ROA) 
variable in the estimation of non-discretionary accruals. In addition to considering the 
net revenue and receivables variables. Based on that, total accruals and 
nondiscretionary accruals have been defined as follows:  
TACCit/TAit-1 = α1 (1/TAit-1) +α2 [(∆REVit)/TAit-1] + α3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + α4 ROA it-1 + εit 
      NDACit = â1 (1/TAit-1) + â2 [(∆REVit- ∆RECit)/TAit-1] +â3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + â4 ROA it-1 
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Where, ROA was calculated as the net income in year t, divided by the total assets in 
year t-1. 
 
5.2.2 Measurement of Internal Audit Committee 
Ayemere and Elijah (2015, p. 15) defined an audit committee as "A sub-
committee of the board that specializes in, and is responsible for, ensuring the accuracy 
and reliability of the financial statements provided by management". Establishing an 
audit committee is one of the major benefits for companies which help to improve the 
quality of financial statements (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Ayemere & Elijah 
2015). This variable has been measured by audit committee presence; the existence of 
an audit committee is divided into two parts, set at one if the company has an audit 
committee and zero if there is no audit committee. This measurement has been used in 
many previous studies (Goodwin-Stewart 2006; Lin et al. 2009). 
 
5.3 Model Specification  
The study used the following model to test the hypotheses presented below: 
DACCit = β0+ β1AC it + β2ROAit + β3LEVit + β4SIZEit + β5CASHit + eit 
Where, 
DACCit = Discretionary accruals for company i in year t; 
ACit:  A dummy variable given the value 1 for the existence of an audit committee and 
0 for no audit committee; 
ROAit = Return on assets for company i in year t; 
LEVit = Financial leverage for company i in year t; 
SIZEit = Firm size for company i in year t; 
CASHit = Cash holding for company i in year t. 
From the above-mentioned model, the measurement of earnings management 
(DACC) was the dependent variable, and audit committee (AC) as the independent 
variable. The control variables were: return on assets (ROA); financial leverage 
(LEV); firm size (SIZE); and cash holding (CASH). 
Based on practices from prior studies, this study included four control 
variables: ROA, LEV, SIZE, CASH, since these have been found to be associated with 
the level of earnings management (Chen 2008; Sun & Rath 2009; Ardison et al. 2012; 
Gallap 2014; Kang & Kim 2014). ROA has been defined as the ratio of net profit and 
interest expenses to total assets; LEV defined as the ratio of debt to total assets; SIZE 
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as the natural logarithm of total assets; CASH was defined as cash to total assets after 
extracting the cash. Table (A1) summarised the definitions of the key variables 
employed in this work. 
 
6. Results 
Table (2) has provided the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
study. The average level of discretionary accruals (DACC) was 8.12 (median = 6.23) 
and DACC_ROA was 7.87 (median = 6.16). The average audit committee (AC) was 
0.53 (median = 1.00). By looking at the firm characteristics, it was found that the 
average level of return on assets (ROA) was 2.39 (median = 3.85). The average level 
of leverage (LEV) was 35.16 (median = 30.59). The average level of ln of firm size 
(SIZE) was 16.91 (median = 16.71). The average cash holding (CASH) was 8.28 
(median = 2.11).   
 
Table (2): Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
Mea
n 
Media
n SD. Min Max 
Observation
s 
Absolute_DACC 8.12 6.23 7.42 0.01 49.17 490 
Absolute_DACC-
ROA 7.87 6.16 6.68 0.17 47.61 490 
AC 0.53 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 490 
ROA 2.39 3.85 9.39 -58.67 43.94 490 
LEV 35.16 30.59 26.55 0.00 227.53 490 
SIZE 16.91 16.71 1.35 13.99 21.31 490 
CASH 8.28 2.11 20.97 0.00 197.20 490 
Note: table (2) presented descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables. Different 
notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC = the level of discretionary accruals 
(measured by Modified Jones Model); DACC_ROA = the level of discretionary accruals (measured 
by Modified Jones Model with ROA); AC = audit committee; ROA = return on assets; LEV = 
leverage, SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = cash holding. 
 
Table (3) presented the differences in the mean values of the explanatory 
variables analysis before and after implementing corporate governance code for firms 
with a score lower and higher than the median. A Mann-Whitney test has been used to 
test the statistical significance of the mean differences. It is noted that variables such 
as DACC, DACC_ROA, and ROA differed significantly between both groups (before 
and after implementing corporate governance code) of firms. Furthermore, the analysis 
revealed that other variables such as AC, LEV, SIZE, and CASH differed statistically 
insignificantly between both groups. 
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Table (3): Differences in the Mean Values of the Explanatory Variables Analysis 
Before and After Implementing Corporate Governance Code 
 Before CG After CG Mann-
Whitney 
test  Mean Median Mean Median 
Absolute_DACC 9.36 6.56 7.60 6.17 1.75* 
Absolute_DACC_RO
A 9.70 7.34 7.08 5.75 
3.40*** 
AC 0.53 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.64 
ROA 4.28 5.24 1.58 3.34 3.69*** 
LEV 31.20 28.40 36.86 31.48 1.54 
SIZE 16.88 16.73 16.92 16.69 0.12 
CASH 5.78 2.09 9.35 2.13 0.13 
Total 147 343  
Note: table (3) presented the differences in the mean values of the explanatory variables analysis. 
Different notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC = earnings management 
measured by the level of discretionary accruals; DACC-ROA = earnings management measured by 
Modified Jones Model with ROA; AC = audit committee measured as: A dummy variable given the 
value 1 for the existence of an audit committee and 0 for no audit committee; ROA = ratio of return 
on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash 
holding; *, **, or ***: Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table (4) presented the correlation matrix. The dependent variable EM 
(measured by DACC) was negatively insignificant correlated with AC and SIZE and 
was negatively significant correlated with ROA and CASH (r = -0.20; -0.09) 
respectively. While, it was positively significant correlated with LEV (r = 0.15). The 
independent variable AC was positively insignificant correlated with ROA and LEV 
and positively significant correlated with CASH (r = 0.15). While it was negatively 
significant correlated with SIZE (r = -0.14).  
The findings indicated that existence of earnings management practices in 
firms was negatively related but not significant with AC and SIZE. On the other hand, 
an increase in ROA and CASH may discourage managers to practice earnings 
management, while an increase in LEV may encourage manager to practice earnings 
management.  
In the second model, the EM measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA, 
was negatively insignificant correlated with AC, LEV, SIZE, and CASH. While EM 
was positively insignificant correlated with ROA.   
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Table (4): Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VIF 
1 DACC 1.00       - 
2 
DACC_
ROA 0.74*** 1.00      
- 
3 AC -0.01 -0.04 1.00     1.06 
4 ROA -0.20*** 0.05 0.01 1.00    1.39 
5 LEV 0.15*** -0.01 0.04 
-
0.37*** 1.00   
1.31 
6 SIZE -0.01 -0.01 
-
0.14*** 0.31*** 0.14*** 1.00  
1.24 
7 CASH -0.09** -0.06 0.15*** 0.19*** 
-
0.22*** -0.02 1.00 
1.10 
Note: table (4) presented the correlation matrix. Different notations used in the table were defined as 
follows: DACC = earnings management measured by the level of discretionary accruals; DACC-
ROA = earnings management measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA; AC = audit committee 
measured as: A dummy variable given the value 1 for the existence of an audit committee and 0 for 
no audit committee; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage; SIZE = natural 
logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, **, or ***: Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 
1% level, respectively.  
 
 Table (5) presented the regression results between the existence of audit 
committee and EM. In the first model (EM measured by DACC), it was found that 
there was a negative insignificant coefficient between the variables. In other words, 
there was no significant relationship between audit committee and earning 
management. This result is consistent with many studies, such as Peasnell et al. 2005; 
Abdul Rahman & Ali 2006; Osma & Noguer 2007; Habbash 2011; Waweru & Riro 
2013; and Wan Mohammad et al. 2016. This result, as mentioned previously, is not 
surprising, as the mere existence of the audit committee, without taken into 
consideration its characteristics (e.g. independence, efficiency), cannot guarantee the 
efficiency of the monitoring process and thus the ability to detect and reduce earnings 
management (Siam, Laili & Khairi 2015). 
By looking into control variables, it was found that both ROA and CASH 
variables were significant and negative at (β = -0.1577, p < 0.05; β = -0.0248, p < 0.10) 
respectively, while LEV and SIZE were statistically insignificant. 
In the second model, the regression was run to determine the results between 
internal audit committee and EM using a different measure of earnings management 
(measured by DACC_ROA). The findings are consistent with the first model. All 
control variables were statistically insignificant except CASH which was significant 
and negative at (β = -0.0275, p < 0.05). 
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Table (5): OLS Regression Results Earnings Management and Audit 
Committee Existence 
 EM_DACC EM_ROA 
Model 1 2 
Constant 
0.0670 
(1.11) 
0.1370 
(2.50)** 
AC 
-0.0016 
(-0.19) 
-0.0043 
(-0.55) 
ROA 
-0.1577 
(-2.25)** 
0.0452 
(1.22) 
LEV 
0.0253 
(1.58) 
0.0056 
(0.45) 
Size 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
-0.0049 
(-1.64) 
CASH 
-0.0248 
(-1.80)* 
-0.0275 
(-2.24)** 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0770 0.0548 
F-Statistics 2.14 2.27 
Probability 0.0006 0.0002 
N 490 490 
Note: table (5) presented the regression results between the audit committee and EM. Different 
notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC = earnings management measured by the 
level of discretionary accruals; DACC-ROA = earnings management measured by Modified Jones 
Model with ROA; AC = audit committee measured as: A dummy variable given the value 1 for the 
existence of an audit committee and 0 for no audit committee; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV 
= ratio of leverage; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, **, or 
***: Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
 
In table (6) the sample was further classified into two groups: (i) prior to 
approval of corporate governance code and (ii) after implementing the corporate 
governance code. In the first model (EM measured by DACC), before the 
implementation of corporate governance code, the study found a positive and 
insignificant coefficient between AC and EM, while after the implementation of 
corporate governance code there was a negative and insignificant coefficient. In the 
second model (EM measured by ROA), the same results were found as in the first 
model. 
This implied that before and after the issuance of the corporate governance 
code, the existence of the audit committee had no impact on earnings management in 
the Jordanian industrial sector. This may be due to the timeframe associated with the 
implementation of the corporate governance code for Jordanian companies. It may also 
be due to, the nature of audit committees (qualified; audit committee independence; a 
117 
 
high level of audit committee expertise; frequent meetings; and a large audit 
committee), as a good audit committee structure serves to strengthen corporate 
governance and limit the level of earnings management (Davidson et al. 2005; Vafeas 
2005).  
 
Table (6): Earnings Management and Audit Committee Before and After CG 
 EM_DACC EM_ROA 
 Before CG After CG Before CG After CG 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Constant 
0.1333 
(0.98) 
0.0219 
(0.35) 
0.1851 
(1.45) 
0.1212 
(2.16)** 
AC 
0.0089 
(0.49) 
-0.0063 
(-0.66) 
0.0027 
(0.16) 
-0.0076 
(-0.83) 
ROA 
-0.1560 
(-0.94) 
-0.2521 
(-3.06)*** 
-0.0165 
(-0.18) 
0.0186 
(0.47) 
LEV 
0.0897 
(2.22)** 
-0.0081 
(-0.55) 
0.0577 
(1.64) 
-0.0136 
(-1.17) 
Size 
-0.0020 
(-0.25) 
0.0037 
(1.06) 
-0.0067 
(-0.93) 
-0.0033 
(-1.15) 
CASH 
-0.0128 
(-0.18) 
-0.0145 
(-0.93) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-0.0258 
(-2.50)** 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.1048 0.1139 0.0050 0.0527 
F-Statistics 1.78 2.27 1.13 2.03 
Probability 0.0000 0.0005 0.4300 0.0026 
N 147 343 147 343 
Note: table (6) presented the regression results between the audit committee and EM before and after 
corporate governance code. Different notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC = 
earnings management measured by the level of discretionary accruals; DACC-ROA = earnings 
management measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA; AC = audit committee measured as: A 
dummy variable given the value 1 for the existence of an audit committee and 0 for no audit 
committee; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage; SIZE = natural logarithm of 
total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, **, or ***: Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
7. Conclusions  
This study examined the association between audit committee and earnings 
management in the Jordanian industrial sector as a case study. Many studies (e.g. Piot 
& Janin 2007; Baxter & Cotter 2009; Lin et al. 2009) have found a negative 
relationship between audit committee and earnings management. This study extended 
these studies, in order to investigate the relationship between audit committee and 
earnings management in the Jordanian industrial sector. Thus, it was expected that 
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audit committee would be negatively related to earnings management; consequently, 
the existence of an audit committee would be related to less earnings management 
practices.  
This research used discretionary accruals as a proxy for measuring earnings 
management, which were derived from the Modified Jones and Modified Jones with 
ROA models. In addition, other control variables were identified. It was found that 
audit committee and earnings management were negatively but insignificantly related 
in the Jordanian industrial sector. 
This result may be due to the current study only taking into consideration the 
existence of audit committee, without considering the audit committee’s 
characteristics (e.g. qualified; audit committee independence; a high level of audit 
committee expertise; frequent meetings; and size of audit committee). This result has 
suggested that future studies within the Jordanian industrial sector should give more 
attention to the characteristics of audit committee. It suggests that the existence of a 
suitably qualified audit committee would improve the efficiency of monitoring system, 
improve the quality of the financial reports, and reduce earnings management, as mere 
existence of audit committee is not enough to improve the efficiency of monitoring 
process.  
This study had several limitations: Firstly, this study focused only on the 
influence of audit committee on earnings management, so future studies could address 
other influential variables. Secondly, this study only focused on Jordanian industrial 
companies, so future studies could consider evaluating different sectors, companies or 
countries. Thus, future research could consider these issues as interesting lines of 
investigation. 
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Appendix (A) 
Summary of Variables 
 
Table (A1) Definition and Measures for study Variables  
Dependent 
Variable 
Definition/Proxy 
EM Earnings Management measured as: Accounting accruals 
(modified Jones Model by Dechowetal. 1995). 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Audit 
Committee 
(AC) 
Audit committee measured as: A dummy variable given the 
value 1 for the existence of an audit committee and 0 for no audit 
committee. 
Control 
Variables 
 
ROA Return on assets measured as: ROA= net profit +interest 
expenses / total assets  
LEV Financial leverage measured as: LEV= the ratio of debt/ total 
assets. 
SIZE Firm size measured as: SIZE= Ln (Total Assets) 
CASH Cash holding measured as: CASH = Cash / (Total Assets-Cash) 
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Summary-Objective 3 
 
Objective 3 was fulfilled in paper II. The relationship between audit committee and 
earnings management practices was examined. The paper found that audit committee 
and earnings management, were negatively but insignificantly related in the Jordanian 
industrial sector. Other than corporate governance mechanisms (insider ownership, 
institutional ownership, and audit committee) that have been examined in this thesis, 
other factors may have an impact on earnings management practices, such as CSR, 
which has been investigated in the following section of this thesis. 
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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING AS AN 
ANTECEDENT OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM 
JORDAN  
Abstract  
Purpose - This study has examined the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
reporting on earnings management (EM) within the Jordanian context.  
Design/Methodology/Approach - The paper has used discretionary accruals (DA) as 
a measure of earnings management. An ordinary least square regression was used to 
investigate the association between CSR and earnings management. The data was 
collected from 49 Jordanian industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE), during the period 2006-2015. 
Findings - The paper found that CSR and earnings management were negatively 
associated. Furthermore, firms that provided higher levels of CSR reporting had lower 
levels of engagement in earnings management.   
Originality/value - The findings of this paper are important for both advancing 
research literature and practice. In relation to the literature, this paper addressed a gap 
in the research regarding the relationship between CSR disclosures and earnings 
management practices. Regarding practice, this paper has provided users of the 
financial reports with information to understand earnings management practices, and 
increase their awareness of the factors which influence decisions to engage in earnings 
management. 
Keywords - Earnings Management (EM), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
Jordan. 
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1. Introduction  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a significant issue for companies and 
previous studies have focused on CSR and its relationship with earnings management 
(Prior et al. 2007; Yip, Staden & Cahan 2011; Grecco, Geron & Grecco 2017; Karthika 
& Nair 2019). An important objective of CSR is about building sustainability for 
business in a responsible manner (Moir 2001). CSR relates to both the ethical and 
moral aspects of corporate decision-making and behaviour (Branco & Rodrigues 
2006). It is considered one of the regulatory tools that encourages more effective use 
of companies’ resources (Gras-Gil, Manzano & Fernández 2016). 
Disclosure of CSR activities is a way for companies to communicate their 
response to these issues with stakeholders (Yip, Staden & Cahan 2011). Sun et al. 
(2010) indicated that CSR reporting practices require the company to be accountable 
to multiple stakeholders, but can also be used as a mechanism to divert the attention 
of shareholders from earnings management activities to other issues, and as a result, 
the share price could be enhanced.   
Many studies have shown the importance of CSR in reducing earnings 
management activity (Hong & Andersen 2011; Scholtens & Kang 2013; Gras-Gil et 
al. 2016). Alternatively, CSR has also been misused by managers, with some managers 
using it to disguise opportunistic behaviour, cover manipulation, and practise earnings 
management. Managers who have manipulated earnings are able to manage 
stakeholder activism and vigilance by resorting to CSR practices (Prior, Surroca & 
Tribó 2008; Grougiou et al. 2014). 
This study examined whether firms involved in corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities are simultaneously involved in earnings management. This study has 
specifically focused on Jordanian industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE). 
The decision to focus on Jordan was motived by several factors. First, there is 
a dearth of studies on earnings management and CSR. Second, there is a high rate of 
failure, and bankruptcy cases of the Jordanian firms (Zureigat et al. 2014). Third, the 
significant financial collapses which have happened around the world have had an 
impact on the Jordanian economy, which provided further justification for this 
research. Finally, recently there has been a significant increase in the attention paid to 
improving corporate governance practices in Jordan (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010). The 
corporate governance code for companies listed on the ASE, came into effect on 1 
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January 2009 (Securities Depository Centre, SDC 2017), and required improved 
corporate governance activities. For these reasons, Jordan made an interesting case 
study for this research. 
This study has made an important contribution to both the research literature 
and practice. Firstly: contribution to literature; this study facilitates discussion about 
the link between CSR reporting and earnings management. It has clarified the factors 
which have the capacity to affect earnings management, and therefore affect the 
quality of earnings reporting. This study has also added to the literature by 
investigating CSR reporting on earnings management in the Jordanian industrial 
public-sector context during the period of 2006 to 2015. This period included 
important events within the Jordanian context: the corporate governance code was 
introduced in 2008; and the global financial crisis occurred in 2008. Consequently, the 
current study has provided an opportunity to compare the results of this study before 
and after the introduction of the corporate governance code. Therefore, it provided an 
analysis of the effectiveness of the code’s introduction. Furthermore, this study is 
distinguished from other studies, in that it examined the relationship between CSR and 
earnings management with a specific focus on a developing market (e.g. Jordan) as a 
case study, whilst other studies have focused on developed countries (e.g. Australia, 
Canada, UK, and USA). Additionally, it focused on the industrial sector which has had 
high rates of failure, liquidation, and bankruptcy. The current study thus added value 
in terms of knowledge, to existing studies. 
Secondly: contribution to practice; this study has provided information for 
supervisory and regulatory authorities about CSR reporting, and how it influences 
earnings management activities. This study has assisted the users or beneficiaries of 
financial reports to understand earnings management practices and increase their 
awareness about this phenomenon. Thus, it may contribute to increasing the reliability 
and usefulness of financial statements in the Jordanian industrial public sector. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 has discussed earnings 
management and CSR reporting in Jordan. Section 3 portrayed the theoretical 
framework. Section 4 presented the literature review and hypotheses development. 
Section 5 explained the research method. Section 6 has revealed the results of this 
study. Section 7 has discussed the conclusions reached by this paper. 
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2. Earnings Management and CSR Reporting in Jordan  
Jordan as a developing country in the Middle East, has issued a set of 
regulations and laws, including a corporate governance code, to improve the reliability 
and credibility of financial statements, and to minimise manipulation of the financial 
statements (Zureigat et al. 2014). The corporate governance code for shareholding 
companies listed on the ASE, came into effect on 1st January 2009 (Securities 
Depository Centre, SDC 2017). However, there are still high rates of failure among 
Jordanian companies, especially in the industrial sector. There were 44 bankruptcy 
cases amongst Jordanian companies during the period 2000 to 2011, where 26 
companies (59%) were from the industrial sector, 15 companies (34%) from the 
service sector and 3 companies (7%) from the financial sector (Zureigat et al. 2014). 
In addition, Jordan started total adoption of the full version of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 (Masoud 2017). However, like many other 
developing countries, Jordan ranks low on the IFRS favourable profile score (Rotberg 
2016).  
The Jordanian government has provided a number of incentives to investors, 
which is intended to attract foreign investment and increase industrialisation (Jaafar & 
El-shawa 2009). Growing industrialisation and foreign investment are factors which 
promote corporate accountability for social responsibility reporting (Muttakin et al. 
2015). However, CSR consciousness among Jordanian firms is a relatively new 
consideration (Al-Jayyousi 2011). Consequently, the Jordanian Securities Depository 
Centre adopted an initiative called "Responsibility to the Local Community" which 
reflected the centre's recognition of the importance of its work, functions and ethical 
service, towards the local community. In addition, the Amman Chamber of Commerce 
plays a leading role in social responsibility in Jordan, where many efforts have been 
made in the area of social responsibility (e.g. education and helping poor students to 
study in schools or universities).  
According to the Amman Chamber of Commerce (2017), a number of 
workshops have been held on the various aspects and prospects that can be achieved 
through social responsibility and the areas in which sustainable economic and social 
development can be pursued. The most prominent of these activities are environmental 
awareness, health care and public safety, education and training, job creation, 
development of remote areas, infrastructure development, youth and women support 
and strengthening their role in society. The Jordanian corporate governance guide 
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requires companies to disclose social and environmental information in their annual 
reports. This is covered in section five of the Jordanian Governance Guide under the 
title "Disclosure and Transparency", which stipulates every company must disclose its 
policies and programs regarding the local community and the environment (SDC 
2017). 
Few studies in the recent literature have examined the relationship between 
CSR and earnings management (Almahrog 2014), and there is similarly a lack of 
studies which have examined this relationship in the context of Jordan. According to, 
Al-Qutaish and Al-Sufi (2011), many firms in Jordan are involved in earnings 
management, and many departments have resorted to earnings management to enhance 
their financial statements in an effort to improve the financial situation of the company, 
in order to achieve their own targets. Al-Sartawi et al. (2013) supported this assertion, 
mentioning that many Jordanian companies listed on the ASE resort to earnings 
management, which would distort the meaning of financial reporting, and destabilise 
the confidence of users in this financial reporting. Thus, this study has examined the 
relationship between CSR and earnings management, and considered whether, and to 
what extent, CSR has been used by managers to achieve special goals within the 
Jordanian context.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
Earnings management behaviour has often been analysed using agency theory 
with many researchers providing evidence of the links (e.g. Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim 
& Nemec 2004; Prior, Surroca & Tribó 2007). Agency theory explains the relationship 
between the principals (owners/shareholders) and the agents (managers), and how that 
relationship may be best managed (Ross 1972; Mitnick 1973; Jensen & Meckling 
1976). According to agency theory, the relationship between the principal and the 
agent may lead to conflicts where both managers and shareholders may have specific 
differing concerns and follow their own interests. Saltaji (2013, p.47) stated that: 
Agency theory is considered as the main theory in business 
word separating ownership from management, which makes 
conflicts called “agency problems” as a result of interest 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. These 
problems are costs on a company to encourage high 
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performance of managers, need to be monitored and 
minimized to protect the company from bankruptcy. 
This conflict of interest leads to an agency cost. Earnings management is 
considered one type of agency cost. This is because if managers issue financial reports 
that do not provide a precise economic picture of the company, and shareholders make 
unfavourable investment decisions (Davidson et al. 2004), then there is an associated 
agency cost. Additionally, agency theory has proposed that managers are motivated by 
self-interest and may not faithfully present the company position (Prior, Surroca & 
Tribó 2007). Therefore, managers may be involved in earnings management to present 
a better picture of the performance of the company to achieve their personal 
motivations, such as meeting market expectations, improving their personal situation 
and interests, or receiving bonuses based on profit.  
Furthermore, Agency theory has provided information about, the separation of 
ownership and control in modern corporations that incentivise managers to choose and 
apply estimates and accounting techniques that increase their own wealth (Kazemian 
& Sanusi 2015). Thus, the most important basis for the use of agency theory is that the 
managers often have incentives to pursue and achieve their personal interests, rather 
than to look after the interests of shareholders (Habbash 2010).  
Agency theory has a number of assumptions, related to the manager's 
behaviour in conjunction with financial reporting (Fields et al. 2001; Iatridis 2010). 
Based on the earnings management concept, agency theory has indicated that 
managers use accounting figures to influence contractual outcomes which reflect the 
concept of opportunistic behaviour (Duru & Tsitinidis 2013). Thus, it can be concluded 
that managers may resort to altering and manipulating financial reports and/or CSR 
reporting to cover or deflect attention being paid to their opportunistic behaviour and 
earnings management. 
Agency theory can be summarised as the problem which occurs as a result of 
separation between management activities and ownership in companies. This 
separation may cause a problem (Agency Problem) because of the different interests 
of both managers and shareholders. Thus, to minimise this problem, there must be an 
effective control system such as corporate governance, to reduce opportunistic 
behaviour and control management performance, and to protect shareholders’ rights. 
The adoption of a particular theory relies on contextual factors: information 
asymmetry, board power, and environmental uncertainty (Hendry & Kiel 2004). This 
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paper examined whether CSR reporting influences earnings management in the 
Jordanian industrial sector. As stated earlier, agency theory argues that the individual 
is primarily self-interested and self-opportunistic, rather than altruistic (Rashid 2009). 
Therefore, this study considered agency theory as an appropriate tool to clarify the 
motivations and incentives of earnings management practices. Thus, this study relied 
on agency theory in its hypotheses development, to test whether there was a 
relationship between CSR reporting and earnings management practices.  
 
4. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
Many previous studies have suggested that companies who provide CSR 
reports are less likely to be involved in financial manipulations and earnings 
management (see, Yip et al. 2011; Hong & Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012).  The 
results of the study undertaken by Hong and Andersen (2011) showed that more 
socially responsible companies have less involvement in earnings management 
activities, and also, have high quality accruals, both of which positively affect the 
quality of financial reporting. Thus, when there is a more socially responsible 
environment, these companies may be more successful in preventing earnings 
management. 
 Gras-Gil, Manzano and Fernández (2016) supported that idea and explained 
that CSR has a negative impact on earnings management practices, as it can be 
considered an organisational device that leads to more effective use of companies’ 
resources. Furthermore, in their study of the association of earnings management with 
CSR and investor protection with 139 firms in ten Asian countries, Scholtens and Kang 
(2013) have concluded that CSR plays an important role in reducing the management 
of earnings. This role is dependent on the legal system within which the companies are 
operating. Thus, increasing efforts in improving CSR and protecting investors, may 
limit the management of earnings and improve the business climate and economic and 
social development.  
However, the current study is concerned that CSR may be used as a mask to 
cover earnings management, and that it is used by managers to achieve their own 
special goals. In other words, firms may use CSR reporting as a tool to hide their 
earnings management activities (Salewski & Zulch 2014; López-González et al. 2019).   
Alternatively, CSR may be used by managers to enhance the firm’s reputation; 
if this is done, a positive relationship between CSR and earnings management would 
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be observed (Kim, Park & Wier 2012). Likewise, Riahi-Belkaoui (2003) presented 
two hypotheses linking the level of social responsibility to both the reporting of 
earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustments. The 
findings showed that the level of CSR was positively correlated with the reporting of 
accounting earnings, and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual 
adjustments was significantly higher when the level of social responsibility is high.  
Prior et al. (2008) investigated the association between earnings management and 
CSR. They argued that earnings management is detrimental to the interests of 
stakeholders, therefore managers who manipulate earnings resort to CSR practices to 
deal with stakeholder vigilance. 
The results of research conducted by Muttakin, Khan and Azim (2015) found 
a positive relation between the level of CSR disclosures and earnings management. 
They argued that managers use CSR disclosures to shift the attention of stakeholders 
away from their opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, analysis undertaken by Grougiou 
et al. (2014), demonstrated that there was a positive relationship between earnings 
management and CSR. They explained that bank managers who manipulate earnings 
tend to intensify their engagement in CSR activities. 
On the other hand, Yip et al. (2011) referred in their study to the research 
undertaken by Chih, Shen and Kang (2008), who have investigated whether CSR is 
negatively related, positively related, or not related to earnings management. If CSR 
companies want to maintain financial transparency, they should be involved in lower 
earnings management, which means a negative relationship between CSR and earnings 
management. Alternatively, if CSR companies try to meet the multi-stakeholder 
demands, financial performance could suffer, prompting these companies to manage 
reported earnings upwards to hide weaker-than-expected results. They found that there 
is probably no relationship between CSR performance and earnings management, if 
earnings management is driven by institutional factors not associated with CSR. 
Based on the previous discussion, which indicated that there is a relationship 
between CSR and earnings management, this study has expected CSR to be positively 
related to earnings management, and CSR disclosures to be related to more earnings 
management practices. In this case, the managers may resort to opportunistic 
behaviours to cover the company's weakness, or cover earnings management through 
CSR disclosures. This discussion had led to the following hypothesis: 
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H1: There will be a positive relationship between CSR and earnings management. 
 
5. Research Method 
5.1 Sample   
This paper examined whether the CSR reporting practices of the firm influence 
the earnings management activities in the Jordanian industrial sector. Selected 
Jordanian industrial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during 
the period of 2006-2015 were examined. The study population consisted of industrial 
companies listed in ASE, consisting of 64 companies at the end of 2015. The study’s 
sample consisted of all industrial companies with available data to achieve the research 
objective. It included 49 Jordanian industrial companies selected on the basis of: (i) 
the availability of data; (ii) the company had not merged; (iii) and the company was 
still trading and had not stopped trading during the period of the study. 
The study gathered the necessary data from annual financial statements of these 
companies based on the company's guide issued by ASE during the period 2006-2015. 
The Jordanian industrial sector consisted of 16 different types of industries (e.g. metal 
mining, chemical and allied products, etc.). These 16 types of industries represented 
49 firms which had financial statements and annual reports available for 10 years, 
which formed the total sample used in this paper, as shown in table (1).  
 
Table (1): Industry Classification of the Sample 
Industry type 
 
Number Percent% 
Agricultural Production-Livestock 2 4.10 
Metal Mining 1 2.04 
Oil and Gas Extraction 1 2.04 
Non-Metallic Minerals, except Fuels 2 4.10 
Food and Kindred Products 8 16.32 
Tobacco Products 1 2.04 
Textile Mill Products 1 2.04 
Apparel and other Textile Products 3 6.12 
Lumber and Wood Products 1 2.04 
Paper and Allied Products 2 4.10 
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Chemicals and Allied Products 10 20.40 
Petroleum and Coal Products 2 4.10 
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 5 10.20 
Primary Metal Industries 6 12.20 
Electronic and other Electric Equipment 3 6.12 
Transportation Equipment 1 2.04 
Total  49 100% 
  
5.2 Variables Definitions 
5.2.1 Measurement of Earnings Management 
 Modified Jones Model (EM1) 
In this study, accounting accruals were used to detect the presence of earnings 
management. This was because managers may practise earnings management through 
the manipulation of discretionary accruals, as it is less likely to be exposed (Habbash 
2010). Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) defined accruals as the difference between 
earnings and cash flows from operating activities. Accruals are classified into two 
categories of non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary accruals 
are modifications to the cash flows of the company, by using the rules established by 
the accounting standards-setting bodies, whilst discretionary accruals are the 
modifications to cash flows selected by the managers (McNichols & Wilson 1988; 
Schipper 1989; Rao & Dandale 2008; Isenmila & Elijah 2012). Therefore, 
discretionary accruals can be a tool to manage earnings and have been used as a proxy 
by a number of researchers, to measure earnings management activities (Dechow et al. 
1995). Due to the difficulty of revealing the discretionary accruals directly through 
financial statements, some mathematical models were used to calculate them (Healy 
1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991; Young 1998). Prior studies used a number of 
models to detect and measure the earnings management such as: Healy Model 1985; 
DeAngelo Model 1986; Jones Model 1991; Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. 
1995. 
Therefore, the discretionary accruals portion has been used as a proxy to 
measure earnings management, because discretionary accruals provide managers with 
different techniques and opportunities to manage earnings. Some studies such as that 
conducted by Healy (1995), used total accruals to measure earnings management, and 
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subsequently, a lot of studies have attempted to separate them into discretionary and 
non-discretionary accruals, and then used only discretionary accruals to measure 
earnings management; non-discretionary accruals reflect non-manipulated accounting 
accruals items because they are out of managers’ control (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010).   
In this study, earnings management was measured by using the modified Jones 
Model (1995) developed by Dechow et al. (1995). The modified Jones Model (1995) 
is the most common and widely used model in accounting literature used for studying 
and measuring earnings management, and it provides the most power in detecting and 
measuring earnings management and discretionary accruals (Guay et al.1996; 
Peasnell, Pope & Young 2000; Bedard et al. 2004). Dechow et al. (1995) have pointed 
out that it is more powerful in exposing the discretionary accruals, compared to other 
models proposed in the earnings management literature. 
The discretionary accruals are more susceptible to manipulation and thus 
considered a good measurement of earnings management (Al-Sartawi et al. 2013). In 
this regard, the total accruals were calculated and then the non-discretionary accruals. 
Then the discretionary accruals were calculated as the residual, being the difference 
between the total accruals and the non-discretionary accruals. 
According to the modified Jones Model developed by Dechow et al. (1995), 
which has been used in many studies (e.g. Muttakin et al. 2015; Abbadi et al. 2016), 
total accruals (TA) were computed as the difference between earnings and cash flows 
from operating activities. 
TACCit = NIit - OCFit 
The equation below was estimated for each firm and fiscal year combination. Thus, 
the industry specific parameters of the Jones model were estimated as follows:  
TACCit/TAit-1 = α1 (1/TAit-1) +α2 [(∆REVit)/TAit-1] + α3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + εit 
Non-discretionary accruals were estimated for each year and fiscal year combination 
by using the equation as follows:  
NDACit =â1 (1/TAit-1) + â2 [(∆REVit- ∆RECit)/TAit-1] +â3 (PPEit/TAit-1) 
Then discretionary accruals were estimated by subtracting the predicted level of non-
discretionary accruals (NDAP) from total accruals, and estimated by using the 
following equation:  
DACCit= TACCit – NDACit 
Where, 
TACCit = Total accruals for company i in year t; 
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NIit = Net income before extraordinary items for company i in year t; 
OCFit = Operating cash flows for company i in year t; 
TAit-1 = Previous year’s total assets; 
∆REVit = Change in operating revenues for company i in year t; 
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment for company i in year t; 
NDACit = Non-discretionary accruals for company i in year t; 
∆RECit = Change in net receivables for company i in year t; 
DACCit = Discretionary accruals for company i in year t; 
α1- α3 = Regression parameters; 
εit = Error term for company i in year t. 
 
 Modified Jones Model Using ROA (EM2) 
Choi, Lee and Park (2013) supported the suggestion made by Kothari et al. 
(2005) to use the modified Jones model, after introducing an additional independent 
variable, the current ROA, to control the impact of a firm’s performance on 
discretionary accruals. Sincerre, Sampaio, Famá and Santos (2016) summed up the 
difference between the Modified Jones and the Modified Jones with ROA models as: 
The Modified Jones with ROA model takes into account the return on assets (ROA) 
variable in the estimation of non-discretionary accruals. In addition to considering the 
net revenue and receivables variables. Based on that, total accruals and 
nondiscretionary accruals have been defined as follows:  
TACCit/TAit-1 = α1 (1/TAit-1) +α2 [(∆REVit)/TAit-1] + α3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + α4 ROA it-1 + εit 
      NDACit = â1 (1/TAit-1) + â2 [(∆REVit- ∆RECit)/TAit-1] +â3 (PPEit/TAit-1) + â4 ROA it-1 
Where, ROA was calculated as the net income in year t divided by the total assets in 
year t-1. 
 
5.2.2 Measurement of Corporate Social Responsibility 
To assess the CSR reporting, a checklist comprising 25 items was developed 
based on previous studies (Rashid & Lodh 2008; Omar & Zallom 2016). These 25 
items (see Appendix) represent four themes (product, community, employee, and 
environment) which are relevant within the Jordanian environment. A dichotomous 
procedure is used where a value “1” was given to a particular item if it was disclosed 
and “0” if not disclosed. This measurement methodology has been used in numerous 
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studies (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Rashid & Lodh 2008; Mohamad et al. 2010). 
Accordingly, the CSR was calculated as follows: 
CSRDj Index = ∑njt=1 Xij / nj; 
Where, 
CSRDj index = the corporate social responsibility disclosure index for j-th firm; 
nj = the number of items expected for j-th firm, where n<=25 and Xij = 1, if j-th items 
were disclosed for firm j, otherwise 0. 
 
5.3 Model Specification  
The study used the following model to test the hypotheses which has been 
presented below: 
DACCit = β0+ β1 CSRit + β2 ROAit + β3 LEVit + β4 SIZEit + β5 CASHit + eit 
Where, 
DACCit = Discretionary accruals for company i in year t; 
CSRit = Corporate social responsibility, score/index; 
ROAit = Return on assets for company i in year t; 
LEVit = Financial leverage for company i in year t; 
SIZEit = Firm size for company i in year t; 
CASHit = Cash holding for company i in year t. 
From the above-mentioned model, the measurement of earnings management 
(DACC) was the dependent variable, and CSR the independent variable. The control 
variables were: return on assets (ROA); financial leverage (LEV); firm size (SIZE); 
and cash holding (CASH). 
Based on prior studies, this study included four control variables: ROA, LEV, 
SIZE, CASH, since these have been found to be associated with earnings management 
(Chen 2008; Sun & Rath 2009; Ardison et al. 2012; Gallap 2014; Kang & Kim 2014). 
ROA has been defined as the ratio of net profit and interest expenses to total assets; 
LEV defined as the ratio of debt to total assets; SIZE the natural logarithm of total 
assets; CASH defined as cash to total assets after extracting the cash. Table (A1) 
summarised the definitions of the key variables employed in this work. 
 
6. Results  
Table (2) has provided the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
study. The average level of discretionary accruals (DACC) was 8.12 (median = 6.23) 
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and DACC_ROA was 7.87 (median = 6.16). The average disclosure score (CSR ratio) 
was 56.26 (median = 56.00). By looking at the firms’ characteristics, it was that the 
average level of return on assets (ROA) was 2.39 (median = 3.85). The average level 
of leverage (LEV) was 35.16 (median = 30.59). The average level of ln of firm size 
(SIZE) was 16.91 (median = 16.71). The average cash holding (CASH ratio) was 8.28 
(median = 2.11).   
 
Table (2): Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Observe. 
Residuals -0.03 -0.05 9.74 -50.82 40.12 490 
Absolute_Resid
uals 
7.00 5.22 6.77 0.00 50.82 490 
NDAC -1.76 -1.94 11.28 -94.55 43.27 490 
DACC 0.46 0.76 11.00 -49.17 41.10 490 
Absolute_DAC
C 
8.12 6.23 7.42 0.01 49.17 490 
DACC_ROA 0.40 -0.52 10.32 -47.61 37.62 490 
Absolute_DAC
C_ROA 7.87 6.16 6.68 0.02 47.61 490 
CSR Ratio 56.26 56.00 15.68 20.00 96.00 490 
Environment 42.86 37.50 21.00 0.00 100.00 490 
Employees 64.93 57.14 14.35 0.00 100.00 490 
Community 51.22 60.00 30.57 0.00 100.00 490 
Product 70.61 80.00 19.57 20.00 100.00 490 
ROA 2.39 3.85 9.39 -58.67 43.94 490 
LEV 35.16 30.59 26.55 0.00 227.53 490 
SIZE 16.91 16.71 1.35 13.99 21.31 490 
CASH 8.28 2.11 20.97 0.00 197.20 490 
Note: the following table has presented descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables. 
Different notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC = the level of discretionary 
accruals (measured by Modified Jones Model); DACC_ROA = the level of discretionary accruals 
(measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA); CSR Ratio = corporate social responsibility 
disclosure score/ index; Environment, Employees, Community, and Product = sup CSR sup score/ 
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index; ROA = return on assets; LEV = leverage, SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = 
cash holding.  
 
Table (3) presented the correlation matrix. The dependent variable EM 
(measured by DACC) was negatively correlated with CSR (r = -0.06), ROA (r = -
0.20), SIZE (r = -0.01), and CASH (r = -0.09). While, it was positively correlated with 
LEV (r = 0.15). The independent variable CSR was positively correlated with ROA (r 
= 0.23), LEV (r = 0.08), and SIZE (r = 0.57). While, it was negatively correlated with 
CASH (r = -0.03). On the other hand, the EM measured by Modified Jones Model with 
ROA was negatively correlated with CSR, LEV, SIZE and CASH (r = -0.10, -0.01, -
0.01, -0.06) respectively, and positively correlated with ROA (r = 0.05).  This meant 
that there was a negative relationship which existed between CSR reporting and 
earnings management level. In other words, Jordanian industrial companies exercised 
less earnings management when they make higher levels of CSR disclosures.  
 
Table (3): Correlation Matrix 
 
DACC 
DACC-
ROA CSR ROA LEV Size CASH 
DACC 1 
      
DACC_R
OA 0.74*** 1.00 
     
CSR  -0.06 -0.10** 1.00 
    
ROA -0.20*** 0.05 0.23*** 1.00 
   
LEV 0.15*** -0.01 0.08* -0.37*** 1.00 
  
Size -0.01 -0.01 0.57*** 0.31*** 0.14*** 1.00 
 
CASH  -0.09** -0.06 -0.03 0.19*** -0.22*** -0.02 1.00 
Note:  the following table presented the correlation matrix. Different notations used in the table were 
defined as follows: DACC = earnings management measured by the level of discretionary accruals; 
DACC-ROA = earnings management measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA; CSR = corporate 
social responsibility disclosure score/ index; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage; 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding; *, **, or ***: Significant at a 
10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  
VIF of the correlation matrix: 1.64.  
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Table (4) presented the differences in the mean values of the explanatory 
variables analysis across the CSR scores for both group of firms with a score lower 
and higher than the median. A Mann-Whitney test has been used to test the statistical 
significance of the mean differences. It was noted that variables such as DACC_ROA, 
CSR, ROA, LEV and SIZE differed significantly between both groups of firms. 
Furthermore, the analysis revealed that other variables such as DACC and CASH 
differed insignificantly between both groups.  
 
Table (4): Differences in the Value of the Explanatory Variables Between Firms 
with Lower and Higher CSR 
 Low CSR firms High CSR firms 
Mann-
Whitney test 
 
Mean Median Mean Median  
DACC -0.67 -0.31 1.53 1.69 2.24** 
Absolute_DACC 8.65 6.21 7.64 6.25 0.81 
DACC_ROA -0.99 -0.82 0.16 -0.38 1.09 
Absolute_DACC_RO
A 8.43 6.54 7.34 5.78 
1.86* 
CSR Ratio 43.75 48.00 67.98 64.00 19.22*** 
Environment 29.43 37.50 55.43 50.00 14.33*** 
Employees 57.20 57.14 72.16 71.43 11.83*** 
Community 30.72 40.00 70.43 80.00 14.70*** 
Product 60.84 60.00 79.76 80.00 10.46*** 
ROA 0.84 3.49 3.84 4.46 2.67*** 
LEV 33.37 27.34 36.84 32.53 2.21** 
SIZE 16.44 16.59 17.35 16.76 5.89*** 
CASH  10.80 2.26 5.92 2.04 0.53 
N 237 253  
Note: the following table presented the results for the mean difference test among different variables. 
Different notations used in table were defined as follows: DACC = the level of discretionary accruals 
(measured by Modified Jones Model); DACC_ROA = the level of discretionary accruals (measured 
by Modified Jones Model with ROA); CSR Ratio = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ 
index; Environment, Employees, Community, and Product = sup CSR sup score/ index; ROA = ratio 
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of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage, SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio 
of cash holding; *, **, or ***: Significant at a 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  
 
Table (5) presented the regression results between CSR and EM (measured by 
DACC). In the full sample, a negative insignificant coefficient for the CSR variable 
was found. In other words, there was no significant relationship between CSR and 
earning management. The reason may be due to the fact that allocated cost by company 
towards CSR in the Jordanian industrial sector, is not high enough to have an influence 
on earning management. This result was consistent with many studies, such as 
Grougioua et al. (2014), who found in their study that banks active in CSR activities 
were also engaged in EM practices, however the reverse relationship was not 
significant. In other words, there is a negative insignificant relationship between CSR 
and EM. Chih, Shen and Kang (2008) found that there was probably no relationship 
between CSR performance and earnings management if earnings management 
activities were driven by institutional factors un-associated with CSR. In addition, 
CASH and ROA had a negative impact on the level of DACC, while SIZE and LEV 
had a positive impact. The coefficient of these control variables was statistically 
insignificant for LEV and SIZE, while ROA and CASH were statistically significant 
(β = -0.1564, p < 0.05; β = -0.0263, p < 0.10) respectively.   
In column 2 of table (5), regression for two samples was run: (i) positive 
sample, and (ii) negative sample group. The analysis for positive discretionary accruals 
sample group found that CSR and CASH had negative insignificant coefficients. The 
ROA, and LEV had positive significant coefficients (β = 0.1486, p < 0.05; β = 0.0367, 
p < 0.10) respectively. SIZE had a positive insignificant coefficient. Similar negative 
insignificant results were found when the regression for negative sample group was 
estimated. The results showed that CSR had a negative insignificant coefficient. 
Turning to other coefficients, it was found that LEV and CASH had negative 
insignificant coefficients while ROA had a positive significant coefficient (β = 0.3679, 
p < 0.01). 
 
Table (5): OLS Regression Results: The Impact of CSR Reporting on Earnings 
Management (DACC) 
 
Full Sample Positive DACC Negative DACC 
Constant 0.0508 0.0794 -0.0596 
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(0.92) (1.11) (-0.69) 
CSR 
-0.0053 
(-0.20) 
-0.0543 
(-1.43) 
-0.0457 
(-1.15) 
ROA 
-0.1564 
(-2.24)** 
0.1486 
(2.12)** 
0.3679 
(4.91)*** 
LEV 
0.0264 
(1.66) 
0.0367 
(1.81)* 
-0.0105 
(-0.51) 
Size 
0.0004 
(0.12) 
0.0023 
(0.48) 
0.0000 
(0.01) 
CASH 
-0.0263 
(-1.89)* 
-0.0123 
(-0.58) 
-0.0003 
(-0.02) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.1312 0.1663 0.3561 
F-Statistics 2.19 2.13 3.40 
Probability 0.0006 0.0011 0.0000 
N 490 263 227 
Note: the following table presented the results of regression analyses. Different notations used in the 
table were defined as follows: DACC = the level of discretionary accruals; CSR Ratio = corporate 
social responsibility disclosure score/ index; Environment, Employees, Community, and Product = 
sup CSR sup score/ index; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage, SIZE = natural 
logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding. 
 
Table (6) presented the regression results between CSR and EM (measured by 
DACC_ROA). In the full sample, a negative significant coefficient (β = -0.0566, p < 
0.05) of CSR variable was found. This finding indicated that a higher CSR disclosure 
resulted in lower discretionary accruals (DACC), suggesting that a higher CSR 
disclosure reduced the earnings management practices of the firm. Thus, the study 
hypothesis was rejected, and implied that CSR may not be the way that managers resort 
to cover earnings management practices. In other words, managers in the Jordanian 
industrial sector may not resort to use CSR reporting as a way to practice opportunistic 
behaviour. This result was consistent with many studies, such as Hong and Andersen 
(2011), Almahrog (2014), and Gras-Gil, Manzano and Fernández (2016), as these 
studies also documented a negative relationship between CSR disclosures and earnings 
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management. They argued that more socially responsible companies have less reliance 
on earnings management activity, and also have high quality accruals, both of which 
affect the quality of financial reporting.  
Thus, the above findings implied that firms with high CSR disclosure may be 
more successful in prohibiting earnings management, when there is a more socially 
responsible environment. Therefore, it may act as a regulatory mechanism leading to 
more effective use of companies’ resources. It was also found that the level of DACC 
was also affected by other factors such as, ROA, LEV, and SIZE, as these variables 
were found to have a positive impact on the level of DACC, whilst CASH had a 
negative impact. The control variables’ coefficients were statistically significant for 
ROA and CASH (β = 0.0681, p < 0.10; β = -0.0226, p < 0.05) respectively, while LEV 
and SIZE were statistically insignificant.  
By looking at the sub sample of positive group, a negative and insignificant 
coefficient for the CSR variable was found. ROA and LEV had positive significant 
coefficients (β = 0.1051, p < 0.10; β = 0.0342, p < 0.10) respectively. The SIZE had a 
negative and insignificant coefficient and CASH a negative and significant coefficient 
(β = -0.0524, p < 0.10). For the negative accruals group, it was found that CSR had 
negative and significant coefficient (β = -0.0693, p < 0.05). It was also found that the 
coefficients of the control variables were statistically insignificant for the negative 
accruals group. 
 
Table (6): OLS Regression Results: The Impact of CSR Reporting on Earnings 
Management (DACC_ROA) 
 
Full Sample Positive DACC Negative DACC 
Constant 
0.1039 
(2.32)*** 
0.0874 
(1.48) 
0.0921 
(1.38) 
CSR 
-0.0566 
(-2.22)** 
-0.0307 
(-0.87) 
-0.0693 
(-2.10)** 
ROA 
0.0681 
(1.93)* 
0.1051 
(1.80)* 
0.0221 
(0.53) 
LEV 
0.0033 
(0.30) 
0.0342 
(1.75)* 
-0.0141 
(-1.08) 
Size 0.0013 -0.0013 0.0035 
148 
 
(0.43) (-0.31) (0.83) 
CASH 
-0.0226 
(-2.43)** 
-0.0524 
(-1.83)* 
-0.0096 
(-0.76) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0639 0.1034 0.1326 
F-Statistics 2.83 2.60 3.26 
Probability 0.0004 0.0017 0.0001 
N 490 232 258 
Note: the following table presented the results of regression analyses. Different notations used in the 
table were defined as follows: DACC_ROA = the level of discretionary accruals (measured by 
Modified Jones Model with ROA); CSR Ratio = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ 
index; Environment, Employees, Community, and Product = sup CSR sup score/ index; ROA = ratio 
of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage, SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio 
of cash holding.  
 
In table (7), the sample was further classified into two groups: (i) prior to 
approval of corporate governance code and (ii) after implementing the corporate 
governance code. Table (7) presented the regression results between CSR and EM 
(measured by DACC). Before the implementation of the corporate governance code, 
it was found that there was a negative and insignificant coefficient for the CSR 
variable, however after the implementation of the corporate governance code, a 
positive insignificant coefficient between those variables was found.  
 
Table (7): OLS Regression Results: The Impact of CSR Reporting on Earnings 
Management (DACC) Before and After Corporate Governance (CG) 
 
Before CG After CG 
Constant 
0.1410 
(1.19) 
0.0153 
(0.25) 
CSR 
-0.0481 
(-0.97) 
0.0211 
(0.64) 
ROA 
-0.1381 
(-0.84) 
-0.2553 
(-3.06)*** 
LEV 0.0955 -0.0084 
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(2.43)** (-0.57) 
Size 
-0.0004 
(-0.05) 
0.0029 
(0.75) 
CASH 
-0.0124 
(-0.19) 
-0.0139 
(-0.86) 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.2411 0.1811 
F-Statistics 5.48 2.21 
Probability 0.0000 0.0008 
N 147 343 
Note: the following table presented the results of regression analyses before and after corporate 
governance. Different notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC = the level of 
discretionary accruals; CSR Ratio = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ index; 
Environment, Employees, Community, and Product = sup CSR sup score/ index; ROA = ratio of 
return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage, SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of 
cash holding. 
 
In table (8), the same model using DACC_ROA was re-estimated as an 
alternative proxy of earnings management. The results showed that before the 
implementation of corporate governance code, there was a negative and significant 
relationship between CSR and EM (β = -0.1105, p < 0.01). The coefficients of control 
variables were statistically insignificant.  After the implementation of corporate 
governance code, a negative and insignificant coefficient between CSR and EM was 
found. The coefficients of control variables were statistically insignificant except 
CASH, which had a negative significant coefficient (β = -0.0225, p < 0.01). 
This implied that before the issuance of the corporate governance code, the 
existence of the CSR disclosure requirements may have reduced the engagement of 
managers in earnings management practices, but after the issuance of the code, the 
CSR disclosure had no impact on earnings management. This may be due to the 
timeframe associated with the implementation of the corporate governance code for 
Jordanian companies; however, the result of the study showed that the commitment of 
Jordanian industrial companies to reporting of CSR, reduced the management of 
earnings practices. Therefore, if there are earnings management practices in the 
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Jordanian industrial companies, it may be driven by other institutional factors 
unrelated with CSR. 
 
Table (8): OLS Regression Results: The Impact of CSR Reporting on Earnings 
Management (DACC_ROA) Before and After Corporate Governance (CG) 
 
Before CG After CG 
Constant 
0.0459 
(0.37) 
0.1299 
(2.91)*** 
CSR 
-0.1105 
(-2.19)*** 
-0.0164 
(-0.59) 
ROA 
0.0362 
(0.53) 
0.0569 
(1.49) 
LEV 
0.0472 
(1.60) 
-0.0041 
(-0.37) 
Size 
0.0075 
(1.01) 
-0.0025 
(-0.83) 
CASH 
0.0478 
(1.11) 
-0.0225 
(-2.91)*** 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0982 0.0534 
F-Statistics 1.61 1.87 
Probability 0.1174 0.0368 
N 147 343 
Note: the following table presented the results of regression analyses before and after corporate 
governance. Different notations used in the table were defined as follows: DACC_ROA = the level 
of discretionary accruals (measured by Modified Jones Model with ROA); CSR Ratio = corporate 
social responsibility disclosure score/ index; Environment, Employees, Community, and Product = 
sup CSR sup score/ index; ROA = ratio of return on assets; LEV = ratio of leverage, SIZE = natural 
logarithm of total assets; CASH = ratio of cash holding. 
 
7. Conclusions  
This study examined the association between CSR reporting and earnings 
management in the Jordanian industrial sector as a case study. Based on the earnings 
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management concept, agency theory indicated that manager’s use accounting figures 
to influence contractual outcomes, which reflects the concept of opportunistic 
behaviour (Duru & Tsitinidis 2013). Furthermore, the agency theory perspective 
implied that CSR is a misuse of firm resources, and indicative of self-serving 
behaviour of managers (McWilliams et al. 2006). Many studies (e.g. Prior et al. 2008; 
Grougiou et al. 2014; Muttakin et al. 2015) have found a positive relationship between 
CSR and earnings management. This research extended these studies, in order to 
investigate the relationship between CSR and earnings management in the Jordanian 
industrial sector. Thus, it was expected that CSR would be positively related to 
earnings management; consequently, CSR disclosures would be related to more 
earnings management practices.  
This research used discretionary accruals as a proxy for measuring earnings 
management, which was derived from the Modified Jones and Modified Jones with 
ROA models. In addition, other control variables were identified. It was found that 
CSR and earnings management were negatively related in the Jordanian industrial 
sector. Furthermore, it was documented that firms that provide more CSR reporting 
had less engagement in earnings management. Thus, the study hypothesis has been 
rejected. This may be due to several factors: 
 The CSR reporting was considered in many cases as a regulatory 
mechanism that resulted in more efficient use of resources, which then 
had a negative effect on earnings management practices (Gras-Gil et al. 
2016);  
 The existence of foreign ownership in the companies, as previous 
studies indicated that the companies with foreign ownership were 
encouraged to report or disclose CSR more broadly and supported in 
doing CSR (Barkemeyer 2007; Meutia, Mukhtaruddin, Saftiana, & 
Faisal 2017);  
 Or there are other reasons that could be considered in future research. 
These findings implied that if CSR companies want to maintain their financial 
performance and handle societies pressures to adopt CSR activities, they should be 
involved in lower earnings management (Chih et al. 2008). The theoretical implication 
of this study does not reject the perspective of agency theory about CSR, as firms will 
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adopt an approach or a combination of approaches, according to their targets for their 
respective CSR initiatives, and find an economic justification for adopting CSR 
projects (Boesso et al. 2013).    
This study had several limitations: Firstly, this study focused only on the 
influence of CSR on earnings management, so future studies can address other 
influential variables. Secondly, this study only focused on Jordanian industrial 
companies, so future studies can evaluate different sectors, companies or countries. 
Thus, future research could consider these issues as interesting lines of investigation. 
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Appendix (A) 
Summary of Variables 
 
Table (A1): Definition and Measures for Study Variables  
Dependent 
Variable 
Definition/Proxy 
EM Earnings Management measured as: Accounting accruals 
(modified Jones Model by Dechowetal. 1995). 
Independent 
Variables 
 
CSR Corporate social responsibility measured as: using CSR index, 
and a value “1” is given to a particular item if it is disclosed and 
“0” if it is not disclosed. 
Control 
Variables 
 
ROA Return on assets measured as: ROA= net profit +interest expenses 
/ total assets  
LEV Financial leverage measured as: LEV= the ratio of debt/ total 
assets. 
SIZE Firm size measured as: SIZE= Ln (Total Assets) 
CASH Cash holding measured as: CASH = Cash / (Total Assets-Cash) 
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Appendix (B) 
Table (B1): CSR Disclosure Items 
(1) Product Information: 
 Types of products disclosed. 
  Product safety programs. 
 Quality reward on products and services (such as ISO 900). 
 R&D programs that aim to improve products and services. 
 Distribution of marketing places in domestic and foreign markets. 
(2) Community Involvement:  
 Community program (health and education). 
 Charitable donations of support other programs for community (i.e. art and 
sports). 
 Creating job opportunities for unemployed individuals. 
 Support for volunteer and social awareness programs. 
 Support for the local community in training programs in the corporation. 
      (3) Employee Information  
 Number of employees in the company. 
 Employees’ education. 
 Employees’ training. 
 Employee health and safety programs. 
 Employee social guarantee benefit scheme. 
 Employee welfare. 
 Loans to employees for housing and other facilities. 
     (4) Environment  
 Compliance with environmental regulations. 
 Support for public activities designed to protect the environment. 
 Recycling plant of waste products. 
 Improving the surrounding environment, such as tree plantation programs. 
 Design pollution prevention programs (i.e. air, water, land and noise). 
 Energy savings. 
 Conservation of national resources. 
 Awards for environmental protection (i.e. ISO 14001). 
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Summary-Objective 4 
 
Objective 4 was fulfilled in paper III. The relationship between company 
attitudes to CSR and earnings management practices was examined. The paper found 
that CSR and earnings management are negatively associated in the Jordanian 
industrial sector. Although, it was expected that CSR would be positively related to 
earnings management; consequently, CSR disclosures would be related to more 
earnings management practices.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined the factors that affect earnings management practices. 
These factors included corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure and 
internal audit committees) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures. 
Earnings management has captured the attention of researchers because 
accounting earnings are considered to be among the most important indicators of the 
financial performance of a company, and this subject remains a fruitful area for 
academic research. As a result of the practice of earnings management, financial crises 
may occur in companies, resulting in weakening reliability and doubtful fairness of 
published financial statements. There are many factors that may limit earnings 
management practices, such as corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate 
governance plays an important role in controlling and monitoring management 
activities. It includes rules, practices, policies, and processes for management, for the 
control and monitoring of companies. Another factor that may influence earnings 
management is CSR disclosures. CSR is a significant issue for companies, and 
previous studies have focused on CSR and its relationship with earnings management. 
The current study has used discretionary accruals as a proxy for measuring 
earnings management, which was derived from the Modified Jones and Modified 
Jones with ROA models. In addition, other control variables were identified. The 
study’s sample consisted of all industrial companies that have the available data to 
achieve the research objectives. The data was collected from 49 Jordanian industrial 
companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period 2006-2015.  
The thesis aims were addressed through papers. The first paper addressed the 
first and second aims of the thesis. It examined the effect of corporate ownership 
structure (insider and institutional ownership) on earnings management in the context 
of Jordan. The paper found that institutional ownership and earnings management were 
positively associated. Furthermore, the paper found that insider ownership had no 
effect on earnings management in the Jordanian industrial sector. The reason may be 
due to the Jordanian Securities Law being enacted creating several rules and 
restrictions to control insider trading; an ethical basis and an economic rationale. On 
the other hand, these laws eased restrictions on investors and outside ownership 
(Malkawi & Haloush 2007). This may explain why the insider ownership-earnings 
management relationship was insignificant, and the outsider ownership-earnings 
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management relationship was positively significant. Furthermore, in a specific 
economic environment, different ownership (diffused or concentrated) and types of 
shareholders (stable shareholders or market investors) (Hu & Izumida 2008), may 
determine whether the ownership-earnings management relation is positive, negative 
or insignificant. This implied that the theoretical implication of this study did not reject 
the perspective of agency theory about ownership structure, as the impact of ownership 
structure depended on the economic environment. Another monitoring mechanism, 
that is, audit committee, has been investigated in the second paper. 
The second paper addressed the third aim of the thesis. It examined the effect 
of internal audit committees on earnings management in the context of Jordan. The 
paper found that audit committees and earnings management were negatively but 
insignificantly related to the Jordanian industrial sector. This result may be because 
the current study has taken into consideration only the existence of audit committee 
without considering the audit committee’s characteristics (e.g. qualified; audit 
committee independence; a high level of audit committee expertise; frequent meetings; 
and size of audit committee). This result has suggested that future studies within the 
Jordanian industrial sector should give more attention to the characteristics of audit 
committee. This implied that the existence of a suitably qualified audit committee 
would improve the efficiency of monitoring system, improve the quality of the 
financial reports, and reduce earnings management, as mere existence of audit 
committee is not enough to improve the efficiency of monitoring process. Other than 
corporate governance mechanisms (insider ownership, institutional ownership, and 
audit committees) that have been examined in this thesis, other factors may have an 
impact on earnings management practices, such as CSR which has been investigated 
in the third paper. 
The third paper addressed the fourth aim of the thesis. It examined the effect 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting on earnings management within the 
Jordanian context. The paper found that CSR and earnings management are negatively 
associated. Furthermore, the firms that provided higher levels of CSR reporting had 
lower levels of engagement in earnings management. This may be due to several 
factors: the CSR reporting is considered in many cases as a regulatory mechanism that 
results in more efficient use of resources, which then has a negative effect on earnings 
management practices (Gras-Gil et al. 2016); the existence of foreign ownership in the 
companies, as previous studies indicated that the companies with foreign ownership 
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are encouraged to report or disclose CSR more broadly and supported in doing CSR 
(Barkemeyer 2007; Meutia, Mukhtaruddin, Saftiana, & Faisal 2017); or there are other 
reasons that could be considered in future research. These findings implied if CSR 
companies want to maintain their financial performance and handle societies pressures 
to adopt CSR activities, they should be involved in lower earnings management (Chih 
et al. 2008). The theoretical implication of this study does not reject the perspective of 
agency theory about CSR, as firms will adopt an approach or a combination of 
approaches, according to their targets for their respective CSR initiatives, and find an 
economic justification for adopting CSR projects (Boesso et al. 2013). 
This study has made an important contribution to both the research literature 
and corporate governance practice. Firstly: contribution to literature; this study 
facilitates discussion about the link between corporate governance mechanisms, CSR 
disclosures, and earnings management practices. It has clarified the factors which have 
the capacity to affect earnings management, and therefore affect the quality of earnings 
reporting. This study has also added to the literature by investigating the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms and CSR disclosures on earnings management in 
the Jordanian industrial public-sector context during the period of 2006 to 2015, which 
included two periods 2006-2008 (before introducing the corporate governance code) 
and 2009-2015 (after introducing the corporate governance code), whilst other studies 
have taken into consideration only before or after introducing the corporate 
governance code. So, the current study provides an opportunity to compare the results 
of the study before and after the introduction of the corporate governance code. 
Therefore, it provided an analysis of the effectiveness of the code’s introduction. 
Secondly: contribution to practice; this study has provided information for 
supervisory and regulatory authorities about the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms, CSR disclosures, and how they may be used to help avoiding earnings 
management. This study has assisted the users or beneficiaries of financial reports to 
understand earnings management practices and increase their awareness about this 
phenomenon. Thus, it may contribute to improving the corporate governance practices, 
and increasing the reliability and usefulness of financial statements in the Jordanian 
industrial public sector.  
The decision to focus on Jordan was motived by several factors. The dearth of 
the corporate governance mechanisms, CSR, and earnings management research in the 
Jordanian context as a developing country (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010; Abed et al. 2012; 
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Alzoubi 2015); a high rate of failure, and bankruptcy cases in the Jordanian firms 
(Zureigat et al. 2014); the significant financial collapses that have happened in the 
world which had an impact on the Jordanian economy, provide further justification for 
this study. Finally, there has been significant attention paid to consolidating the support 
for corporate governance in Jordan (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010) when the corporate 
governance code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman stock exchange 
(ASE), came into effect on 1 January 2009. For these reasons, Jordan has been selected 
as a case study for this research.  
This study showed that corporate governance mechanisms and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) are important factors that have the capacity to affect earnings 
management, and therefore may improve the quality of earnings reporting. However, 
any study has limitations and this study is not an exception. Firstly, this study focused 
only on the above-mentioned factors on earnings management, so future studies may 
address other influential variables. Secondly, this study only focused on Jordanian 
industrial companies, so future studies may evaluate different sectors, companies or 
countries. Thirdly, this study used the Modified Jones and Modified Jones with ROA 
models - future studies may use different models or the same model to compare the 
findings of this study with their findings. Thus, future research could consider these 
issues as interesting and important lines of investigation.   
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